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In 2007, the government of Rwanda launched a medium-term programme of four years, as stated in its 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS).  A part of this programme is a 
prudent monetary policy which is one of the responsibilities of the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR), 
especially via its role of controlling liquidity in the national economy for ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. The National Bank of Rwanda adjusts base money to ensure that the level of the monetary 
aggregate M2 is consistent with price stability. To effectively implement this monetary policy, two 
conditions are necessarily required: (i) a stable demand function for money; (ii) a stable long-run 
relationship between the money stock and the price level. Using a cointegration analysis we investigated 
the effectiveness of this policy through examining whether these two conditions are fulfilled for the years 
1996:Q1 to 2008:Q3. This study confirmed the stability of the money demand function and found that the 
money stock in the Rwandan economy and prices trend together in the long-run. Thus, targeting the 
monetary aggregate M2 is a good indicator of the price level. Moreover, we found that at a five point six 
per cent (5.6%) significance level, the Rwandan money market needs 3.5 quarters to eliminate a half 
disequilibrium discrepancy in the money demand model. At a six point five per cent (6.5%) significance 
level, the Rwandan money market needs 4.5 quarters to eliminate a half disequilibrium discrepancy in the 
money supply model. Monetary policy implemented by the National Bank of Rwanda remains effective 
as it is still possible to achieve the overall objective of price stability through targeting the monetary 
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 1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme that has the aim of stimulating higher 
economic growth in Rwanda, the government of Rwanda, under pressure from the IMF to focus on price 
stability, made low and stable inflation as the final objective of monetary policy. This study seeks to 
analyse whether price stability adopted in Rwanda from 1998 (CGD, 2007) is still effective as a monetary 
policy framework for the country‘s economic stability. It achieves this by scrutinizing the predictability of 
the relationships between the price level, monetary aggregates (Handa, 2000: 296), the nominal exchange 
rate (Oskooee et al., 1990, Corden, 1984, Mundell, 1963), assessing the state of equilibrium between 
money supply and demand, and analysing whether, in the relationship between the variation in money 
supply and prices, causation runs from money supply to prices as assumed in the quantity theory of 
money (Colander and Gamber, 2002: 185). Achieving a low rate of inflation is the main objective of 
policy under examination by this study, and it is hoped that if such a policy leads to a stable price level, 
this reduces uncertainty in the economy, and promotes the formation of optimal saving and investment, 
which in turn increases output and employment (Handa, 2000: 296). In contrast, with the classical 
theoretical analysis which separates money from real variables, Friedman restates the quantity theory of 
money to limit its main role to that of a theory of the demand for money (Handa, 2000: 42), adding to the 
relationship between money supply and prices the demand for money. Moreover, Hansen and Kim (1995: 
296) argue that a stable money demand function is crucial for the effectiveness of monetary stock 
targeting; otherwise, the monetary authorities cannot target inflation. The stability of the demand function 
for money means a reasonable volatility for the velocity of money (Wallace, 1978: 365), and this requires   
predictability between the demand for money and inflation be feasible to estimate and reliably assess. 
Keynesians and monetarists (Wallace, 1978: 368) agree that stability in money demand is primarily a 
matter of the stability in the velocity of circulation. This study uses the cointegration approach (a recent 
statistical approach to modelling economic time series) (Abadir, 2004, Granger, 2004) to analyse the 
stability of money demand in Rwanda, and the state of equilibria in money demand and supply models. 






The outcome of this study will help improve monetary policy implementation and thus strengthen 
macroeconomic stability in Rwanda. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem, background and motivation for the study  
 
An important question for the formulation and conduct of monetary policy by a central bank concerns the 
appropriate variables on which it can focus as indicators of the need for such a policy (Handa, 2000: 285).  
Investigating monetary policy in Rwanda, Sayinzoga and Simson (2006) and Rusuhuzwa et al., (2006) 
confirm a stable money demand function. This study examines whether the excess quantity of money 
supply causes inflation in Rwanda and confirms this. Therefore, the assumption of causation running 
from money supply to prices can be accepted, while the former study proposes the inverse. The former 
study covers the first quarter of 1980 until the fourth quarter of 2000 and the latter considers the first 
quarter of 1995 up to the fourth quarter of 2006. Rwanda has recently experienced economic and financial 
events which motivate us to investigate their effects on current monetary policy in Rwanda. These events 
are: (i) in 2006, Rwanda (AFDB, 2007), became eligible for benefiting from the initiatives of HIPC 
(Highly Indebted Poor Countries) and MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives). These initiatives led to 
a reduction of debt firstly by 76.6 million US dollars and later a reduction of more than a billion dollars; 
(ii) in January 2008, the National Bank of Rwanda (Kanimba, 2008(a): 3) recommended, in conformity 
with the law, that the commercial banks increase their registered capital of shareholders from 1.5 billion 
Rwandan francs (2.7 million US dollars)  up to a minimum of 5 billion Rwandan francs (9 million US 
dollars); (iii) in January 2007, foreign direct investment in Rwanda as well as the acquisition of Rwandan 
transferable assets by non-resident foreigners was fully liberalised. Non-residents are allowed to invest in 
government securities and financial resident savings institutions can invest in securities abroad (NBR, 
2007); (iv) the exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against major international currencies maintained the 
same trend that had started at the beginning of the year 2004, with a slight but continuous appreciation of 
the Rwandan franc against the US dollar (Kanimba, 2008(a): 4).  The appropriateness of any variable as 
an indicator of the need for monetary policy depends upon the structure of the economy (Handa, 200: 
285). Therefore, these financial and economic events experienced in Rwanda could affect the existing 
structure of the Rwandan economy and result in the existing monetary policy being more or less effective 
for economic stabilisation. Others claim one cannot comment about the effectiveness of policy before 







Using data collected at the National Bank of Rwanda from the first quarter of 1996 to the third quarter of 
2008, we reinvestigate the stability of the money demand function and price stability effectiveness. Given 
some insights into inflation in Rwanda, it would not be wise to establish the causes of inflation before 
updating research in this area, as some, such as Levacic (1978: 250), see inflation being the outcome of 
the reactions in one sector of the economy to events occurring in other sectors. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that the period of this study is characterised by important inflows of foreign reserves to Rwanda 
and when this is the case Obstfeld (2002) proposes that the optimal monetary policy is inflation targeting 
of domestic prices and allowing the exchange rate to adjust residually. Chang and Velasco (2000) and 
Eichengreen et al., (1999) share the same view.  
 
Considering the United States as an example, we rate that over the past ten years there has been almost no 
connection between money growth and inflation, and predictions of inflation based on money growth 
have been wrong (Colander and Gamber, 2002). This phenomenon has also been seen in other countries 
with highly developed financial markets like the UK, Canada, and New Zealand which are currently using 
interest rates as an intermediate variable to target inflation; but developing countries with undeveloped 
financial markets have shown a stable relationship and some of them are still using monetary aggregates 
as a guide for targeting inflation. However, in developing countries sometimes economic structures are 
sensitive to unexpected changes in the velocity of money, political crises and other shocks (Wallace, 
1978) which could make for an unstable relationship between money growth and inflation. Therefore, the 
prediction of inflation based on money growth may not always be correct. In addition, much research 
confirms that inflation targeting effectiveness is required for any economic stabilisation programme to 
work. An example is Kohn (2004) and Amato et al., (2002), who show that the essential elements of 
inflation targeting are the announcement of a numerical inflation objective with a clear desire on the part 
of the central bank and the government to achieve this objective. Via such a process, the central bank 
actively adjusts its instruments whenever it comes to believe that future inflation might deviate from the 
target assigned.  
 
In contrast, Neumann and Hagen (2002) argue that despite a lot of effort, empirical studies have 
consistently failed to show convincingly that inflation targeting has been an important factor in achieving 
lower inflation rates, lowering the cost of disinflation, or raising the credibility of the central bank‘s 
commitment to lower inflation.  With reference to the Lucas supply function (Handa, 2000), it is worth 
recalling that when expected inflation is greater than actual inflation, the output supplied in the economy 
is affected negatively. The inflation targeting framework has been used exclusively in industrial countries 






like Chile, Israel, the Czech Republic, Korea, Poland, Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa adopted this 
policy (IMF, 2006). According to Nassar (2005), developing countries with undeveloped financial 
markets generally rely on the existence of a stable money demand function for the formulation and 
conduct of efficient monetary policy. In fact, Lee et al., (2008) and Hacker and Hatemj, (2005) deem that 
monetary policy only has a role to play in macroeconomic stabilisation if the money demand function is 
stable. Indeed, the following paragraphs of this chapter emphasize the stability of the demand function for 
money as highlighted by others (Mehra, 1993). In African countries, the finding confirming the stability 
of demand function for money is observed often. For example, in Madagascar, Nassar (2005) estimates 
the relationship between prices, money, and the exchange rate and finds a stable long-run relationship 
among a monetary aggregate, domestic prices, real income, and foreign interest rates. His error correction 
model shows that changes in the monetary aggregates, the exchange rate, and foreign interest rates exert a 
significant impact on inflation. In Nigeria, Kabir et al., (1995) conclude that any depreciation in black 
market exchange rates exerts a significant negative impact on the domestic demand for money. Before 
concluding, we must recall from history that the point of view among economists about inflation and 
economic stabilisation depends upon that period‘s dominant ideas. Considering, for example, the 
stabilisation of real variables, Keynesians agree with the idea of a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, while modern classical and monetarists argue that only an apparent trade-off exists in the 
short-run when there is a divergence between actual inflation and expected inflation (Delorme and 
Ekelund, 1983). On theoretical and empirical grounds, both classical and the Keynesian‘s ideas, and 
Nassar‘s, (2005) IMF working paper on money demand and inflation in Madagascar, inspire this study.  
 
1.3 Key questions and research hypotheses 
 
From 1998, Rwanda adopted price stability as the goal for economic stabilisation (IMF, 1998: 7). The 
National Bank of Rwanda utilizes the M2 monetary aggregate (NBR, 2003: 30-31) as a guide variable for 
price stability and the monetary base (currency plus reserves) is considered the operating target (NBR, 
2003: 33). From 2004 to 2008, net external reserves had increased (Kanimba, 2008(a): 4). Therefore, the 
exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against major international currencies maintained a trend of a slight 
but continuous appreciation of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar. In 2006, Rwanda benefited from 
a reduction of debt due to activities of the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank 
(AFDB, 2007). In January 2008, the National Bank of Rwanda recommended that the commercial banks 
increase their registered capital (Kanimba, 2008(a): 3). These changes in Rwandan economic structures 







(i) Is the stability of money demand in Rwanda, as confirmed by previous researchers, still valid 
given the recent structural changes in the Rwandan economy?  
(ii) Do equilibria exist in money demand and supply models and does the money stock indicate 
the price level? 
(iii) Is money demand sensitive to exchange rate changes? 
 
Based on these questions, our research will seek to confirm the following hypotheses: 
       
(i) The demand function for money in Rwanda is still stable given the recent changes in the 
Rwandan economic structure. We confirm this in section (6.5.2) and thus we answer the 
research question (i) in the affirmative. 
 
(ii) Equilibria exist in money demand and supply models and the money stock indicates the 
price level. We show such equilibria in section (6.6.1) and answer ―yes‖ to research 
question (ii). We confirm in section (6.5.4) a long-run relationship between money stock 
and the price level. 
 
(iii) Money demand is sensitive to exchange rate changes. We cannot confirm this on the basis 
of our sample. 
 
 1.4 Objectives and chapters’ outlines 
 
 
In Rwanda, the NBR sets base money as an operating target with the intention of achieving the 
intermediate target for monetary aggregate M2, consistent with price stability which is the final objective 
of monetary policy. To attain the final objective of price stability, two requirements are necessary: (i) a 
stable demand function for money and (ii) a stable long-run relationship between the money stock and the 
price level (Hansen and Kim, 1995: 286). The overall objective of this study is to investigate whether 
these two necessary conditions still hold after recent structural changes in the Rwandan economy, 
highlighted in sections (1.2) and (1.3) above, since the appropriateness of a variable as an indicator of the 







 In order to achieve this objective the thesis adopts the following structure. Chapter two provides the 
specification of the money demand function emphasizing the role of real income, an interest rate, and the 
exchange rate (Handa, 2000: 40). Chapter three provides an overview of the theory of monetary policy 
and inflation. Chapter four reviews the Rwandan monetary policy framework based on a medium-term 
economic programme as stated in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(MINECOFIN, 2007). Chapter five summarizes the statistical estimation methodology and model 
specification we use. Chapter six proceeds to estimate the models plus present and discuss the statistical 
results. We conclude in chapter seven by summarizing the main empirical results as well as their policy 
implications.  
 
1.5 A brief presentation of the main empirical results 
 
Five years ago, Sayinzoga (2005) showed that the Rwandan money market needs over five quarters to 
eliminate half of the disequilibrium discrepancy as the error correction coefficient was -12 % per quarter. 
Currently, this situation has improved positively as the empirical results presented in chapter six (section 
6.6.1) proved the error correction coefficients equal to -21.5 % per quarter for money demand model and 
equal to -12 % per quarter for money supply model. At a five per cent (5%) significance level these 
coefficients are not statistically significant. From a macroeconomic perspective, this is good because we 
see that in these circumstances, the impact of a monetary policy change in the Rwandan money market to 
be immediate. This means that indirect monetary instruments (open-market operations, discount window 
facilities, and reserve ratio requirements) covered in detail in chapter four (section 4.3), properly serve the 
National Bank of Rwanda to match the national liquidity with economic activities.   In addition to the 
empirical results obtained at a five per cent (5%) significance level, it is important to verify how the 
change of the probability of the sample error (p-value) can affect them. We found that at a five point six 
per cent (5.6%) significance level, the Rwandan money market needs 3.5 quarters to eliminate a half 
disequilibrium discrepancy in the money demand model. At a six point five per cent (6.5%) significance 
level, the Rwandan money market needs 4.5 quarters to eliminate a half disequilibrium discrepancy in the 
money supply model. We see that the error correction coefficient of the money demand model has 
increased (in absolute value) about 10 % compared to its status five years ago (see table 1.1 below) and 
this means an improvement in the ability of monetary policy to affect the Rwandan money markets when 








Table 1. 1 Comparison of the error correction coefficients of money demand models in Rwanda  
                                                      Study done in  2005                                                        study done in 2010                                                       
Error correction coefficient          -12% per quarter                                                                -21.5% per quarter 
Hypothesis (t- test)                     
O
H : error correction coefficient=0                                   
O
H : error correction coefficient=0                  
t-test.statistic (calculated)           -2.41                                                                                       -1.64084 
t-critical.value at 5%                                                                                                                  -1.68 
t-critical.value at 5.6 %                                                                                                              -1.633 
 
1.6 Rwanda’s macroeconomic context: a brief review 
  
 
Rwanda is located in East Africa. Its neighbouring countries are Tanzania to the east, Burundi to the 
south, Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Uganda to the north. Rwanda has put considerable 
effort into its rehabilitation and promoted reconciliation amongst its citizens after experiencing a very sad 
history of genocide that occurred in 1994. The economy of Rwanda has been mostly characterised by 
internal (budget deficit) and external (balance of payments) macroeconomic disequilibria. In addition, 
Rwanda‘s exports are composed mainly of tea and coffee, whose prices are subject to fluctuations on the 
international market and have not been able to cover import needs (MINECOFIN, 2007).  
 
In 2007, the government of Rwanda launched a medium-term programme (four years), as stated in the 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), with the aim of enhancing public 
investment that can serve as an engine for private investment (MINECOFIN, 2007). This economic 
programme is supported by the IMF under a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme. The 
IMF‘s mission in Rwanda is to assess how well the Rwandan government implements this programme 
(IMF, 2009). Rwanda has sustained strong economic growth over the last decade, but the country is still 
very poor. Sound macroeconomic and structural policies backed by substantial donor assistance have 














―It is perhaps an overstatement to suggest that no single issue has been the concern of more economists 
than examining both the theoretical and empirical analysis underpinning the demand for money‖ 
(Schmidt, 2008). Some economists like Mankiw (2007) and Wallace (1978) define the demand for money 
as the relationship between the quantity of money that people wish to hold and the variables which 
determine that quantity. Delorme and Ekelund (1983) and Sánchez-Fung (2008) consider the demand for 
money as the key element which policy-makers emphasise for formulating and conducting a sound 
monetary policy. Indeed, money fulfils many functions in the economy, serving as a medium of 
exchange, acting as a store of wealth, being the unit of account and the standard of differed payment 
(Wallace, 1978). The definitions of money based on these functions are reasonable, given that no unique 
definition of money has been agreed upon since the gold standard system (Evans et al., 2008). Even fiat 
money has problems of definition as payments technology changes. Like Keynes, Friedman reiterates that 
money balances cannot be separated from the role they perform, and it may be each Rand held performs 
many functions (Handa, 2000: 44). Economic theories analysing the determinants of the demand function 
for money vary from the classical economists‘ views, through to Keynes and then monetarists, to the 
modern treatment of the demand for money analysis carried out by post-Keynesians (Tobin and Baumol) 
and new-classical economists.  
 
Section (2.2) covers the evolution of economic theories about the demand for money starting with the 
traditional classical economist‘s ideas such as Fisher (1911) who sums up the role of money via the 
concept of the quantity theory of money ultimately underpinning a theory of the price level (Wallace 
(1978) and Handa (2000)). Section (2.2.1) continues with the ideas of Marshall (1923) and Pigou (1917) 
emphasising  the desire of people to hold a definite quantity of cash balances known as the Cambridge 
approach to the quantity theory of money, from which we derive a preliminary demand function for 
money. Further, section (2.2.2) briefly explains Keynes‘ (1936) theories evocating the desire for 
individuals to hold cash balances summarised in the three ways which are known as the transaction‘s, 
precautionary and speculative motive. Keynes‘ ideas brought a new concept in the demand for money 






precautionary motives are virtually addressed in the Cambridge approach of Pigou (1917) and Fisher 
(1911), when they examine the role of money as a medium of exchange. Keynes summarises speculative 
motives as a liquidity preference concept and considers money as an asset competing with other financial 
assets (especially bonds in Keynes‘ analysis) in the economic agent‘s portfolio. Moreover, section (2.2.2) 
provides theoretical refinements of the demand for money analysis which are closer in spirit to 
microeconomics initiated by Tobin (1956) and Baumol (1952).  
 
Furthermore, section (2.2.3) introduces the monetarists and especially Friedman‘s conceptual demand for 
money, and concerns the factors that determine how much money people wish to hold in their portfolios 
under various economic states (Delorme and Ekelund, 1983, Wallace, 1978). Apart from Friedman 
treating the demand for money as a demand like any other durable good, he introduces the tastes and 
preferences of the wealth holder (Delorme and Ekelund, 1983). The orthodox analysis addressed by 
classical economists and Keynes is essentially macroeconomic in character and must be considered in the 
context of the overall economy (Wallace, 1978). Handa‘s (2000) Warlasian analysis is covered in section 
(2.2.4).  
 
Taking into account the rationality of economic agents when analysing the demand function for real 
money balances, enhances the quality of its specification and improves, therefore, the precision in the 
predictability, for decision makers, of money balances that individuals would like to hold in the overall 
economy. Hence, the monetary authorities obtain a reasonable picture of the quantity of money to inject 
into the economy as production grows and aids them in maintaining economic stability. Nevertheless, 
new-classical economists such as Lucas (1972) and Sargent et al., (1975: 9) argue that systematic 
monetary policy cannot affect real income. Their view is that monetary policy cannot change real income 
and the unemployment level because producers systematically increase prices by the expected level of 
inflation prior to the introduction of the policy changes. Contemporary macroeconomic theorists reiterate 
the critical role of money demand and money supply for predicting and analysing the trend of real 
variables and price changes in the overall economy (Delorme and Ekelund, 1983). In this way, Dreger et 
al., (2009) confirm that the vulnerability of the link between money balances and the macroeconomy 
causes an inability to predict monetary aggregates by the central bank. Section (2.3) briefly reviews the 
economic theories underlying the specification of the empirical econometric model we use in this thesis 







2.2   Evolution of money demand economic theories: 
 
 
2.2.1 Classical economists’ quantity theory of money and cash balance approach  
  
Friedman (1991: 2) considers the concept of the quantity theory of money as the relation between the 
quantity of money in the economy and prices. According to Friedman, the quantity theory is one of the 
oldest in economics. Examining how the preliminary simple form of the demand function for money is 
derived from the concept of the quantitative theory of money, Handa (2000) evocates the traditional 
classical economist‘s idea about expenditures carried out by economic agents in the overall economy. He 
elucidates in a mathematical identity that PY≡MV (2.1) as being the total value of expenditure, (PY) 
which is identical to the amount of money used (M), multiplied by the number of times it has been used 
over and over (V). The average rate of turnover (V) is known as the velocity of money income and is a 
function of the density of the population, their payment habits and technical conditions available to banks 
and individuals. However, neither the quantity of money in the overall economy nor the price level can 
affect that rate of turnover, and therefore V is often assumed to be constant.  
 
Further, Pigou (1917) and Marshall (1923) progress from the exchange equation (2.1) attributable to 
Fisher (1911) to the version known as the Cambridge approach for explaining cash balances. It is worth 
recalling that it is the Cambridge approach that provides the preliminary function of the demand for 
money as M=kPY (2.2) (where M: money stock in the overall economy, Y: real income, P: the price 
level; k: the proportion of the nominal income held as cash balances), which is improved by economists 
like Keynesians, monetarists, Tobin, Baumol and many others. In addition to Fisher‘s exchange equation, 
Pigou and Marshall, adherents of the Cambridge School, emphasise the fraction of total expenditure that 
people wish to hold in the form of money. From their perspective, equation (2.2), known as the quantity 
theory of money, embodies the behaviour of economic agents through the parameter k which captures an 
economic agent‘s decision to hold cash balances. As such, equation (2.2) represents a demand function 
for money (Ritter et al., 2004). 
 
After establishing the relationship between the quantity of money that people would like to hold as a 
fraction of their expenditures and its determinants, economists strive to identify a reasonable justification 
for their formulation and provide comment about it. In this way, Pigou (1917) points out that unforeseen 
future circumstances (security, increase of prices and other factors) motivates people into keeping ―k.‖ 
Handa (2000: 31) captures this idea in mathematical form by M
d
/Y=k (r) (2.3) with k‘ (r) <0, and k‘(r) is 






investment and an approximate measure for satisfaction from forgone consumption. (M
d
) and (Y) 
represent, respectively, the ratio of money balances demanded and total expenditures. For Marshall (1926: 
75) this relationship is possibly stable over the long-run, but it might fluctuate in the short-run as the 
result of adjustments depending on the behaviour of the economic agents.  
 
In fact, Wallace (1978: 320) suggests these adjustments originate from psychological reasons. Indeed, 
Mankiw (2007:86) says that the tendency for ―k‖ being large will influence money income to change 
infrequently between economic agents. This clearly means the velocity of money income need not be 
constant as assumed by traditional classical economists.  
 
According to Handa (2000), the orthodox classical economists‘ thinking could be broadly analysed with 
two components in models of monetary economics. One strand embodies the quantity theory of money 
for the determination of prices and the other emphasises the determination of an interest rate from the 
loanable funds theory. For the second component, Wicksell (1898) advises the monetary authority to 
create additional money for keeping actual rates steady in the face of a real shock that raises the natural 
rate above the market rate as viewed by economic agents (lenders and borrowers) on the basis of their 
expectations. In this thesis, we use the former model; the quantity theory provides a theory of price 
determination (because it forms the basis of the ideas we analyse in this thesis) as initiated by the classical 
economists and improved upon by Keynesians, monetarists and modern economists in their analysis of 
the demand for money.   
 
One of the common perceptions of the classical economists‘ theory of money relies on economic 
activities being consistent with the full employment equilibrium level (a situation where the labour market 
clears). Recalling that at this level, real income Y is assumed fixed (because all resources are used 
optimally) and from the assumption of a constant velocity examined in the preceding paragraphs, and also 
based on the quantity theory relation, one can support the proportionality idea as summarised by Ritter et 
al., (2004). This is the notion that a change in the money supply produces a proportionate change in the 
price level. Hence, the quantity theory of money concept is considered a theory of price determination. 
Many others economists and researchers agree with this idea, for example Colander and Gamber (2002), 
Handa (2000), Mankiw (2007) and many others.  
 
In summary, it is worth recalling the main outcomes from the classical analysis surrounding money 
demand theories: these are:  (i) M=kPY (2.4): This equation, known as the Cambridge version of the 






money demand function; (ii) The velocity of money is assumed constant and real income is fixed at its full 
employment level; therefore a change in the money supply leads to a proportionate change in price level; 
hence the neutrality of money (all changes in the money supply do not affect the real value of all variables 
in the economy) and this separation of prices from values is the essence of the so-called classical 
dichotomy where the real values of the endogenous variables in the economy are independent of the 
nominal money supply and the price level.  
 
2.2.2   Review of Keynesian and Post-Keynesian demand for money theories  
 
 
Demand for money theories have evolved parallel to economic thought on other matters. Indeed Keynes 
(1936) questions, from the quantity theory (in its Cambridge school version), which is based on the 
assumption of an unchanged level of output and argues that changes in money supply can cause changes 
in output and employment. The Keynesian doctrine agrees with the passive movement of velocity as 
highlighted by Friedman (1991: 10), explaining that the rise in money implies a decline in velocity and 
vice versa. Therefore, Delorme and Ekelund, (1983: 136) conclude that the relationship between the 
money supply and the price level is rather indirect than direct as classical economists stipulate.  In 
Keynesian thinking, it is practically impossible for an economy to be in full employment equilibrium. 
Keynes deems that even if this happens, this state could only exist for a very short time and any deviation 
from full employment can take longer (or never return) to that equilibrium level consistent with full 
employment. Handa (2000: 18) justifies Keynesian thinking using the concept of involuntary 
unemployment and price stickiness (hesitation on the part of businesses to raise prices because of the high 
cost incurred in communicating new prices to customers) both of which are encountered frequently in any 
economic agent‘s life.  
 
In the controversy over the analysis of the classical economist‘s dichotomy, Keynes (1936) endeavours to 
integrate the money supply transmission mechanisms with the chain of causation running from the money 
supply to real output with a value theory explained by changes in real output and prices. Further, Maxwell 
(1995) highlights the importance of considering explicitly the existence of the opportunity cost of holding 
money balances advocated in the main by Keynes under the concept of liquidity preference. In fact, as 
Handa (2000) defines the demand for money balances as the desire of economic agents to hold a certain 
level of the stock of money and that individuals incur the inherent cost of holding money; it seems 
reasonable to consider the yields on assets that substitute for money when analysing the determinants of 







In this way, when trying to motivate a demand function for money, Keynes (1936) identifies three basic 
reasons for pushing economic agents towards holding money balances. They hold transaction balances in 
order to bridge the gap between planned receipts and expenditures; they keep precautionary balances to 
meet unforeseen contingencies. Finally, they may hold speculative balances if they expect the market 
value of alternative assets to fall. 
 
 
2.2.2.1   The transactions demand for money 
 
 
When analysing the factors that motivate people to hold cash balances, Keynes (1936) views the 
transaction motive as the need for holding cash balances to pay for current transactions of personal and 
business exchanges. In this way, Handa (2000: 36) reiterates Keynes‘ ideas; Wallace (1978: 324) relates 
this motive for holding money balances to day-to-day economic dealings; and Delorme and Ekelund 
(1983: 103) reaffirm these ideas. 
 
Considering economic agents as an example of households and businesses, Handa (2000) separates their 
transaction motives into an income-motive category and receipts from sales category, permitting them to 
maintain compulsory payments until the receipt of further income.  Keynes (1936) encloses transaction 




(Y) (2.5); (where M
tr
: represents the 
amount of money held for transaction motives; Y: total value of the transaction) and Keynes (op.cit) 
supposes that the amount is not very sensitive to changes in the rate of interest and these balances increase 
in the same direction as the volume of transactions. In the same way, Ritter et al., (2004: 473) bypass this 
idea, and argue that an increase in GDP leads to an increase in the amount of money demanded because 
people hold more cash to carry out the higher level of transactions.  
 
Further, Wallace (1978: 324) shows the relationship between the frequency in receiving income and 
money balances that people and business firms wish to hold to satisfy transaction motives. According to 
him, the more frequent the pay period, the smaller could be the proportion of an individual‘s annual 








2.2.2.1(a)   Inventory analysis of the transactions demand for money 
 
 
Handa (2000: 86) highlights the overriding input of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) as enhancing 
Keynes‘ analysis of the transaction demand for money balances. With reference to Baumol (1952) and 
Tobin‘s (1956) analysis, Delorme and Ekelund (1983: 117) agree the lack of a relationship between 
transactions demand and an interest rate is problematic. 
 
Clarifying this lack of dependence, Baumol (1952) bases his analysis on several assumptions and we 
emphasise some of them in the following discussion. Baumol, assumes for example, that money balances 
held do not pay interest and bonds or saving accounts do and the individual intends to convert his bonds 
into cash in lots of W spaced evenly through the period (see figure 2.1 and 2.2 below). From the fact that 
each maximum amount withdrawn (W) is spaced equally (Patinkin, 1965), it seems reasonable to assume 
that 1/2W=Mtr (2.6). Baumol also suggests that economic agents incur costs when converting bonds into 
cash balances. Further, there is no uncertainty in the timing or amount of the individual‘s receipts and 
expenditures. For the following analysis let W stand for the amount converted into cash balances as 
Baumol (1952) does. The fixed cost is (B0) and variable costs (B1). Therefore, the overall cost per 




W).   
  
 
In fact, in financing the total expenditure Y, economic agents incur opportunity costs given that they 
could use that amount either as a capital investment or place it in, say, a savings account.  Handa (2000) 




Y    (2.7) where: W/2 =M is 
the average money balances based on the withdrawal, Y is the amount of the total expenditures, B
0
: is a 
fixed brokerage cost per withdrawal, B
1
: variable brokerage cost per withdrawal, and r is the rate of 
interest paid from the saving account. Now we need to find the optimal W rather than the maximum W.      
 
Considering the economic agent as acting rationally and hence minimising the cost of holding transaction 







    
and solving the equation (2.8) for (W ) we get W = ( 2 Y
0
B / r )1/2       (2.9)  
 
Replacing (W) by (2Mtr) in equation (2.9), as is assumed in equation (2.6), where W/2= Mtr and solving 
equation (2.9) for Mtr, the transaction‘s demand function for money with an interest rate and income 





-1/2                
(2.10) 
 















Figure 2.1: Conversion of financial assets (bond or savings) into cash balances (Source: Handa (2000: 
88).  
 
In figure 2.1, we show the problem with the interval between conversions arbitrarily set at unity. The cost 
minimising problem is to find the optimal time interval between conversions. Equations (2.10) is the 
money demand consistent with the vertical distance not set at Y but at the optimal Y, say Y*. 
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Figure 2.2: Conversion of financial assets (bond or savings) into cash balances (optimal interval=0.25).  
Source: Handa (2000: 88).  
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the amounts withdrawn (W) where for arguments sake the optimal interval (a 
fraction) is 0.25 giving the ‗saw-tooth‘ diagram permitting the economic agent to finance the total 
expenditure Y during the given period.  
 
In line with this model of Baumol (1952), Delorme and Ekelund (1983: 117) advocate a negative 
relationship between the transaction‘s demand for money and the interest rate and a positive one with 
respect to income. According to them, the awareness of this relationship is important for policy makers 
involved in controlling the money supply given that any effect on the interest rate may affect the 
transactions demand for money.  
 
2.2.2.2   The precautionary demand for money 
 
 
In the life of an economic agent, unforeseen contingencies can happen frequently. Ritter et al., (2004) 
supports this view, explaining the precautionary motive as being the desire for security, leading people to 
hold money balances equivalent to a certain proportion of their total resources. 
 
In the same way, Sriram (1999: 12) highlights the uncertainty of future income and consumption needs, as  






agents strive to formulate subjective expectations as to probable dates of the receipt of income and likely 
payments to be made. 
 
Further, it is worth recalling that the optimality issue must always guide the rational economic agent‘s 
expectations about receiving income and payments to be made in the near future. Shedding light on this 
issue, Wallace (1978) suggests a negative relationship between the yields from investments and the 
precautionary demand for money balances. In addition, Delorme and Ekelund (1983: 105) and Laidler 
(1977) deem the precautionary demand for money to vary positively with the income of the economic 
agent when they argue that, as the income of the economic agent increases, they are able to hold more 
money to meet their precautionary needs.  
 
2.2.2.2 (a)   Precautionary demand for money and uncertainty  
 
 
The uncertainty underlying the precautionary demand for money balances is a particular concern of 
economists. Based on this concern, Handa (2000) draws attention to the costs incurred by economic 
agents when responding to future needs through precautionary savings influenced in part by the financial 
and economic circumstances and personal tastes for risk. Further, assume the yield on portfolio assets is 
known, and capturing uncertainty of income via a mean and variance in the same period and drawing each 





(b ,r ,µy, σy)    (2.11), where m
prd
: precautionary demand for money, b: real brokerage cost, r: an 
interest rate, µy: the expected value of income and σy is the standard deviation of income.  
 
Under uncertainty, the economic environment and personal attitude towards risk plays a significant role in 
the determination of precautionary demand. As such, the precautionary demand function for money 
becomes: m
prd
=m(b, r, µy, σy, ρ, Ω)    (2.12) where ρ measures risk aversion, Ω indicates substitutes for 






2.2.2.2 (b) The precautionary demand function as an extension of the transactions demand 
model  
 
The extension of the transactions demand from Baumol‘s (1952) analysis to the precautionary demand for 
money balances is based on Whallen (1966), where a penalty cost is included as an additional cost to 
consider over and above brokerage and interest costs. This penalty is incurred when economic agents 
postpone payment to another date or order the bank to convert bonds into cash balances at short notice. 
As such, the total cost function incurred by an economic agent is C=rM+B0Y/W+βp (N>M)   (2.13) , 
where C: the nominal cost of holding precautionary (including transactions) balances, M: money balances 
held, B0: the nominal brokerage cost per withdrawal, Y: total (uncertain) nominal income/expenditures, 
W: amount converted each time from interest bearing bonds, N: net payments (expenditure less receipts), 
p (N>M) : probability of N>M, β: nominal penalty cost of a shortfall in money balances (Handa, 2000: 
131). 
 
As we saw in our previous discussion (section 2.2.2.2) of the precautionary demand for money, we are 
now dealing with an economic agent who strives to minimise his total opportunity costs function from 
holding cash balances, allowing him to postpone payments or ordering his bank to convert bonds into 
cash balances for meeting unforeseen contingencies at very short notice but with penalty. In this context, 
the additional costs of a shortfall in money balances emphasises these penalty costs and they increase the 
existing brokerage and interest costs.     
 
To continue the analysis, we rely on Handa (2000) who assumes that the economic agent holds 
precautionary money balances M=kσN (2.13‘), where σN is the standard deviation (this is because these 
payments in the future are not certain) of net payments N, and by Chebyscheff‘s inequality stipulating 
that p (for -kσN >N> kσN) ≤1/k
2 
with k>1. Further, when an economic agent is estimating desired M, 
Handa (2000: 131) supposes this economic agent to be sufficiently risk-averse and consequently the 
decision is determined by the maximum value for the probability that payments can exceed precautionary 
money balances. Therefore, from Chebyscheff‘s inequality p (for -kσN >N> kσN) ≤1/k
2 
we have an 




then by replacing k with M/σN as assumed in equation (2.13‘), we obtain 
p(N >M) =1/ (M/σN)
 2
 (2.14). The aim here is to get a measurable quantity to replace the probability 
expression in the total cost formula and then proceed to the minimisation process. After minimizing, one 


















and as in Baumol‘s (1952) analysis, taking into account the assumption that M=1/2W results in the cost 
equation becoming C=rM+1/2 B0Y/M+βσN
 2
/M
2        
(2.16).  
 
An economic agent minimises the total costs they incur in holding precautionary balances, Handa (2000: 
131) applies the usual method of taking the partial derivative of equation (2.16) with respect to M. It is 
worth recalling that we are dealing with uncertainty as regards income and payments and this justifies 
why the total cost function C (2.16) has the variables Y and M rather than just Y as in Baumol‘s (1952) 














Multiplying equation (2.17) by M
3
 and assuming that the brokerage cost B0 is zero (for simplicity) and 


















income and payments, and not necessarily on the level of income itself. To get the familiar function 
embodying the level of income as one of the determinants of money demand, Handa (2000: 132), assumes 
a normal distribution of net payments, and argues that the variance of receipts and payments could 
increase proportionately with Y
2






α stands as a constant 






in equation (2.18) we
 
get our familiar (but now embodying the level of income and payments) formula of the precautionary 







2/3   
(2.19). Notice the income elasticity is now closer to the 
















































2.2.2.2 (c) Precautionary demand for money with overdraft 
 
 
As we mentioned in section (2.2.2.2 (a)), the financial and economic environment significantly influences 
the precautionary demand for money balances. For this reason, economists scrutinising the determinants 
of the precautionary demand for money take into consideration aspects of the financial and economic 
environment in the analysis. This includes the evolution of technology leading to the use of credit cards 
and quality increases in services provided by banks to customers such as getting an overdraft easily and 
quickly. In this way, Handa (2000) formulates from Sprenkle and Miller‘s (1980) analysis, the total cost 
incurred by rational economic agents receiving an overdraft from their bank as being: 
 
                                                                                                            (2.20)
 
where A are precautionary balances held at the beginning of the period, Z stands for payments less 
receipts, f(Z) is the probability distribution of Z that Miller and Orr (1966) assume is known to economic 
agents, with f(∞)=0;  r is the interest rate on bonds; ρ is the interest rate charged on an overdraft, (ρ-r) is a 
net loss when using an overdraft assuming ρ>r;  Z is a forecast error with E(Z)=0 so that the payments 
and receipts over the period are equal and this clarifies why we have f(Z=∞)=0. Handa (2000: 134) uses 
equation (2.20) to get total cost incurred by economic agents when holding precautionary money balances 
or obtaining an overdraft from a bank or when economic agents use a combination of the two options. 
Dornbusch and Fisher (1990) support this idea as they stipulate that economic agents optimise this sum of 
cash balances by carefully weighing the interest costs against the advantages of not being caught illiquid. 
Familiar from sections 2.2.2.1(a) and 2.2.2.2(b) is the procedure for optimising the total cost incurred by 
an economic agent so as to obtain the determinants of the demand for money. Handa (2000: 134) 




  shows the 
probable case of covering total payments using only precautionary balances with an initial amount being 




  illustrates that payments can exceed the 
precautionary balances and the economic agent must consequently take an overdraft from the bank to 
make these extra payments. The following paragraph highlights the steps undertaken for determining the 














By setting up the derivative of the total cost C (equation 2.20) with respect to the initial amount A (to 
hold), we have:  
 
            
 
 










dCr   
 It is worth noting that we get zero when taking the derivative in equation )''20.2( with respect to A for 
the second term and the third term because they are considered as constants as they do not contain A. For 
the first term and the last term in equation )''20.2( , the variable A disappears after taking the derivative as 
the derivative of A with respect to A is equal to one. Hence, we obtain equation )'''20.2( below: 
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 )'''20.2( . Assuming )(F =1 and )(zF  
Zlim = 0)( F  as A  is the cash balances held at the beginning of the period and in the context of 
need for an overdraft, the minimum value taken by Z (net payments) is zero, hence the cumulative 
probability from Z=0 to Z=   is zero. Also, as it is familiar to us from statistics, when we sum all 
values taken by the probability distribution f (Z) for all possible values assigned to Z (all probable events) 
we get the value one, hence Handa (2000) assumes the same and we get )(F =1.  Therefore, from 




dC  =  )21.2()()(0)( ArFrAFArF    
So that, setting the expression (2.21) equal to zero and solving it for F(A) we get F(A) =  

 r
        
(2.22). Assuming the optimum amount of cash balances held at the beginning of the period is A*, we 
replace A in the equation (2.22) by A* and obtain F (A*) = 

 r
       (2.23). 





















The equation (2.23) can be interpreted as the cumulative probability that the optimal cash to hold is at 
least equal to the need for cash. Intuitively, it is understandable that at the optimum situation (cash held is 
at least equal to the need for cash), precautionary balances will be zero when actual overdrafts are 
positive. Therefore, to obtain the demand function for precautionary money balances from an optimum 








  (2.24). Assuming a normal distribution for Z with zero mean and standard 
deviation σ, we get from Handa (2000:134) the precautionary demand for money equal to M
pr
=A*F (A*) 
+ σf (A*)  (2.25). Replacing the expression for F (A*) from equation (2.23) into equation (2.25) we get  
     AfrAM pr  . Our aim in this chapter two is to gain as much information about 
the determinants of demand for money. For the case examined in this section (2.2.2.2(c)) we have an 
economic agent behaving rationally but also having the possibility of obtaining an overdraft from the 
bank which shows us that as the interest rate on the overdraft ( ) increases, the economic agent holds 




2.2.2.3   Speculative demand for money 
 
 
It is said that the future does not belong to anyone. So, economic agents strive to secure their present and 
future profit by competing with each other in predicting what changes the market holds in store for them. 
Wallace (1978: 325) has this in mind and according to him, the speculative motive is securing profit from 
knowing better than others in the market what future prices are going to be. Under the speculative motive, 
money is required as an asset rather than as a medium of exchange and as such the asset is drawn upon as 
needed at some future date. As such, the speculative motive is connected more to the store of value 
function for money. Economists like Ritter et al., (2004) and Delorme and Ekelund (1983) claim the 
speculative demand is a Keynesian innovation and Keynes (1936) himself in the General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money reveals an overriding concern for holding money balances as an asset 
under the liquidity preference theory. 
 
In order to secure their profits, economic agents regularly ―guess‖ what will happen in the future and their 






political and business climate and the expected response of the central bank to those changes (Delorme 
and Ekelund, 1983). Further, Keynes (1936) posits a simple form of the expectation function relating 
individual anticipations with a decision period which implies an expected price with no variance. 
Therefore, at the beginning of a decision period, economic agents expect a particular rate of interest to 
exist and accordingly they decide to transfer their financial assets into bonds or money.  Handa (2000) 
asserts that, if the expected bond prices plus the accumulated interest is higher than current prices, they 
will place all their funds in bonds rather than in money and vice versa. With Keynes (1936), a particular 
economic agent will hold either bonds or money but not both. As a result, in Keynes‘ analysis, the 
speculative demand for money depends inversely upon the rate of interest and the speculative demand 
function for money can be written as M
sp
 = L(r) (2.26) where M
sp
 stands for speculative demand for 
money, r is the market rate of interest and L represents  the liquidity.  
 
2.2.2.3(a)   Speculative demand for money and the liquidity trap  
 
When economic agents form expectations about future bonds prices and interest rates, Keynes (1936) 
argues that the speculative demand for money becomes infinitely elastic at the rate of interest at which the 
bond market participants prefer holding cash to bonds. Wallace (1978: 339) reiterates that uncertainty 
with respect to the future is the reason justifying why economic agents prefer to hold money rather than 
an income earning asset. Keynes (1936) emphasises that the liquidity trap occurs at the rate of interest at 
which a generally unanimous opinion comes into being that the rate of interest will not fall further but 
may rise. Therefore, the expectations with respect to the future value for an income-earning asset become 
pessimistic as bonds prices are expected to fall. As a result, monetary authorities lose effective control 
over the rate of interest and Maxwell (1995) points out that any attempt by the monetary authority to 
lower interest rates by increasing the money supply fails. 
 
 
2.2.2.3(b)   Speculative demand for money and Portfolio selection  
 
 
In the controversy with Keynes‘ analysis of speculative demand for money over either its bonds or money 
approach, Tobin (1958) shows that a rational economic agent may desire to hold a portfolio of both bonds 
and money (see figure 2.3 below). While Keynes (1936) focuses on the speculator‘s expectations about 






emphasises utility maximisation given the income generated from allocating wealth between bonds and 
cash balances in a portfolio decision.  
   
Further, Tobin (1958) sheds light on portfolio selection optimisation using expected utility. He argues that 
as economic and financial environment changes, an economic agent‘s degree of risk aversion leads him to 
demand a less risky asset and this affects the optimal combination of the less risky assets in the portfolio. 
Handa (2000) advocates this eclectic approach by emphasising the capital loss from any holdings of the 
risky assets whose prices are declining.  
 
Furthermore, Tobin (1958) views money as a riskless asset with a zero rate of return and a terminal value 
of unity and with zero standard deviation. But, he considers bonds as a risky asset with a positive return 
and a positive standard deviation. By terminal value Tobin (1958) means the total value at the end of the 
given period for the bond and is the total of the initial investment plus the income generated during the 
contract period. 
 
In a slight controversy with Tobin (1958), Fisher (1975) deems that the risk aversion behaviour of 
economic agents alone could not be a sufficient reason to justify holding money, because money balances 
are sometime subject to the risk of price level changes, and thus for Fisher the safe asset must be a bond 
indexed to changes in the price level.  
 
Figure 2.3 below illustrates the combination of choices between investing in money or bonds with a slight 
difference in the basic theory because we assume money to have a positive rate of return just for the sake 


















Figure 2.3: Combinations of investing in the money balances or bonds (source: Handa (2000: 112)). 
 
Figure 2.3 presents the expected value µ of terminal wealth on the vertical axis and the standard deviation 
σ of wealth on the horizontal one. It shows that for an economic agent investing all his wealth in money, 
he is at point M and will be only in bonds at point B. Any other choice of a combination of both bonds 
and money is on the segment MB. In the bottom portion of this graph, choose a point on the vertical axis 
as 1. The distance from 0 to any point on the segment 1, is the proportion of wealth invested in bonds. 
The line from the origin down to the point given by (1, σBW) is OX. If for example the individual chooses  
point A, he invests the proportion a of his wealth in bonds and the proportion 1-a in money. As we know 
money has a standard deviation of zero, therefore from the point a to the point 1 means no more 
movement on the horizontal axis. Tobin (1958) thus shows us the possibility of investing simultaneously 
in bonds with a standard deviation σA and in money with no variance. 
 
 
2.2.3 Monetarist’s review of demand for money theories  
 
 
Monetarists, originally labelled the Chicago School, have produced ideas with significant implications for 
the role of money in the economy (Ritter et al., 2004). They adhere to all the beliefs of classical 
economists with slight changes. They illustrate the quantity theory as the relationship between money 
balances and overall economic activity rather than just the relation between money balances and prices. 
Further, they recognise that real output may deviate temporarily from full employment but have the 
invisible hand push the economy towards full employment.  Furthermore, Friedman‘s revival of the 
quantity theory replaced the idea of a stable velocity with at least a predictable velocity where money 








2.2.3.1 Monetarists and Challenges brought to Keynesian approach 
 
Unlike Keynes, Delorme and Ekelund (1983) confirm that Friedman makes no distinction between the 
motives for holding money; rather he takes it for granted that individuals want to hold money. Economists 
like Handa (2000) and Wallace (1978) highlight the criticism by monetarists of the Keynesian‘s 
orthodoxy, where Keynesians stress the concept of cheap money by which rapid expansion of the money 
supply pushes interest rates down and expands investment. In this controversy, monetarists criticise this 
approach, emphasising cheap money‘s consequences, such as the rise and persistence of inflation which 
worsens the economic climate. 
 
In addition Wallace (1978) deals with the fundamental transmission mechanism, distinguishing 
Keynesians‘ and monetarists‘ models. For him, the Keynesian model explains aggregate demand by a 
variety of factors including autonomous shifts in the consumption function of economic agents, increases 
or decreases in investment as a result of varying interest rates, and tax and public expenditure directed by 
public policy measures. In contrast, monetarists deem that what really matters are changes in the quantity 
of money and changes in money supply and these explain changes observed in money income, real output 
(in the short-run), and the price level. In the same way, the empirical study conducted by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) confirms the existence of a direct and causal link between changes in the quantity of 
money and changes in money income.  
 
2.2.3.2 Friedman’s demand for money analysis and the opportunity cost of holding money 
 
In Friedman‘s demand for money analysis, the concern is the factors that determine how much money 
households and businesses want to hold in their portfolios and it is worth recalling that the allocation of 
wealth over different types of assets inherently involves opportunity costs. Based on this, Delorme and 
Ekelund, (1983) stress the rate of interest (i) and the expected rate of change in the price level (∆P/P)
e
 as 
being important opportunity costs in Friedman‘s analysis. As such, a rise in the market interest rate 
implies an increase in the interest income on bonds and an economic agent having wealth in cash balances 
forgoes that income. Thus, the demand for money varies inversely with the market interest rate. Further, if 
the market value of physical or financial assets rises, the real value of money balances is likely to fall. 







2.2.3.3 Permanent income as the scale determinant of money demand 
 
Apart from the determination of the opportunity cost incurred by economic agents in holding money 
balances, Sriram (1999) argues that an awareness of the scale determinant remains important as well, in 
order to get a sound and complete demand function for money from which we can approximate how 
changes in the money supply affect velocity and hence nominal income. Here Handa (2000: 44) helps 
shed light on the link between the supply and demand for money by emphasising Friedman and Keynes‘ 
views stipulating that money balances must not be separated from the function they perform in the 
economy, given that each unit of money balances held performs a variety of functions.  
 
As such, economists like Levacic (1978: 169), Handa (2000), Delorme and Ekelund (1983) stress the 
scale variable in Friedman‘s analysis of demand function for money as being the wealth of economic 
agents and for theoretical reasons, permanent income can proxy wealth. Wealth is defined, in Friedman‘s 
analysis, according to Delorme and Ekelund (1983: 123) as being any asset generating income or services 
and it could be a nonhuman asset including for example bonds, equities, producer and consumer durable 
goods and human assets embracing for instance education, knowledge and skills and the ability to earn 
future income, which in turn could be used to purchase more nonhuman assets.  
 
 
2.2.3.4     Friedman’s demand function for money 
 
In line with Friedman‘s analysis, Handa (2000) and Delorme and Ekelund (1983) lay emphasis on three 
most important features that determine how much real money economic agents would like to hold at any 
given time. Such factors could be: (i) the total wealth in all forms held by the economic agent, (ii) the 
opportunity cost of holding money, and (iii) the tastes and preferences of the wealth-holding unit. 






,P,u) (2.27) where: 
M
d
 is the nominal demand for money, Yp is the permanent income, w is the ratio of nonhuman wealth to 
human wealth, i is the rate of interest, ∆P/P
e
 is the expected rate of change in prices, P is the price level, 
and u is an index representing taste and preferences. Handa (2000) strives to justify the relationship 
between wealth and permanent income as being specified by: y
p
=rw (2.28), where r is the expected 
average long-term interest rate. He emphasises that permanent income y
p
 could be seen as the expected 
average income over a future long period. Concerning the ratio of nonhuman wealth to human wealth, 






wealth to human wealth decreases, there is a larger demand for money to compensate for limited 
marketability of human wealth. Moving to tastes and preferences, Friedman (1969) places more 
emphasises on the disequilibrium between cash balances held by economic agents and the amount that 
they desire to hold. He points out that such a disequilibrium causes portfolio imbalance and the marginal 
utility of holding a unit in cash balances falls below the marginal utility of allocating it to other uses such 
as buying commodities or other financial assets. And the only way to restore equilibrium is to change the 
marginal utility of money by holding more or less of it. 
 
In concluding this part, we would like to recall that the purpose of reviewing the monetarist‘s approach is 
to emphasise the components of a money demand function and consider their input to our empirical 
analysis. Being aware of the variables is relevant to us given that as we proceed with the review of the 
literature we are able to isolate the determinants of money demand function which is the overall objective 







,P,u)(the same equation as equation (2.27) above). 
 
 
2.2.4   The demand function for money derived from utility and production functions  
 
Theories underlying the demand function for money have clearly attracted economists, independent 
researchers and other academic fields presumably because of their important role in formulating and 
conducting sound monetary policy. Handa (2000) considers the demand for money in the overall context 
of the demand and supply for all goods in the economy, inspired by the Walrasian general equilibrium 
model, which assumes that all markets for commodities, labour, financial instruments and money will 
clear. Therefore, he treats real money balances as goods like any other goods in that market, thereby 
integrating money balances into the utility and production functions of economic agents drawing on 
Friedman. This analysis by Handa (2000) seems to add a little more to Friedman‘s demand for money 







2.2.4.1   Money in the direct utility function  
 
 
Handa (2000) stresses that the link between money balances and the state of the economy is made 
stronger with a utility function expresses preferences. In this light, let the individual‘s one period utility 
function be designated as U (.)=U(x1, ……, xk, n, m
h
) (2.29). This equation for utility has k+2 goods, 
consisting of k commodities, labour and real money balances and U (.) is an ordinal utility function. 
Where: xk is the quantity of k
th
 commodity, k=1,…, k; n: is the labour supplied in hours; m
h
: is the 
average amount of real money balances held by the individual/household for their liquidity services, the 
















UU  (2.32) are the partial derivatives of the utility function 
with respect to each commodity (Uk), number of hours worked (Un) and real money balances (Um). The 










 ) yields positive marginal utility 




 ) generates negative marginal utility.   
 
2.2.4.2   Money in the indirect utility function  
 
The focus is now the overriding role of money in saving time spent for economic agents when making 
transactions. Clearly, this concern seems important in analysing the demand for money function; anyone 
can appreciate how the development of technology today allows a considerable number of transactions in 
quick succession. For example, by using electronic transfers to pay suppliers, employees or to purchase 
goods locally and abroad.   
 
Using this idea, Handa (2000) reveals how money can be integrated into indirect utility functions which 
we summarise as follows:  the one period utility function is: U (.)=U(c, Θ) (2.33) where c stand as 
consumption of commodities and Θ as leisure and Uc, UΘ>0 are the partial derivatives of utility function 
with respect to the consumption of commodities and leisure and the signs show that an additional unit of 







Assuming that consumption requires the purchase of goods which in turn requires shopping time and that 
leisure could be the time outstanding in the day after deducting the time spent working and in shopping, 
then leisure can be defined mathematically by the following equation Θ=ho-n-n
σ
 (2.34) where: ho is the 
maximum available time for leisure, work time and shopping time; n is the time spent working, n
σ
 is the 















n  are the partial derivatives function of shopping time 
with respect to the number of purchased units of commodity and real money balances. The sign of these 
partial derivatives functions seem justified; intuitively it makes sense that when more money is involved 
in transaction activities, less will be time spent in making transactions and as economic agents spend 
more time purchasing goods, it will take more time to achieve that activity.  
 
Furthermore, how important money usage is in transactions of economic agents is based on saving time in 
achieving them. This phenomenon is more understandable when comparing two economies: one with 
rigidities, for example, where it is hard to access an overdraft as lenders ask for more collateral or in 
another economy where the automatic means of payment are less developed and so on, compared to an 
economy in which all of these facilities are much more developed. The greater availability of facilities 
and modern means of payment in that second economy unambiguously diminishes the time spent in 






U ) ( 

n
 ) < 0 
(2.35) meaning that an increase in shopping time decreases leisure and in turn decreases utility. On the 












  >0 (2.36), utility increases ceteris paribus with an increase in the amount 
of real money balances held which in turn decreases shopping time.  
 
2.2.4.3   Money in the production function 
 
After discussing the inclusion of money balances in the utility function of households, section (2.2.4.3) 
emphasises the incorporation of money balances into the production activity of firms. Handa (2000) 
proposes a production function specified as xk=F (n, k, m
f
) (2.37), where xk stands as the quantity of the 
k
th
 goods produced by the k
th
 firm, k=1,……………, K; n is the number of workers; k stand as the 
variable physical stock; m
f 






function symbol, and the superscript f stands for a designated firm involved in production. Real money 
balances integrated into the production function are considered as being of the same importance as any 
other input. Therefore, an insufficiency of currency in the firm‘s production activities could lead to 
difficulties in paying employees and suppliers and thus constraining the firm to reduce the number of 
employees and (or) the amount of capital allocated to the production, thereby reducing the firm‘s output. 
It seems reasonable to assume that higher real money balances used in production activities of firms lead 
to higher output levels.  
 




The integration of money into the utility and production functions of economic agents has been examined 
in the above paragraphs, (2.2.4.1; 2.2.4.2; 2.2.4.3) and the following steps in this section concern 
maximising those functions and deriving the demand function for money balances, as illustrated by 
Handa (2000), as follows:  
 
Maximise    ),,,,.........( 1
h
k mnXXU   (2.38) 
 
Subject to:   ))( hmkk PmrrXp = WA 0     (2.39)                 k=1,……………,K    
 
           
Set the Lagrangian function as: 
 




k PmrrXpWAmnXXUU       (2.40)                                    
 
Where: 
xk          quantity of the k
th
 good; 
Pk      price of k
th
 commodity; 
P       price level; 
r        market interest rate on the illiquid asset; 






r-rm     net interest forgone from holding a unit of nominal balances; 
P m    nominal value of the m real balances; 
W       nominal wage rate; 
A0       nominal value of initial endowments of commodities and financial assets;  
λ         Lagrangian multiplier; 
n         the labour supplied in hours; 
m
h      
    real balances held by individuals. 
 
Maximising utility subject to the budget constraint gives the first order maximising conditions represented 













































































































                                                                                                                                        
Solving this system of K+3 equations for the K+3 endogenous variables x1,……,xk, n, m
h
 and   where 
p1,…….,pk, W, r-rm, and P are the exogenous variables and assuming that a unique solution exists for each 
endogenous variable and the maximising conditions are satisfied, the solutions for K+3 endogenous 
variables have the general form as follows:  
 












            (2.46)                
 
                                                                              




The superscript d; s; h stand for designating the demand for commodities (d), the supply of labour (s), and 
households (h).  
 
It is worth recalling that when reviewing Handa‘s discussion about integrating money balances into the 





(p1,…………..,pk,W, (r-rm)P, A0) (2.48) carried out by maximising the utility function of economic 
agents and gaining progressively more information on the determinants of the demand function for money 
as is also our earlier purpose when reviewing monetarist, Keynesian, post Keynesians and classical 
economists views on the demand for money.    
 
The maximisation procedure as applied to the utility function of a household so as to derive the demand 
function for real money balances is now applied for similar purposes by Handa (2000: 65) to the profit 
function of the firm. This firm is assumed to be operating in a competition environment. Profit is defined 
as being Π=pk F (n, k, m
f
)-Wn- ρkK- ρm m
f
 –F0 (2.49), where: Π is the profit function symbol, ρk is the 
nominal user cost of physical capital, ρm =(r-rm)P (2.50) is the nominal user cost per unit of real money, F0 
is a fixed cost, n is the number of workers, pk is the price of the physical capital goods, Wn is the nominal 
wage for n workers, k is the physical stock of capital, m
f 
represent the average real money balances held 
by the firm, and the superscript f stands for the designated firm involved in production. Handa (2000: 65) 
defines the nominal user cost of physical capital in a perfect market as being ρk=(r+δk-πk) pk (2.51), where 
δk is the rate of depreciation; πk is the rate of increase in the price of the capital good;  pk  is the price of 
capital, and r is the market interest rate on illiquid assets.  
 
Considering that the rate of depreciation of the capital does not play any particular role in our further 
analysis, it is reasonable to let δk=0. Therefore, the nominal user cost of capital would be: ρk=(r -πk) pk  
(2.52) and the profit equation becomes: Π=pk F (n, k, m
f
)-Wn- (r -πk) pk k- (r-rm)Pm m
f
 –F0 (2.53) . Taking 
the partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to: n, k and m
f
, the first order conditions for 
maximising profits are represented by the following equations: 
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In order to get the solutions in real terms after solving the equations (2.54), (2.55), (2.56), we proceed by 
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mm       (2.62) 
 
The superscript (d) stands for the demand of labour and the variable physical stock. The superscript (f) 
stands for a designated firm. 
 
The purpose of reviewing Handa‘s discussion about integrating money balances in the production 




(pk/P, w, (r- 
πk) (pk/P),(r- rm)) (2.63) from profit maximisation function by firms and enhance again our awareness of 
the determinants of the demand for money function and this will help us later to adapt these determinants 







After aggregating all consumers and firms in the economy, Handa (2000) presents us with one equation 
embodying aggregate demand for real money balances, inspired by the Walrasian general equilibrium 




(p1/P,…………,pk/P,W/P, (r- πk) (pk/P),(r-rm), A0/P)   (2.64). 
 
 
2.3 Economic theories underlying the specification of our empirical econometric model  
 
As chapter one mentioned, our empirical research is inspired mostly by the study of Nassar (2005). The 
economic model presented by Nassar (2005: 7) encloses two economic sectors such as monetary sector 
and commodity sector as shown by equation (2.65) and equation (2.66) below:  
 
       (2.65)    
 
Equation (2.65) represents the overall price level as a weighted average of the prices of tradable goods 
and other prices. 
                                                    
                                               
         
(2.66)          
 
The equation (2.66) represents the economic model of demand for money where: 
dM  is money 
demand, tp   is the price level, ty  is the real income,  ti  is the interest rate, te  is the expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate. In equation (2.66), the demand for real money balances 
d
tm is 
determined by real income ty , an interest rate ti  and the expected depreciation of the exchange rate 
te . Nassar (2005) uses the expected depreciation of the exchange rate, real income and an interest rate 
as the determinants of real money demand. Classical, Keynesian, post Keynesian and monetarist 
economists emphasise real income and an interest rate have to be the determinants of money demand. 
With the support of these economic theories and inspired by the study of Nassar (2005), we include real 
income, an interest rate and the exchange rate variables in our econometric models for empirical analysis.   
 










Also the economists such as Oskooee et al., (1990), Corden (1984) and Mundell (1963) justify the 
inclusion of the exchange rate as one of the determinants of real money demand. Thus, to enhance our 





The review of the economic theories on the demand for money is approached by examining the evolution 
of monetary theory from classical economists, Keynesians, post Keynesians, and monetarists plus more 
recent contributions connected with two techniques of optimization.  
 
Mostly, the keys points from the classical economists cover the concept of neutrality of money and its real 
economic variables and also the constancy of velocity. The classical concept of the quantity theory of 
money is challenged by Keynes who advocates an income and expenditure approach by which he 
emphasises that expansionary monetary policy leads to a lower interest rate thereby reducing the cost of 
money (cheap money concept) and thus increases investments and output.  
 
With the concept of liquidity preference, Keynes is the first to mention explicitly the relationship between 
the interest rate and the demand for money arising from the speculative motive for holding money 
balances which Keynes adds to the transaction and precautionary motives. He denies the concept of a 
constant velocity, arguing that economic agent behaviour is characterised by always guessing what the 
future holds for them. This argument does not give a stable demand function for money. Post Keynesians, 
especially William Baumol and James Tobin, show that the transactions demand for money depends on 
the interest rate and any economic agent acting rationally invests simultaneously in financial assets and 
cash balances.   
 
Monetarists, even if they agree that money matters as do Keynesians, support most of the tenets of 
classical economists, principally that velocity need not be constant but rather must at least be predictable 
and they agree with the notion that the invisible hand pushes the economy towards the full employment 
equilibrium and for them any intervention by government in economic activities could worsen 







Friedman has been the one to consider the demand for money as a demand like other goods in the 
economy. His conceptual framework has been advocated recently by Handa (2000) supporting the idea 
that the demand function for money is obtained from a maximisation of utility and profit and considers 
the demand for money as a demand like any other good under the assumption that all markets clear, as 








A REVIEW OF MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
―Most economists and policymakers agree that the overall aim of monetary policy is to advance the 
economic well-being of the country‘s citizens‖ (Hubbard, 2005: 476). By economic well-being, Hubbard 
(2005) emphasises an economy that performs and creates an economic environment providing maximum 
benefits to all citizens. To accomplish this, any monetary authority must formulate and conduct an 
adequate monetary policy. Mishikin (2007) and Handa (2000) highlight price stability as being the 
overriding objective of monetary policy so as to provide a sustained and favourable macroeconomic 
environment for economic agents. However, the question arises as to how monetary policy should be 
carried out to achieve the price stability goal? The main ideas embodied in this chapter endeavour to 
answer this question by examining the causes of inflation and the monetary policy needed for achieving 
low inflation. Indeed, Thornton (2007) emphasises that reducing market uncertainty in the economy could 
render long-run inflationary expectations more stable and therefore induce price stability in the economy. 
Further, Rasche and Williams (2007) show that the monetary policy of any central bank must target a 
macroeconomic variable such as the money stock, or an interest rate or the nominal exchange rate when 
trying to achieve the ultimate goal of price stability.  
 
In many countries, economic agents (businesses and households) intend to accrue real wealth. 
Accordingly, the firms strive to predict trends in their economic activities and households seek ways to 
add to the real value of their future income (Hubbard, 2005). To attain these goals, economic agents need 
reliable nominal anchors to help establish subjective expectations of inflation, and this nominal anchor 
could either be market interest rates, or an inflation rate target or an exchange rate target or even other 






To achieve price stability as an ultimate monetary policy objective, the monetary authority can define an 
intermediate target variable serving as the link between the direct actions of the central bank and the 
objective they wish to attain (Handa, 2000). According to Rasche and Williams (2007), the effectiveness 
of this intermediate target for price stability is controversial according to monetary economist‘s theories. 
Rasche and Williams (2007) assert that monetarists recommend targeting the aggregate money stock for 
providing a better nominal anchor to the economic system and this policy is supported by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963), and Andersen and Jordan (1968). Monetarists treat sustained inflation as a monetary 
phenomenon and central banks must be held accountable for maintaining price stability. Hence, it is better 
to target the money aggregate‘s stock in order to attain the ultimate goal of price stability. 
 
An opposite view takes root in Keynesian ideas and associates inflation with excess demand (spending) 
relative to the available supply of goods and services at the full employment equilibrium (Wallace, 1978). 
From the Keynesian‘s income-expenditure approach, emphasis is placed on targeting an interest rate and 
manipulating it to motivate investment. Apart from this controversy between Keynesians and monetarists 
on the most appropriate economic policy to implement, Handa (2000) highlights that the shift of 
monetary authorities from implementing one monetary policy to another policy is justified, mostly by the 
specific nature of economy for a country and also by the development of financial and stock markets. For 
some countries, because of a lack of development in financial markets, the relationship between money 
supply aggregates and the price level is not stable. Mishikin (2007) says that for the US and Germany, the 
empirical relationship between monetary aggregates, nominal income and inflation are no longer strong 
and stable enough to let monetary aggregates adequately inform monetary policy (used then as an 
intermediate target). Sargent and Wallace (1975) suggest that, in a model with rational expectations, the 
price level can be undefined if central banks target nominal interest rates, because the economy can lack a 
nominal anchor. In contrast, McCallum (1981) argues that an appropriately defined interest rate policy 
must include a nominal anchor and provide an adequate reference for forecasting future prices. Taylor 
(1993) also proposes the need for a nominal anchor to inform policy. 
 
So summarising, it is worth noting that this chapter reviews theoretical and empirical outcomes and 
endeavours to respond to how the objective of price stability can be achieved by implementing different 
monetary policy regimes. Section (3.2) briefly discusses the theory and empirical outcomes underlying 
inflation, section (3.3) reviews different monetary policy regimes such as an inflation targeting 
framework and monetary policy with an implicit nominal anchor. A final section summarises the main 







3.2    Review of theories and empirical outcomes underlying inflation 
 
Many economic agents are concerned about inflation and frequently try to be present in front of their TV 
(television) screens watching the news, reading newspapers, so as to be informed as much as possible 
about stock market prices, overnight loan rates, exchange rate trends and struggle to forecast future 
inflation tendencies in their countries and overseas. Justifying this concern, Jordan (2006) emphasizes that 
money‘s effectiveness depends on its value being stable. Hubbard (2005) notes that steadily rising prices 
reduces the value of money. According to Jordan (2006) and Hubbard (2005), when the purchasing power 
of money is not stable, it becomes costly for economic agents to gather information about how much 
better or worse off they will be in the future and this uncertainty concerning the future is a handicap for 
investment. Maintaining stable prices by avoiding sustained inflation and the negative effects on the 
economy can reasonably be justified by many policy makers across the world as inflation has its greatest 
negative impact on the poor. Lower inflation helps economic growth and the stability of other 
macroeconomic variables (Handa, 2000). Some economists like Friedman (1991), Wallace (1978) and 
others (El-Sakka and Ghali (2005) and Lim and Papi (1997)) analyse the typical causes of inflation.  
 
 
3.2.1 The causes of inflation  
 
 
When analyzing the causes of inflation, El-Sakka and Ghali (2005) suggest the following three 
approaches, the monetary, the public finance and the structural approach. 
 
The monetary approach 
 
Quoting from Baetjer (2008: 11), we have ―from Friedman‘s writings that inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.‖ Baetjer argues that inflation takes place once the quantity of 
money rises significantly faster than output. According to Friedman (1991), the money supply affects the 
general level of prices over any long period. In the short-run, the changes in the general level of prices 
can come from many sources. In the analysis of the monetary approach, Friedman (op.cit) suggests 
focusing on the rate of money growth relative to the rate of growth of output instead of mechanically 
associating the rate of inflation with the exact rate of monetary growth.  In this way, Thornton (2008) 
investigating the relationship between money growth and inflation for 36 African countries, confirms the 






inflation rates below 10 per cent, but a strong one when money growth and inflation go over that number. 
Siegel (2009) confirms that inflation is caused by too much money chasing too few goods in the 
economy. Subrata and Derek (1989) agree with this idea. Baetjer (2008) deems that one of the prominent 
reasons underlying inflation over a short-run horizon is people‘s expectations for the trend of prices today 
over the very short term. According to Baetjer (op.cit), these expectations influence how promptly the 
money supply responds to the growth rate of output. El-Sakka and Ghali (2005) agree that a sudden 
increase in prices as the aggregate supply of goods and services changes does not readily occur even in 
the short run.  
 
Public finance approach 
 
Friedman (1991) says that the intrusion of government into the economy and the reluctance to impose 
explicit taxes can exacerbate the increase in the quantity of money in the economy and this consequently 
provokes inflation. El-Sakka and Ghali (2005) highlight many governments‘ dependence on seigniorage 
to finance their budget deficits.  
In the seigniorage process, central banks take over overdrafts of the public treasurer that finance 
government expenditures (Hubbard, 2005). Usually debt of the treasurer is covered as the revenue from 
tax collection increases. But the government expenditures financed through the seigniorage process can 
pump up aggregate demand over and above the short-run supply in the economy causing inflation.  
To this end, Catao and Terrones (2001) analysed inflation in 23 emerging market economies and conclude 
that the long-run inflation rate falls from 1 to 6 per cent when the budget deficit to GDP ratio falls by 1 
per cent. These findings confirm the relationship between the government‘s seigniorage process and 
inflation.  One can then inquire why government should opt for seigniorage if it causes inflation? Many 
reasons could be given and the prominent motivation, supported by Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1991), 
gives emphasis to the commitment by governments to the policy of full employment. According to 
Friedman (1991), this commitment may induce governments to over-react to a temporary recession and 
consequently provoke a significant disequilibrium between aggregate demand and supply in the economy 
and possibly initiate short-run inflation.  
The structural approach 
In the structural approach, El-Sakka and Ghali (2005) regard the increase of prices as driven mostly by 






openness of an economy. According to El-Sakka and Ghali, wage growth affects the cost of production 
and consequently producers increase prices of goods and services to cover higher wage costs. The results 
of empirical studies undertaken for developing countries show a correlation between the depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate and inflation (El-Sakka and Ghali, 2005). When analysing the effect of 
openness on inflation, Romer (1993) examined a sample of countries and found that openness in severely 
indebted countries is responsible for over 22 per cent of the variation in inflation. It is worth recalling that 
between the three approaches, this thesis places more emphasis on the monetary approach as we review a 
monetary policy regime when applying our research question (identified in chapter one) to Rwanda.  
 
3.2.2 Expectations of inflation and the Phillip’s Curve 
 
 
In section (3.1.1) above, Baetjer (2008) indicates that changes in expectations of inflation can drive up 
prices in the short run. According to Baetjer, these changes in expectations of inflation can occur when 
economic agents are concerned about inflation. If producers bid up prices consumers are quick to realise 
that their money is losing value because of inflation. Hence, everyone finds that prices in general are 
increasing and come to expect further increases. It is probably very difficult to reverse this situation after 
it has started (Baetjer, 2008). We examine this phenomenon in more detail in the next paragraph.  
 
Phillip’s Curve and inflation  
 
The Phillip‘s Curve (see figure 3.1 below) shows that unemployment rates are assumed to fall as 
aggregate demand increases, and this rise in aggregate demand is accompanied (along PC1 on figure 3.1) 
by a higher rate of inflation (Wallace, 1978: 498). Thus Sakka and Ghali (2005) reiterate such a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment familiar to us from the Keynesians‘ economic theories. Adding to 
this idea, Wallace (1978) and Delorme and Ekulend (1978) assert that prices rising faster than nominal 
money wages causes real wages to fall and they presume this situation cannot hold permanently. Delorme 
and Ekulend (1978) maintain that people bargain for new salaries so as to catch up with the price level. 
Consequently, real wages get back to their former level and the employers will not be motivated to 








In addition, Wallace (1978), inspired by the expectations theory, assumes that new wage earners readily 
abandon money illusion and they, expecting further increases in the price level, bargain for increased 
money wages. If this happens, the short-run Phillip‘s curve in figure 3.1 below will shift upward from PC1 
to PC 2 in response to the expectation that inflation will continue from the base of expectation of say 4 per 
cent. If policy makers once again endeavour to stimulate aggregate demand the process will replicate 
itself, and the inflation rate will rise along the curve PC2 to 6 per cent and this rate serves as a new base 
for expectations of further inflation occasioning a shift of the short-run Phillip‘s curve from PC2 to PC3. 
These shifts make Wallace (1978), Friedman (1991) and many others believe that rational expectation 
theory is not consistent with a trade-off between inflation and unemployment, as exploiting this trade-off 
only results in higher inflation. As part of this controversy, Cogley et al., (2008), drawing on a new  
Keynesian theory which claims that expansionary investment expenditure alleviates unemployment in the 
economy, assert from the findings of their study that inflation persistence is mostly generated by the 
changes in monetary policy. Hence, Section (3.3) reviews different monetary policy regimes and their 


























Figure 3.1. Phillip‘s Curve (source: Wallace (1978: 498)) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the trade-off between unemployment and inflation familiar from Keynesian theory. 
According to this theory, an increase in aggregate demand will push the natural rate of unemployment Un 
to the low target rate Ut. Nevertheless, monetarists and believers of the importance of the expectations 
theory do not support such a trade-off as any monetary policy change provokes persistent inflation 
without leading to a consistently lower unemployment rate (a shift of PC1 to PC2 and then to PC3 and then 
usually moves from B to C and D to E).  
  
3.2.3   Review of structure and dynamic models of inflation  
 
Thornton (2008) endeavours to identify models of inflation using the equation of the quantity theory of 
money familiar to us from Handa (2000) and labelled as MV≡PY (3.1), where M is the money supply, V 
is the velocity of money income, Y is real output, and P is the price level. With the intention of dealing 
with the growth rates of variables rather than their quantities, one can take the natural logarithm (ln) using 
identity (3.1) and obtain therefore ln (MV≡PY) giving m+v≡y+p (3.2), where lower case letters denote 
growth rates or a change in the logarithm. Thus the value of p (grow rate) is equivalent to, p≡m+v-y (3.3). 
Identity (3.3) embodies mainly two ideas: (i) the proportionality proposition, which shows that in the long 
run, a permanent increase in money growth leads to an equal increase in the rate of inflation; and (ii) the 
neutrality of money which states that a permanent increase in the growth rate of money leaves output and 
velocity unaffected in the long-run (Thornton, 2008). Identity (3.3) represents a structural model of 
inflation as it can link policy (m) to inflation (p). Apart from this model, Laidler (1977), drawing from the 
works of Cagan (1956) and Dutton (1971), builds a dynamic model of inflation and bases changes in the 
price level on expectations of inflation by economic agents. For the equation of inflationary expectations, 
Laidler follows an error-learning process (Gujarati, 2003) which assumes that economic agents update 
expectations of inflation using the current information on prices and the mistakes made in previous 
forecasts. This equation is ΔP
e
t = h ΔPt + (1-h) ΔP
e
t-1 (3.4) where ΔP
e
t-1 is the expected rate of inflation at 
the end of the period t-1, ΔPt is the proportion change in the price level between period t-1 and period t, 
and ΔP
e
t  is the expected rate of inflation at the end of the period t.  
 
Further, Laidler (1977) adds expected inflation as one of the determinants of the demand for money by 
using the equation mt-pt=w+ky-aΔp
e
t-1 (3.5), where: mt-pt is the natural logarithm of real money balances 








t-1 is from equation (3.4). Equation (3.5) is the familiar one discussed in chapter two (section 2.2.3.4) 
which identifies some components of the demand for money (Delorme and Ekelund, 1983). 
 
3.3 Review of different monetary policy regimes  
 
To achieve the objective of price stability, monetary authorities attempt to define and implement 
monetary policy which they presume to be appropriate for the state of the economy (Mishikan, 2007). 
Some countries prefer to use the aggregate money supply as an intermediate target and others choose an 
interest rate. The policies under review in this section cover inflation targeting and monetary policy with 
an implicit nominal anchor.  
 
The emphases here are the macroeconomic effects resulting from implementing each monetary policy 
regime with regard to providing price stability in the economy. For now, we postpone the review of 
policy tools and operating targets that link policy decision and economic agent‘s behaviour. These are 
covered in chapter four of this thesis as they apply to Rwanda‘s situation.  
 
3.3.1 Inflation targeting regime 
 
Across the world, monetary authorities strive to create a reliable economic environment facilitating any 
economic agent‘s ability to anchor inflation expectations (Bernanke and Woodford, 2005).  Fountas et al., 
(2006) maintain that inflation uncertainty causes imbalances in the allocation of resources among 
different investment opportunities. Striving to alleviate these imbalances, some monetary authorities 
across countries opted for inflation targeting policies. Mishikin (2007: 207) considers a inflation targeting 
regimes as a monetary policy characterised by the official announcement that low and stable inflation is 
the overriding goal of monetary policy and thereby setting an inflation rate to achieve in a given period. 
Stimulated by a particular reason, commonly the collapse of a previous monetary policy, some countries 
implement new policies to restart a reliable nominal anchor for economic agents. In fact, many countries 
shifted to inflation targeting regimes as the overriding goal of their monetary policy, one of them being 
South Africa, where the empirical study carried out by Mitchell et al., (2007) confirms the effectiveness 
of this policy from the year 2000. Hence, Mitchell et al., (2007) deem that South Africa did manage to 







Clarifying the reasons that motivate some countries to opt for an inflation targeting regime, Mishikin 
(2007) argues that the exchange rate peg regime failed to reassure the public that monetary policy would 
remain disciplined in the UK and Sweden. To overcome this shortcoming, these countries shifted to 
inflation targeting. In Canada, the adoption of this policy was implemented after unsuccessfully trying to 
use a monetary aggregate targeting approach. Furthermore, research from many countries shows inflation 
targeting to be an effective policy. This includes the study undertaken by Levin et al., (2004) confirming 
that in the past decade inflation targeting has played a role in anchoring inflation expectations and in 
reducing inflation persistence for some industrial countries. Another study, carried out by Lin and Ye 
(2007) and another by Dueker and Fischer (2006), confirm the effectiveness of inflation targeting. For 
Huang and Liu (2005) the interest in inflation targeting seems justified as this policy focuses on 
stabilizing the variability in inflation and the output gap.     
   
3.3.1.1 Advantages of inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
 
 
According to Mishikin (2007), inflation targeting has several important advantages: (i) in contrast to 
exchange rate targeting, but like monetary aggregate targeting, inflation targeting enables a focus on 
domestic considerations and responds to shocks from the domestic economy; (ii) velocity shocks are 
largely irrelevant because the inflation targeting policy is no longer reliant on a stable money to inflation 
relationship; and (iii) an inflation targeting policy can reduce the likelihood that the central bank will fall 
into the time-inconsistency trap in which under political pressure, the monetary authorities are pushed to 
engage in expansionary monetary policy for misguided purposes. One other advantage, according to 
Bernanke and Woodford (2005), is that inflation targeting lets the monetary authority make use of all 
existing information to consider for setting up of an adequate monetary policy and thus it can be readily 
understood by the public and can be highly transparent.  
 
3.3.1.2 Challenges to an inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
 
Bernanke and Woodford (2005) emphasise that in transition economies, central banks can face a trade-off 
between transparency and a need to control inflation. This is because inflation is a sustained movement in 
the consumer price index and these movements could unfortunately reflect other factors than monetary 






and transparency required in a regime of inflation targeting. According to Mishikin (2007), low inflation 
that results from an inflation targeting policy, might have substantial negative effects on real economic 
activity. Economic agents can presume that disinflation will occur in the near future and then deflation 
does follow in the economy.  With regard to a range that the target must cover and the time necessary to 
affect the economy, Bernanke and Woodford (2005: 387) deem that too large a band could reduce the 
ability of an inflation targeting policy to anchor inflation over expectations and the effects of such a 
policy might only come after a long lag. Further, Bernanke and Woodford suppose one year to be the 
approximate time horizon as in most countries there are a number of drawbacks: (i) the frequent missing 
of the inflation target as has been the case in South Africa; (ii) instrument instability, (iii) and insufficient 
control of output fluctuations by the central banks have been the consequences of target inflation rate for 
a period of less than one year. It is thus of some interest that we find the adjustment period in Rwanda to 
be about one year. 
 
To conclude this section (3.3.4) which reviews the theory of inflation targeting regimes, it is worth noting 
that despite the benefits of an inflation targeting monetary policy, Mishikin (2007) shows us that many 
countries have achieved excellent low and stable inflation records without using an explicit nominal target 
to anchor inflationary expectations. Mishikin (2007) argues that a monetary strategy can posit an implicit, 
but not an explicit nominal anchor as an overriding emphasis in policy to control inflation in the long-run.  
However, the lack of an explicit nominal anchor can be a potential problem for the ―just do it‖ strategy. In 




Chapter three emphasises the overall aim of monetary authorities as being the promotion of a reliable and 
consistent economic environment permitting economic agents to anchor their expectations of inflation and 
then be able to make rational choices for investment or consumption. The activities of monetary 
authorities arise from monetary policies whose focus has as a final goal, economic stabilization, including 
controlling output fluctuations and emphasising price stability. The price stability goal has been the 
particular concern of this chapter as it embodies one of the objectives of the study undertaken in this 
thesis. Potential causes of inflation are examined under the three approaches. These are the monetary 
approach, the public finance view and a structural approach to price level changes. The monetary 
approach takes root in monetarists‘ views which stipulate that sustained long-run inflation is a monetary 






cause seigniorage problems. The structural approaches focuses on significant changes that can occur in 
aggregate demand, movements in exchange rates and other factors especially those related to the 
openness of the economy. Achieving a price stability goal through maintaining low and stable inflation, 
the monetary authorities endeavour to formulate and implement monetary policy such as inflation 
targeting and monetary policy with an implicit nominal anchor.  
 
With an inflation targeting monetary policy, it is assumed that economic agents anchor expectations of 
inflation as they focus explicitly on a ―known‖ rate of inflation or a range for inflation over a given time 
horizon. Many advantages have been associated with an inflation targeting policy such as focusing more 
on domestic considerations in responding to monetary policy shocks; the irrelevance of velocity shocks 
for disturbing monetary policy; reducing the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy and many 
other benefits. Apart from these advantages, drawbacks such as the frequent missing of the inflation target 
and insufficient control of output fluctuations by the central banks are highlighted. Finally, we offer some 
examples of countries who have successfully achieved low inflation like South Africa through 
implementing an inflation targeting monetary policy. Others countries have managed to achieve price 
stability without using an explicit nominal target to anchor inflationary expectations like the US. 








A REVIEW OF THE MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK IN RWANDA 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In line with its ―vision 2020‖, the Government of Rwanda has put in place, with technical and financial 
support from its development partners, a medium-term programme as stated in the Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (Kanimba, 2008(a): 1). Monetary policy one of 
the responsibilities of the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) is part of this programme, especially the role 
of creating a favourable environment that fosters production and investment by ensuring macroeconomic 
stability by controlling liquidity within the national economy and monitoring the financial system 
(Kanimba, 2008(a): 1).  
This chapter provides an overview of the monetary policy framework in Rwanda by examining the 
National Bank of Rwanda‘s control of broad money (M2) in the national economy (intermediate 
objective) with the intention of achieving the final objective of price stability (NBR, 2003: 30-31). To 
achieve the final objective the National Bank of Rwanda uses an indirect monetary instrument. This 
instrument allows the NBR to adjust the monetary base (currency plus reserves) which is considered an 
operating target (NBR, 2003: 33). Chapter four outlines this framework in three sections:  
Section (4.2) outlines the process of control of the monetary base by the National Bank of Rwanda with 
the intention of attaining a level of the money stock, M2, consistent with price stability. Section (4.3) 
discusses the tools used by the National Bank of Rwanda to implement sound monetary policy. Sub-
section (4.3.1) outlines the open market operations through which the NBR accepts surplus liquidity from 
banks and in return transfers eligible securities to them as collateral. Sub-section (4.3.2) covers the 
discount window facility in case a bank fails to get the desired liquidity from the Repurchase Agreement 
Operations (REPO) auction or from the inter-bank market. A penultimate section points the reserves 
requirement changes used by the National Bank of Rwanda to affect free reserves of the banks and 
ultimately the supply of broad money. Section (4.4) gives some of the obstacles which the monetary 
authorities face in attempting to forecast national liquidity. Finally, a conclusion summarises the main 







4.2 Controlling the money stock M2 by the National Bank of Rwanda 
 
 
In 1998 the National Bank of Rwanda came under pressure from the IMF to maintain a low and stable 
inflation rate (IMF, 1998: 7).  Implementing this recommendation and staying in line with the Rwandan 
Government‘s economic programme as stated in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (EDPRS), the NBR forecasts the level of monetary aggregate M2 each year as consistent with 
economic activities in Rwanda and also consistent with price stability. Taking as an example the year 
2008, one observes that, in accordance with government‘s programme of achieving a growth rate in real 
GDP ranging between 5.5 per cent and 6 per cent, the NBR set its inflation target to 7 per cent (Kanimba, 
2008(a): 8) and the monetary aggregate M2 at 444, 4 billion Rwandan francs (Kanimba, 2008: 23). 
 
In attempting to achieve the targeted level of M2, the NBR makes projections of bank liquidity on a 
weekly basis. Basically, the annual forecast consists of envisaging the sources of excess liquidity from: (i) 
net foreign assets, (ii) net claims on government, and (iii) the total credit provided by the banking system 
to the economy (Kanimba, 2008: 23). This forecast of the excess liquidity on the annual monetary stock is 
converted into monthly forecasts and updated from time to time. Weekly forecasts of banking liquidity 
are based on the following factors, such as: (i) currency in the hands of the public, (ii) the net foreign 
exchange position at the NBR, and (iii) the government deficit (NBR, 2003: 34). Practically, in a 
particular week, actual base money is compared with the forecast level and the gap indicates the direction 
of monetary policy. In the case of actual weekly or monthly liquidity levels being inconsistent with 
forecasts and thus ultimately annual monetary plans, open market operations can inject or mop up 
excessive liquidity from the economy (Kanimba, 2008: 23-24) and (NBR, 2003: 37). Thus, the NBR 
adjusts liquidity levels according to the needs of the economy so that the monetary base stays in line with 
annual forecasts. Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that the achievement of price stability 
as the final objective depends on the NBR being capable of accurately forecasting M2. The NBR tries to 
maintain equilibrium between the supply and the demand for money, with the intention of keeping the 
economy‘s liquidity at levels consistent with stable price levels. However, the evolution of the monetary 
stock can only be scrutinized indirectly by adjusting an operational objective, which is the monetary base 
in the case of Rwanda (NBR, 2003: 33). The monetary base is chosen since the central bank can control 
currency and bank reserves on a daily basis and assuming a stable relationship, say for instance M=K.BM, 











multiplier and is a function of currency in circulation ratio (c), and the commercial bank reserve ratio (r) 
(Munyankindi et al., 2008: 60). Economic theory stipulates that the more stable the monetary base 
multiplier, then the central bank is better able to control M2 through changes in the monetary base 
(Handa, 2000; Hubbard, 2005). In the case of Rwanda, the NBR deems that the required condition of 
stability in the money multiplier is not always guaranteed (Munyankindi et al., 2008: 63-66). The 
difficulty the NBR faces is that it needs daily information on M2 whereas this is only available on a 
monthly basis. Thus, the NBR has to forecast M2 and to do this uses the monetary base, which is 
available on a daily basis, and thus can be used to provide a daily forecast of M2 (Sayinzoga, 2005: 74). 
As we have mentioned, in the case of a divergence between actual liquidity in the economy and the 
forecast (NBR, 2003: 37), the NBR attempts to regulate the monetary base using the usual instruments of 
monetary policy which we discuss below.    
 
4.3 Instruments of monetary policy in Rwanda 
 
 
As a part of its responsibility to regulate the banking system‘s liquidity, the National Bank of Rwanda 
conducts daily monitoring of liquidity and regulates the money market (NBR, 2009: 59). In line with its 
current indirect monetary policy, the NBR uses monetary policy instruments to control the commercial 
banks‘ free reserves and makes sure that the supply of base money remains in the range consistent with 
price stability. In this way, the indirect monetary instruments utilised by the NBR are (NBR, 2003: 38-
46):  
 
(i)    Open-market operations; 
(ii)   Discount window facilities; 
(iii)  Reserve ratio requirements.  
 







4.3.1 Open-market operations, the inter-bank money market and other operations 
 
 
Instead of operating a direct lending and borrowing link to commercial banks, the NBR introduced a 
money market as part of its programme of achieving better control over the money supply (NBR, 2003: 
38).  The NBR can now modify base money through banks lending and borrowing in the short-term 
liquidity market. In addition, monetary policy analysis is improved by the creation of a monetary policy 
committee that meets weekly, to assess whether the state of liquidity and conditions prevailing in the 
foreign exchange market are consistent with the forecasts; if not they suggest corrective measures (NBR, 
2003: 47-51). Indeed, this committee (NBR, 2003: 47-51) has to: 
 
(i) Undertake a retrospective analysis of the current monetary situation and determine how monetary 
policy accommodates any variation occurring in the liquidity of the banking system; 
 
(ii) Forecast base money for subsequent periods and determine the necessary interventions of the NBR in 
the money market in order to achieve its macroeconomic goals;   
 
(iii) Propose any other actions the NBR might undertake to maintain control over the money                 
supply and provide backing for continued bank supervision.  
 




a. Repurchase Agreement Operations (REPO)  
 
In order to conduct an efficient monetary policy, from August 8
th
 2008, the NBR decided to opt for the 
―Repurchase Agreement Operations‖ (REPO) instead of overnight or weekly open market operations. The 
REPO operations took place every working day with a duration of up to two weeks at competitive bids 
(NBR, 2009: 58). The NBR reviews from time to time the duration of REPOs depending on the success 
of the instrument (Kanimba, 2008: 42). In carrying out these operations, the NBR accepts surplus 






(NBR and banks) agree to reverse the transactions at a future point in time, when the NBR as a borrower 
repays the loan plus interest and the creditor bank returns the collateral to the NBR. The replacement of 
the overnight operations and other open market operations by the use of the REPO aims to force 
commercial banks to forecast their liquidity adequately. Thus, the NBR is better able to conduct an 
efficient monetary policy. Based on the situation prevailing in 2008 in the money market in Rwanda and 
forecasts of future conditions, the NBR set the money market reference rate at 8 per cent (key repo rate) 
per annum (Kanimba, 2008: 42). 
 
 
b. Treasury bills  
 
Treasury bills have a double role in the Rwandan economy. Not only can the NBR buy and sell these 
instruments but they are principally issued by the government to finance its expenditure‘ plans (NBR, 
2003: 42). By buying (or selling) these bills, the NBR modifies liquidity levels in the national economy 
and thus induces base money to remain in line with their forecasts of liquidity consistent with price 
stability. Non-financial companies and individuals can bid to buy (or sell) treasury bills through 
commercial banks (NBR, 2003: 39). 
 
 
c. Deposit facility 
 
To enhance liquidity management in the national economy, the Rwandan monetary authorities introduced 
(in December 2008), an investment facility called the ―deposit facility‖. With this facility banks are 
allowed to deposit their excess liquidity at the NBR, on a daily basis, for a maximum of 28 days at a fixed 
rate of 7 per cent with a discount option halfway to maturity (NBR, 2009: 58).  
 
d. The inter-bank market 
 
In 2000, an inter-bank market was initiated to motivate the exchange of liquidity between banks 
(Sayinzoga, 2005: 80). The gain this brings is that banks do not look for accommodation at the NBR 
(NBR, 2003: 38-39). This borrowing and lending is relatively unrestricted but collateral is provided. In 






interest rate close to the key REPO rate of 8 per cent. As an example, from August 2008, the inter-bank 
interest rate range was fixed to fall between 6.75 per cent and 9.25 per cent. This encourages inter-bank 
market activities, and the NBR helps by lending money to banks on a competitive basis and absorbs 
excess funds at some lower rate (NBR, 2009: 58). 
 
e. Selling of foreign reserves as a supplementary monetary instrument 
 
Since 2004 the Rwandan banking system experienced continuous excess liquidity mainly generated by 
financial inflows from external donors to support the national budget (Kanimba, 2008(a): 6). In order to 
adjust the liquidity in line with monetary indicators, the National Bank of Rwanda mops up excess 
liquidity through sales of foreign exchange, sells in overnight markets, and makes general sales of 
treasury bills (Kanimba, 2008: 23-24). Sales of foreign exchange to commercial banks are regarded as a 
supplementary monetary instrument utilised mainly to smooth out unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the 
money markets. The excess liquidity (in Rwandan francs) generated in the national economy by the 
government‘s expenditures are indirectly collected from the national economy through commercial banks 
by bidding in the foreign exchange market coordinated by the NBR. In return, the NBR credits the 
demand deposit accounts held abroad by commercial banks, an equivalent amount in foreign currency 
(mostly in US dollars). These available reserves (held abroad) in dollars are used by commercial banks 
for financing imports. Thus foreign exchange sales to banks by the NBR serve as a supplementary 
monetary instrument which can regulate liquidity within the Rwandan economy (Kanimba, 2008: 41).  
 
 
4.3.2 The discount window 
 
 
Central banks usually limit commercial banks to add liquidity by using a penalty rate on borrowing. In 
Rwanda the NBR‘s last resort facility remains available just in case a commercial bank fails to get the 
desired liquidity from the Repo auction or the inter-bank market. The interest rate, if one uses this facility, 







4.3.3 Reserve requirements  
 
Cash reserves can affect banks‘ free reserves in the short-run and the supply of broad money in the long-
run. Principally, reserve requirements are considered as a prudential instrument used by the central bank 
to make sure that the commercial banks keep enough funds on hand to meet any unpredicted withdrawals 
by customers. Cash reserve requirements are also an instrument that the NBR can use for controlling base 
money (Sayinzoga, 2005: 82). Indeed, the occurrence of a surge in lending money to customers by 
commercial banks can oblige the NBR to adjust the reserve requirements ratio (NBR, 2003: 44). An 
increase in these ratios leads to a tightening of the banking system‘s liquidity and, consequently, reduces 
the commercial banks‘ capacity to create money through lending to customers, while a reduction allows 
the reverse (NBR, 2003: 44). However, the option to use of this instrument should not be frequent and it 
is better to use it when banking liquidity expands enormously (Sayinzoga, 2005: 82). 
 
4.4 Obstacles to implementing a satisfactory monetary policy in Rwanda 
 
Monetary policy management in Rwanda faces a number of obstacles especially at this time which is 
marked by the financial crisis. Currently, the world is experiencing one of the worst economic shocks in 
the last 60 years (Kanimba, 2008: 8). But Rwanda experienced high inflationary pressures during the first 
half of 2008 (Kanimba, 2008: 16; 23) and the persistent excess liquidity in the Rwandan banking system 
continued even late into 2008. To keep the monetary policy programme on track, it is important to 
reinforce the economy‘s capacity to absorb growing inflows from a scaling up of external assistance 
(Kanimba, 2008(a): 6). The low absorptive capacity of the Rwandan economy and higher aid flows result 
in the NBR facing extra costs when mopping up this excess liquidity.   
 
 
Furthermore, unpredictable behaviour on the part of commercial banks can cause problems for the NBR. 
In normal circumstances, the Rwandan financial sector is characterised by a low degree of monetization. 
There is general agreement that the conduct of monetary policy is enhanced by the existence of well-
functioning markets, and that indirect monetary policy instruments serve to deepen financial markets 
(Sayinzoga, 2005: 84). In this way, developed markets can serve as channels facilitating the 






September 1997 (NBR, 2003: 38), and from 2008 a capital market has been launched (NBR, 2009: 59). 
Markets in Rwanda are still developing. As these markets develop monetary policy can only improve.  
 
In addition, it is difficult to forecast future real GDP growth and accordingly predict national liquidity 
needs. In 2007 there was a significant difference between the increase in money supply, M2, (31.25 per 
cent) and that of the nominal GDP (13 per cent) (Kanimba, 2008(a): 5).  For the same time period the 
general price level increases from 8.9 per cent to 9.1 per cent . 
 
This situation is attributable to the Rwandan economy being in the main informal, and to the lack of 





In line with the Rwandan Government‘s programme of Economic Development and its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) has the role of creating a favourable 
environment for production and investment through controlling liquidity within the national economy. 
 
In attempting to achieve the targeted level of M2, the NBR makes projections of bank liquidity which 
require daily information on M2, whereas this is only available on a monthly basis. Thus, the NBR 
forecasts M2 using the monetary base, which is available on a daily basis. Practically, in a particular 
week, the actual base money is compared with the forecast level and the discrepancy indicates the 
direction of monetary policy. The NBR tries to alleviate the gap between the forecast and actual situation 
in national liquidity by adjusting the monetary base using: (i) open-market operations; (ii) discount 
window facilities and (iii) reserve ratio requirements. 
 
Some problems in implementing monetary policy are: (a) the coordination between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy in order to absorb foreign aid; (b) a lack of a developed money market; (c) difficulties in 












5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses all the relevant statistical estimation concepts and techniques as well as the 
specification of the models to estimate in chapter 6. Before attempting any regression analysis using time 
series, the first step one undertakes is to check the existence of stationarity or otherwise in the data 
(Gujarati, 2003: 792) and (Brooks, 2002: 367). Indeed, the motivation for investigating stationarity, 
among other reasons, is to avoid getting biased results from a spurious regression. These results come 
from regressing non-stationary time series data on each other (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 28).  
 
If one uses non-stationary data, a spurious regression can show insignificant estimates for coefficients and 
a high R
2 
which results from a regression between two unrelated time series variables but trending 
together over time (Enders, 2004: 171; Brooks, 2002: 367-368; Noriega and Ventosa, 2007: 439-444).  
Furthermore, the OLS estimators from a spurious regression do not converge asymptotically to the true 
values of population parameters. Thus, it is worthless to use the usual inferencial statistics by which 
researchers extrapolate sample results to the population under examination (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 25-
26).  
 
The problems caused by non-stationary time series data constrain researchers to be cautious and they 
must always start their analysis by determining whether their time series data is stationary or otherwise 
before attempting any regression analysis (Hill et al., 2001: 340).  In this way, a stationary time series can 
usually be included in the econometric model, while a non-stationary time series may first have to be 
differenced or detrended before adding it to any econometric model. In addition, when considering long-
run relationships between time series, a cointegration analysis should be done. Researchers have to 
include in their econometric models the cointegrating but non-stationary time series. This chapter is 







Section (5.2) discusses the concept of stationarity in time series, and includes definitions and examines 
other properties of time series. Furthermore, it discusses the Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity tests. 
Section (5.3) examines the concept of cointegration, plus the Engle Granger (EG) and the Augmented 
Engle Granger (AEG) tests of cointegration based on a residuals approach. In section (5.4) we outline the 
Johansen approach used when one has more than one relationship to investigate in the long-run 
cointegrating relationships among time series. Section (5.5) identifies the regression with the time lags of 
the variables and it justifies the choice of variables that are included in both models we estimate based on 
the economic theory we reviewed in chapter two and three and we base the analysis on previous empirical 
research. Both these models are known as Vector autoregression and we call them VAR1 and VAR2. 
 
5.2 Stationary and non-stationary time series data 
 
 
In outlining stationarity within a time series, it is necessary to highlight the behaviour of a time series 
when a shock occurs in the data generating process. Brooks (2002: 240) deems that the stationarity or 
otherwise of a time series influences its behaviour. According to Patterson (2000: 601) and Gujarati 
(2003: 811), when a shock affects a stationary time series, it decays progressively and disappears over 
time. Hill et al., (2001: 341) reiterates the progressive decline of the effect of a shock on a stationary time 
series. Moreover, Gujarati (2003: 797) stipulates that shocks can generally indicate some change (such as 
a change of economic policy for instance) during a particular time period in the data generating process, 
and for non-stationary time series this shock persists over time, while for a stationary time series it decays 
progressively and it disappears over time. One must also be careful, in the case of a stationary time series, 







5.2.1 Strictly and weakly stationary process  
 
 
Gujarati (2003: 797-798) and Brooks (2002: 230) emphasise that a strictly stationary process is one 
having the same probability of generating a time series say, ty  as time progresses. Furthermore, Gujarati 
(2003: 797) and Maddala and Kim (1998: 11) deem that the process generating time series data rarely 
behaves in this way, especially for macroeconomic time series. Additionally, Brooks (2002: 230-231) and 
Gujarati (2003: 797) turned the concept of a strictly stationary process into a weak stationary process by 
requiring stationarity within a time series. According to Brooks (2002: 231) and Enders (2004: 53), a 
stationary time series has three properties: 
(i) a stationary time series has a constant mean (E ( ty ) = µ): The mean of a stationary time series does 
not change within time. Graphically, this time series crosses the mean line frequently as time progresses 
and it does not have any time trend.                                                                                 
(ii) a stationary time series has a constant variance (E ( ty - µ) ( ty - µ) = σ
2  ): As the time progresses 
the dispersion of a stationary time series above and below its mean values is almost the same.                                                           
(iii) a stationary time series has a constant covariance ( E (
1t
y - µ) (
2t
y - µ) =
12 tt 
 ) : The correlation 
between a time series and its own lags remain unchanged for all values separated by the same interval of 
time. For instance, E (
1t
y - µ) (
2t
y - µ) is equal to E (
10t
y - µ) (
11t
y - µ) and so on.  
 
Empirically a weak stationary process shows some of these three properties, mostly the property of 
constant variance (a progressive decay of a shock in time series) and we scrutinise our variables by using 
formal tests which we review in section (5.2.3) below.                   
 
5.2.2 Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions within an AR (p) model 
 
 
The significance of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients indicate how a time series is 
correlated with its own lags as time progresses and can generally tell one a great deal about the presence 
of stationarity within a time series (Box and Pierce, 1970).  According to Brooks (2002: 239) and 






variable, ty  depends upon only the values that the variable took in the previous periods plus an error term. 













5.2.3 Empirical tests for stationarity 
 
 
The condition of stationarity is achieved through testing for the presence of a unit root in a time series. In 
this way, Brooks (2002: 377) stipulates that one can test for a unit root through checking the significance 
of autocorrelation function coefficients, or examining the correlogram plots to determine if the 
correlogram is decaying (stationarity) or not.  However, Enders (2004: 175) and Brooks (2002: 377) 
reiterate that when one is analysing the decay of a correlogram, one can sometimes reach the wrong 
conclusion about the existence of stationarity within a time series. Thus, hereafter formal stationarity 
hypothesis testing is discussed.  
 
We suggest that in order to test stationarity, popular tests such as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test (Patterson, 2000: 257-260) and (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 126-128) be used.        
 
5.2.3.1 Dickey-Fuller stationarity test 
 
 
Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979) investigate the null hypothesis that 1  in the 
model ttt uyy  1  (5.1) against one side alternative hypothesis that 1 . In addition to model (5.1), 
Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979) examine two other models, (5.2) and (5.3) below, having 
respectively, a constant, and a deterministic trend and a constant.  It is worth noting that when empirical 






generating process of time series ty . This emphasises the non-decaying effect of any shock occurring in 
this series as time progresses. To carry out this test one can estimate the following models: 
 
ttt uyyH  10 :                                 (5.1) 
1,: 11  ttt uyyH    
 
 ttt uyyH  10 :                                (5.2) 
 1,: 11  ttt uyyH    
 
ttt uyyH  10 :                                 (5.3) 
 1,: 11  ttt utyyH    
 
According to Gujarati (2003: 815), the null hypothesis of a unit root can be empirically investigated 
through estimating the model ttt utyy    1 , with 1 ttt yyy  and 1 . The test 






, where  ̂ÊS  is the standard deviation of an estimate of the coefficient on 
1ty . The critical values for DF tests are given in Fuller (1976: 373), Brooks (2002: 675), Patterson 
(2000: 237) and Maddala and Kim (1998: 64) and can be obtained by simulation. As is familiar to us 
from the econometrics literature, for a given significance level, we do not fail to reject the null hypothesis 






 is greater (less negative) than the 
critical value for the DF tests. In the same way, one can fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root if 






 is, for a given significance level smaller than the critical value for the DF tests. 
Before concluding on these DF tests, it is worth noting that the estimates of the intercept and that of the 
coefficient on the time trend variable, included in the models (5.2) and (5.3) are not examined by a unit 
root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981: 1062). The asymptotic distribution of the DF tests supposes that the 






5.2.3.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (ADF-tests) 
 
 
The distribution of errors can be identically and independently distributed (iid ~ ( 2,0  )) or maybe not, 
the latter especially if there is autocorrelation in the dependent variable of the regression  ty (Brooks, 
2002: 379). According to Patterson (2000: 239-241), to correct for the effect of serial correlation in the 





y ) to improve the test statistic.  In this way, Brooks (2002: 379-380) 




y ) variables be in the regression model (see equations (5.4 to 
5.6) below) for the purpose of correcting any autocorrelation in the dependent variable  ty  to make 
sure that the autocorrelation in tu is removed. Otherwise, the usual test statistic will be incorrect and leads 







y , where for any given period ―T‖ of study, 
t
y  is the value of a time series 
―Y‖ observed at t and 
1t






























1                      (5.6) 
 
Enders (2004: 182) maintains that the same critical values for the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test can be used 
with the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and is still conducted on the  coefficient of 1ty . We do 
not fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in favour of stationarity or we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root if the test statistic is greater or less than the DF critical values at a given 






variable  ty , one can use Akaike‘s (1974) information criterion
1





5.2.3.3 Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
 
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests assumes that the autocorrelation of errors is caused by the 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable  ty  (Patterson (2000: 239-241). To remove the bias caused 
by autocorrelation in the error tem, the lagged dependent variables should be included in the regression 
model as regressors. In addition, Maddala and Kim (1998: 79) advocate the point that autocorrelation may 
have many sources. Taking into consideration this idea, Phillips (1987) and Perron (1988) devised a new 
test statistic
3

























12 2  for respectively correcting for the variance of 
errors (
2
e ) and the variance of the sum of squared errors (
2 ); where T is the total number of sample 
observations, te are regression errors, l is the number of lags (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 78-81). It is worth 
noting that the econometric software package, Eviews 6.0, calculates the PP tests statistic and provides 







ˆln 2    
2
   T
T
k
SBIC lnˆln 2   , ), where 2̂   is the variance of residuals (also equivalent to the residual sum of 
squares divided by the number of degrees of freedom kT  ; k  is the number of parameters estimated and T is the 
sample size ) (see Maddala and Kim, 1998: 77). 
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the critical values at different significance levels. Concerning the power of these tests in detecting the 
existence of a unit root within a time series, Brooks (2002:  380-381) shows that the PP and ADF tests 
have the limitation of failing to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the case of stationary process 
for an insufficient number of times. Despite this limitation, we use these tests as they are popular in the 
literature.  
 
5.2.3.4 Testing stationarity as a null hypothesis: KPSS tests 
 
 
Maddala and Kim (1998: 126-128) stipulate that one way of getting around the problem of failing to 
reject the null hypothesis of unit root when false is to perform a test which has the stationarity under the 
null hypothesis. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) developed such a test for a series appearing 
stationary by default in those cases where there is little information within the sample of data 
(Kwaitkowski et al., 1992).  In empirical tests, it is recommended that one compare the results of the 
KPSS tests with the results obtained from the ADF/PP procedure to see if the same conclusions are 
reached. One must note that the null and alternative hypotheses under each test are not the same and are 
as follows:  
 
ADF/PP                           KPSS               
0H : ty  1I                    0H : ty  0I   
   
1H : ty  0I                 1H : ty  1I . 
 
The econometric package Eviews 6.0 calculates the KPSS test statistic and provides critical values for 
this. In comparing the results from ADF/PP and KPSS tests, the four following outcomes can take place: 
 
(i) Reject 0H in ADF/PP test and do not reject 0H in KPSS test 
(ii)  Do not reject 0H in ADF/PP test and reject 0H in KPSS test 
(iii)  Reject 0H in ADF/PP test and reject 0H  in KPSS test 







If the results from testing stationarity in the empirical research fall under the outcome (i) and (ii), we can 
unambiguously conclude for stationarity. Conflicts arise if outcomes (iii) or (iv) occur. In this case, it will 
be difficult to make a decision and the only way to avoid this difficulty is to obtain more information.  
 
5.3 Cointegration methods and linear combinations of non-stationary time series 
 
The inclusion of a time series in regression analysis requires that the time series be stationary. A non-
stationary time series can be made stationary by differencing or detrending and these procedures can be 
guided by the results from the unit root tests (Gujarati, 2003: 802-804). The elimination of any trend 
(stochastic or deterministic) may result in the loss of relevant information about the long-run relationships 
among macroeconomic time series (Patterson, 2000: 602). However, there might be equilibrium between 
variables and research must include cointegrating non-stationary time series in their analysis (Patterson, 
2000: 602).  
 
According to Enders (2004: 325), time series trending together can appear to have a long-run equilibrium 
since they cannot progress ―independently‖ from each other. Furthermore, the fact that these series trend 
together could induce some linear combination of the two to become stationary and are said in this case to 
be cointegrating, and this stationary linear combination must be included in the econometric model if 
there is a sound economic reason for doing so (Brooks, 2002: 392) and (Enders, 2004: 322).  
 
The next section discusses cointegrating (stationary linear combinations) non-stationary time series. 
Brooks (2002: 388) stipulates that the vector  /21 ,,, ntttt xxxx  , is cointegrated of order bd , , 
denoted tx ),( bdCI if  two necessary conditions are verified:  
 
(i) all components of tx are integrated of order d ;  
(ii) if there exists a vector  n ,,,, 321  called the cointegrating vector such that a linear 
combination tntntt xxxx   2211 is integrated of order )( bd  where 0b . The order 
d of integration of a time series indicates how many times one has to difference it in order to get the 







In defining the long-run equilibrium resulting from a linear combination of non-stationary series trending 
together over time, it can happen that one of these series deviates from the equilibrium trend and causes 
disequilibrium among the cointegrating series. However, the subsequent period can be characterised as a 
short-run dynamic movement of that series such that there is a return to the long-run equilibrium 
(correcting the previous disequilibrium) and therefore the system (these series) returns to the long-run 
equilibrium (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 36) and (Patterson, 2000: 608). The following sub-section (5.3.1) 
summarises this phenomenon using the concept of error correction models.  
 
5.3.1 Cointegration, error correction models, weak exogenous and Granger causality 
 
The proportion of the deviation from the equilibrium relationship of cointegrating time series corrected in 
each period is estimated using an econometric model called the error correction technique (Enders, 2004: 
328-329). Furthermore, to illustrate the error correction model, let us say that ty and tx are cointegrating 
time series. Indeed, the proportion of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium can be estimated using 
equations (5.7) and (5.8) below: 
 
  0,11 xxtttxt xyx                       (5.7) 
ty   0,11 yyttty xy                      (5.8) 
 
Where yt and xt are white noise disturbance terms, y , x are named speeds of adjustment to 
equilibrium,   is the long-run equilibrium parameter and  11   tt xy   is the deviation in a previous 
period from the long-run equilibrium between ty and tx  (Patterson, 2000: 608-609) and (Enders, 2004: 
328-329).  
 
The estimation of an error correction model can give biased results if there is autocorrelation in the error 
terms. To alleviate this problem, as is done for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, one includes lagged 
values of the dependent variables in the error correction model as an explanatory variable (Brooks, 2002: 
391). In this way, it is appropriate to estimate equations (5.9) and (5.10) seen below: 
 
  xtititttxt aa yixixyax    
1211






  ytititttyt aa yixixyay    
2221
)()(1120            (5.10) 
 
After estimating equations (5.9) and (5.10), one can apply the standard statistical tests (t-test, F-test) for 
the significance of the coefficients and the model, since all variables included in these models are 
stationary. Furthermore, if it happens that x̂ is not significant, one should note that  tx  does not 
respond to the deviation  11   tt xy   from equilibrium and  tx  is therefore said to be weakly 
exogenous (Enders, 2004: 334). In addition, if the estimates of the coefficients of the lagged variables 
ity  are not significantly different from zero in equation (5.9), we can conclude that  ty  does not 
Granger cause  tx . This interpretation can be applied to  ty  in the case of 0ˆ y in (5.10).   
 
5.3.2 The Engle-Granger methodology: Testing for Cointegration 
 
 
For testing cointegration of non-stationary time series, Engle and Granger (1987) suggest examining 
whether the residuals from the regression of a non-stationary time series have a unit root or not (Xiao et 
al., 2002). Indeed here we undertake two regression models: (i) the first model is ttt exy  10   
(5.11) corresponding to the regression of non-stationary time series and (ii) the second model  
ttt eae  11 ˆˆ  (5.12) has enclosing residuals from an estimation of equation (5.11) (Brooks, 2002: 
391) and (Shin, 1994).  
 
Furthermore, a Dickey-Fuller or augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is carried out on these residuals to 
ensure that they are stationary given that these residuals represent the deviations )( 10 tt exy    
from their long-run equilibrium (Brooks, 2000: 393-394). Their stationarity entails that any shock to the 
cointegrating non-stationary time series, which causes disequilibrium, will disappear over time and the 
series return to equilibrium (Banerjee et al., 1996). 
 
Additionally, if we reject the null hypothesis that 01 a  from equation (5.12), we can conclude that the 
 ty  and tx  sequences are cointegrated (Xiao et al., 2002). Moreover, it is worth noting that when we 
estimate the error correction model, the residuals  1ˆ te  can substitute for the deviations from long-run 







5.4 Multivariate models and the Johansen methodology for testing cointegration 
  
When we have one stationary linear combination of macroeconomic variables, the Engle-Granger 
methodology suffices. However, when we intend to have more than one cointegrating relationship among 
non-stationary time series, Enders (2004: 347) suggests we make use of Johansen‘s methodology. 
Furthermore, for investigating cointegration within the Engle-Granger framework, the usual test of the 
unit root hypothesis is a two step process where the second step uses an autoregressive model of the 
residuals obtained from the regression carried out in the first step (see section 5.3.2). This second 
regression can give biased results since any error introduced in the first regression can affect the second 
(Patterson, 2000: 341-343).  
 
To avoid these problems, Johansen (1988) and Stock and Watson (1988) using full information maximum 
likelihood methods estimate a differenced vector autoregressive model   tt exIAx  11 , where 
 /21 ,,, ntttt xxxx  is a vector enclosing n  non-stationary time series (variables), 1A is a matrix of 
regression coefficients, I is an identity matrix. In this way, Johansen (op.cit) and Stock and Watson 
(op.cit) determine the coefficients and eigenvalues of the matrix  IA  1  and they show that the test 
for cointegration is done through investigating the statistical significance of the nonzero eigenvalues from 
this matrix   and is thus a multivariate unit root test (Xiao et al., 2002) and (Enders, 2004: 348).  
 
The statistical software package, Eviews 6.0, helps in estimating the eigenvalues of the matrix   







ˆ1ln   and 
   1max ˆ1ln1,  rTrr  , where: r   the number of independent cointegrating vectors, i̂ = the 
estimated value for the i
th
 ordered eigenvalue from 1 to n  ( n  is the number of non-stationary time series 
components of the vector tx ).The main objective of the trace and max tests statistics is to investigate 
among the number of eigenvalues of the matrix  , how many of them are insignificantly different from 
one but keeping track of the number of co-integrating relationships (Enders, 2004: 352). In performing 
the test, Brooks (2002: 404-405) and Enders (2004: 352-353) point out that the test statistic trace  under 
the null hypothesis is the number of independent cointegrating vectors less than or equal to r against a 






the null hypothesis the number of independent cointegrating vectors equal to r  against an alternative 
hypothesis of 1r  vectors. Johansen and Juselius (1990) provide the asymptotic critical values for the 
two statistics. In this way, comparing the calculated test statistic and the critical values at conventional 
significance levels, we can form a subjective opinion as to the number of the cointegrating vectors 
between two variables. Eviews 6.0 provides the calculated test statistic, trace  and λmax, and their critical 
values at different significance levels. After comparing the values of the test statistic with the critical 
values, we obtain some idea as to the number of cointegrating vectors among variables in our data. 
 
5.5 Model specification  
 
 
To our knowledge only a few studies analyse the stability of the demand for money function and show 
whether the monetary aggregate M2 serves as an adequate intermediate target to achieve the primary 
objective of price stability in Rwanda and not using the more recent data we have obtained.  
 
In line with this prior research, we find it valuable to undertake this research in order to ensure that 
policies still remain valid after changes (cited in the introduction) occurred in the Rwandan 
macroeconomic structure. The support for this research comes from Handa (2000: 285) stipulating that 
the appropriateness of a macroeconomic variable (either monetary aggregate, or interest rate or exchange 
rate) as an indicator of the need for monetary policy depends upon the structure of the economy.  
 
According to Handa (op.cit), one is not sure that existing policies remain effective after changes in 
economic structures even if they appear to be minor. The best action to take in these circumstance is to 
keep updating research to ensure policy makers know whether their policies are still on track and this 
study is indeed useful for this purpose.  
 
All the economic theories reviewed in chapters two, three, and what we expect to find from the estimation 
of the econometric models in chapter 6, are centred on figure 5.1 that is a summary of the monetary 








           Instruments            Intermediate target       Primary objective  
 
              
    Feedback            Long-run stable relationship 
Figure 5.1: Monetary targeting.  (Source:  Munyankindi et al., 2008: 55)
 
 
Based on this figure, the NBR sets base money as an operating target with the intention of changing the 
intermediate target of any monetary aggregate (money stock in the economy). Indeed monetary aggregate 
targeting is part of the strategy by which the National Bank of Rwanda chooses the money stock as the 
nominal anchor for achieving price stability as a final objective. To attain this final objective, the 
following two requirements are necessary: (i) a stable demand function for money; (ii) a long-run 
relationship between the money stock and the price level (Hansen and Kim, 1995: 286).  
 
These two necessary conditions ((i) and (ii) above) are combined into two macroeconomic relationships, 
which are subjected to cointegration analysis. The cointegration analysis sets out to identify all the 
existing long-run cointegrating relationships, based primarily on the economic theory covered in chapters 
two, three, and on empirical work of Nassar (2005) for the case of Madagascar, and improve on studies 
undertaken for Rwanda by Sayinzoga and Simson (2006) and Rusuhuzwa et al., (2006).  
 
These previous studies on Rwanda cover in large part the period of this thesis and use the Johansen 
framework for detecting the cointegrating vectors and include the exchange rate in the long-run 
relationship of the money stock with other economic variables. In addition, since weekly auctions in 
which the NBR sells US dollar reserves to commercial banks began, the exchange rate became linked to 
market forces (IMF, 2009: 25).  
 
Furthermore, the cointegration analysis we undertake in chapter six (sections 6.5.1.1 and 6.5.1.2) covers 
the cointegrating long-run relationships between the variables of the VAR1
4
 (based principally on the 
demand function for money) and VAR2
5
 models (mainly based on the long-run relationship between the 
money stock and the price level). The VAR1 model has four variables: real money balances (LNM2-
LNCPI), real income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DINTERES), and the nominal exchange rate 
                                                 
4
 VAR1: is the vector autoregressive model representing the conditions giving a stable demand function for money: 
VAR1= (LNM2-LNCPI, LNREALGD, DINTERES, LNEXCHAR); 
5
 VAR2= (LNM2, LNREALGD, DINTERES, DLNEXCHA): is the vector autoregressive model representing the 
second condition representing principally the long-run relationship between the money stock and the price level. 











(LNEXCHAR). The VAR2 model contains the money stock (LNM2), the price level (LNCPI), real 
income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DINTERES), and the depreciation of the exchange rate 
(DLNEXCHA).  
 
Additionally, the cointegrating relationship among the components of the VAR1 model is represented as:  
VAR1 = ((LNM2-LNCPI), 1  DINTERES, 2  LNREALGD, 3  LNEXCHAR). In the VAR1 model 
2  is expected to be positive given that an increase in real income increases the demand for money for 
transactions purpose while 1 and 3 are expected to be negative as they both represent an opportunity 
cost of holding money. An increase in the opportunity cost of holding money discourages the economic 
agents to hold money balances and this behaviour consequently provokes an increase in the outstanding 
money stock, which can then causes an increase in the price level.  
 
The second long-run cointegrating vectors can be represented as: VAR2= (LNM2, 1  LNREALGD, 2  
LNCPI, 3  DINTERES, 4  DLNEXCHA) and inform about the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
controlling prices and regulating aggregate demand. Indeed, the significance of real income in the VAR2 
shows the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing real income and we expect the sign of 1  to be  
positive. In addition, under the VAR2 model we expect to observe from the sample of data that an 
increase in the money stock provokes an increase in the price level and the causation is to run from the 
money stock to prices and thus the expected sign of 2 is positive. In this case, targeting the monetary 
stock as the intermediary objective for attaining the final objective of price stability is considered an 
effective monetary policy.  
 
Furthermore, the IS-LM theory emphasises that an increase of the money stock in the economy reduces 
the interest rate (Colander and Gamber, 2002) and (Hubbard, 2005: 482). We therefore expect to have 
from our sample of data a negative relationship between changes in the money stock and the changes in 
the lending interest rate.  
 
Additionally, according to El-Sakka and Ghali (2005), most of the empirical studies undertaken in 
developing countries show a positive correlation between the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
and inflation. The positive correlation between the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and 
inflation, can justify a positive sign between the depreciation of the exchange rate and the money stock. 






deprecation of the local currency. In this way, they can avoid further inflation via a depreciation of the 
exchange rate and opt to buy more in the current time period than in the future. This situation is 
summarised as trying to get ahead of possibly increasing inflation by purchasing more now, including 
imports (Beatjer, 2008: 15).  
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
 
The statistical estimation methodology and model specification discussed in chapter five are firstly, based 
on the techniques of testing the integration order of a time series so as to identify the non-stationary time 
series )1(I  from the stationary time series )0(I . This endeavour is completed through the Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) unit root test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test, 
and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity test. 
 
Furthermore, the procedure of investigating cointegrating time series summarises the Engle-Granger 
residuals based approach and the Johansen methodology based on determination of the rank (identifying 
non-zero eigenvalues) of the matrix of the coefficients in a multivariate system.   
 














This chapter provides an explanation of the empirical estimates and is done jointly with both a 
presentation and interpretation of the results. The focus of the empirical exploration is to develop two 
long-run cointegrating relationships. The first cointegrating relationship (VAR1) is between real money 
balances, real income, a lending interest rate, and the exchange rate. The second (VAR2) model is 
developed between the money stock, the price level, real income, a lending interest rate, and the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Further, from the cointegrating relationships we can formulate the 
dynamic short-run models which embrace an error correction model providing a picture of the adjustment 
of the system (both demand and supply) to long-run equilibrium. 
 
Section (6.2) of this chapter highlights the data sources and covers the choice of variables in reference to 
the theory discussed in chapters two, three, and four of this thesis. Furthermore, based on the discussion 
outlined in chapter five, this chapter divides the estimation procedure into five sections. Section (6.3) 
emphasises the transformation of the data. This stage includes the log transformation of all the variables 
except the interest rate. Further, the transformation of nominal income into real income and the 
determination for real money balances are carried out. In addition, the depreciation of the Rwandan franc 
against the US dollar is determined. In section (6.4), the estimation procedure undertakes tests of 
integration based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF-tests), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit roots tests for stationarity in order to separate the non-stationary 
variables )1(I  from the stationary )0(I variables. This section also presents the results concerning 
stationarity and motivates the subsequent approach of testing for cointegration.   Section (6.5) undertakes 
the tests of cointegration using the Johansen approach. Under the Johansen framework, variables are 
arranged into a multivariate VAR model (Vector Autoregressive) and the order of lag (p) is determined 






constant in the cointegrating space, or a model having a linear trend in the data and a constant in the 
cointegrating space, or a model having a linear trend and a constant in the data as well as in the 
cointegrating space. Furthermore, section (6.5) presents and discusses the results of the estimated 
cointegrating vectors in both models, namely, VAR1 and VAR2. Section (6.6) exploits the long-run 
relationships, VAR1 and VAR2 in order to develop VECM1 and VECM2 models (Vector Error 
Correction Models). The VECM (s) are formed by the equations that capture the correction of the demand 
for money balances back to equilibrium and the correction of the disequilibrium in the outstanding money 
stock in the economy. Section (6.7) involves diagnostic tests of the error correcting models: VECM1 and 
VECM2. We also verify exogeneity tests to check whether there is a possibility of the existence of a 
single equation relationship to be estimated using OLS. 
 
6.2 Data collection  
 
 
The data is from the National Bank of Rwanda for the period 1996: Q1 to 2008: Q3. Information about 
the data is available in the various publications of the National Bank of Rwanda, including quarterly and 
annual reports.  
 
Monetary aggregate M2 (LNM2): Broad money comprising narrow money M1 (currency in circulation 
and demand deposits), time and savings deposits, and foreign currency assets. The National Bank of 
Rwanda targets M2 with the aim of achieving a final goal of price stability.  
 
Real income (LNREALGD): The quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data is collected from the 
NBR and according to the National Institute of Statistics can be categorized  into three activities including 
the agriculture sector (food crops, export of crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries), the industry sector 
(mining and quarrying, manufactured goods; foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, electricity, gas and water 
and construction), and services in the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage 
and communication, finance, insurance, real estate and business services, public administration, 
education, health and other services (NBR, 2009: 130).  
 
Further, when researchers choose a scale variable to include in the money demand function, some prefer 
considering money as an asset competing with other financial assets and suggest using the wealth of 
economic agents as a scale variable. On the other hand, if the focus is the demand for money for 






of many African countries (including  Rwanda) is based on agriculture and their financial markets are less 
developed, most of the empirical research examining the demand for money in these countries emphasize 
the transaction motive and most use real GDP as a scale variable (Rusuhuzwa et al., 2006: 52). Indeed, 
we use real GDP here to represent a scale variable in the econometric models.  
 
Lending interest rate (DINTERES): Basically, in the context of demand for money the opportunity cost 
is represented by the rate of return remunerating other financial assets that economic agents should 
choose as an alternative investment to holding money balances. 
 
 According to Laidler (1999), the interest rates in the money market usually trend together (as all of them 
are determined as a function of inflation) and anyone of them can be a proxy for each other in any 
empirical analysis. We make this assumption here.  
 
In Rwanda, the developing financial market started in December 2007 and from that date until December 
2008 only three bonds were issued. Furthermore, only some banks and other private or public institutions 
are directly involved in the money market engaged in the selling and buying of treasury bills, and not the 
rest (small businesses) of Rwandan economic agents. To this end, the demand for money emphasising the 
transactions‘ motive may fit well into the Rwandan macroeconomic context, over our sample period.   
 
It is worth noting that we were not able to collect the data on interest rates for treasury bills transactions 
over the study period. For this reason, and considering Laidler‘s (1999) idea that the interest rates in 
money market trend together, we suggest use the lending interest rate as representing the cost of holding 
money in our econometric model. 
 
Exchange rate (LNEXCHAR): According to (Oskooee et al., 1990, Corden, 1984, Mundell, 1963) the 
nominal exchange rate should be included in the list of the determinants of demand for money. In 
conformity with this suggestion, the exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar is included 
in our econometric model to represent the opportunity cost of holding money balances in the local 
(Rwandan franc) currency (Rusuhuzwa et al., 2006: 53). 
 
Depreciation of the exchange rate (DLNEXCHA): According to Mishikin (2007), changes in the 
exchange rate can either be an appreciation (increase in the value of the domestic currency) or a 
depreciation (a decrease in the value of the domestic currency). Indeed, a depreciation of domestic 







In an empirical study of money demand and inflation conducted by Nassar (2005: 7) for Madagascar, the 
expected depreciation of the local currency is found to be a major factor in stoking inflationary 
expectations. In the same way as Nassar, we include this variable in the econometric models under study 
here for assessing its effect in the context of Rwanda. 
 
Consumer price index (LNCPI): The ultimate objective of the NBR is to achieve price stability through 
targeting the monetary aggregate M2. For this reason, we investigate the existence of a stable long-run 
relationship between nominal money stocks and the price level as part of answering our research 
questions so as to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy. In the case of Rwanda, the Consumer Price 
Index comprises a wide range of goods and services, including: food, non-alcoholic and alcoholic 
beverages, clothing, housing, gas, water, electricity, furnishing, restaurants, and hotel services (NBR, 
2009: 132).  
 
Dummy variable: This variable captures the fact that in 2006: Q4, Rwanda (AFDB, 2007), became 
eligible for benefits from the initiatives of the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) and the MDRI 
(Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives). These initiatives lead to a reduction of debt by 76.6 million US 
dollars and later a further 1.150 billion US dollars. 
 
Dummy2 variable: In January 2008, the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR; 2007: 3) recommended, in 
conformity with law and regulation, that commercial banks increase their capital of 1.5 billion Rwandan 
francs up to a minimum of 5 billion Rwandan francs (roughly 9 million US dollars). We add this dummy 







6.3 Data transformation  
 
 
This stage involves the natural log transformation of the variables except for the interest rate. And it also 
involves the determination of real income, real money balances and the depreciation of the exchange rate 
of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar. 
 
Natural Log Transformation  
 
It is standard practice to transform macroeconomic time series data into the natural log form since the 
non-transformed data usually trends upwards and unit root tests undertaken on these series may 
mistakenly conclude they are non-stationary (Maddala and Kim, 1998: 88). In addition, a natural 
logarithm transformation of time series data facilitates interpretation of results given that in the natural 
logarithm transformation any responses are thus stated in percentage change rather than in measured 
units. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the interest rate variable is already in percentage terms; thus 
it needs no transformation. 
 
Transformation of nominal income into real income  
 
Normally, to deflate nominal GDP economic theory recommends the use of the GDP deflator (Colander 
and Gamber, 2000). In the absence of a GDP deflator variable use of the consumer price index has 
become popular with the intention of removing the effect of price increases (or decreases) in the value of 
aggregate income. In this way, the consumer price index is used here to remove the effects of price 
changes to obtain real income since we were not able to get the GDP deflator from the National Bank of 
Rwanda over the study period.  
 
Transformation of nominal M2 into real M2 balances  
 
Economic theories discussed in chapter three emphasise that a rational economic agent negotiates their 
income in terms of purchasing power. Further, the economic theories discussed in chapter two suggest 
analysing money demand in terms of real balances. Empirically, the transformation of nominal M2 into 
real M2 is carried out by taking the natural logarithm of M2 minus the natural logarithm of CPI (LNM2-







 Calculation of the depreciation of the exchange rate  
 
Inspired by Nassar (2005: 7), the depreciation of the exchange rate between the Rwandan franc against 
the US dollar is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate series at period t  
and then taking a one period lag of the natural logarithm of the exchange rate and subsequently 
determining the difference between the natural logarithm of the exchange rate series and its lagged value. 
It is worth noting that a positive value for the difference is an appreciation of the exchange rate. In 
African countries (including Rwanda) with less developed economies, usually the exchange rate 
depreciates rather than appreciates. Indeed, we make this assumption for the exchange rate of the 
Rwandan franc against the US dollar. 
 
6.4 Estimation of order of integration, and the methodology for testing for cointegration   
 
This section tests for the order of integration of the time series under study and reports the results of unit 
root tests. In addition, the correlation of a series with its own lags and interaction among series under 
study point to the right approach to use for identifying the cointegrating vectors among them. In this 
endeavour, the results of the test for stationarity of time series are crucial when estimating the 
econometric model, since only non-stationary time series are involved in the cointegrating relationships.  
 
6.4.1 Estimation of order of integration 
 
Before attempting the formal test of unit root hypothesis in each time series, one can first plot the data and 
the correlogram of each time series using Eviews 6.0 and SPSS 15.0. Through these plots one can identify 
whether a time series is a random walk from a decaying-correlation of each time series with its own lags 
exists. In appendix 1, the plots and the correlogram of each variable show the presence of a random walk 
and a slowly decaying-sample correlogram leading one to posit a unit root in these series. But not in the 
interest rate and the depreciation of the exchange rate series. With the intention of enhancing the analysis, 
the second step is to detect formally the presence of unit roots using the ADF, PP, and KPSS (detailed 
earlier in chapter five, sections 5.2.3.2; 5.2.3.3, and 5.2.3.4) unit root tests and we report the results in 







Table 6.1 - ADF, PP, and KPSS Unit Root Tests Results  
 
                                                        Test stat.             Critical                                        1st differences 
Method     Variables      Lags          in levels                  stat.                      Lags             Test stat.                                        Critical stat. 
 
ADF         LNM2            5           0.692470          -3.568308 (at 1%)             1             -2.736707                                 -2.614029 (at 1%) 
PP             LNM2                         2.669686            -2.921175 (at 5%)                          -5.462030                                 -2.613010 (at 1%) 
KPSS        LNM2                         0.945057            0.739000  (at 1%)                            0.231649                                  0.739000  (at 1%)  
 
ADF     LNREALGD      0           - 2.945529          -3.568308 (at 1%)           5              -1.981951                                - 1.948313 (at 5%) 
PP        LNREALGD                      -2.539169          -2.921175 (at 5%)                         -3.341006                                   -1.947665 (at 5%) 
KPSS   LNREALGD                      0.929907            0.463000 (at 5%)                           0.361287                                   0.463000 (at 5%) 
     
ADF       LNCPI              1             1.229258             -2.922449 (at 5%)           0             -1.990681                                -1.947665 (at 5%) 
PP            LNCPI                            2.191048             -2.921175 (at 5%)                           -2.277329                                -1.947665 (at 5%) 
KPSS      LNCPI                             0.924418              0.739000  (at 1%)                          0.388436                                   0.463000 (at 5%) 
 
ADF   LNEXCHAR       6             -1.359759              -2.922449 (at 5%)            0            -1.990681                                  -1.947665 (at 5%) 
PP       LNEXCHAR                     -1.167608              -2.921175 (at 5%)                          -2.061025                                  -1.947665 (at 5%) 
KPSS   LNEXCHAR                      0.858294              0.739000   (at 1%)                                0.262838                                     0.463000 (at 5%) 
 
ADF  DLNEXCHA          0           -2.356622              -2.922449 (at 5%)            0            -6.486051                                -2.614029 (at 1%) 
PP   DLNEXCHA                          -2.471651              -2.922449 (at 5%)                          -6.967225                                 -1.947816 (at 5%) 
KPSS    DLNEXCHA                     0.159793               0.216000 (at 1%)                            0.097808                                   0.146000 (at 5%) 
 
ADF    DINTERES           0           -0.557625             -1.947665 (at 5%)         10               -2.836376                                  -2.624057 (at 1%) 
PP        DINTERES                       -0.792918              -1.947665 (at 5%)                            -12.38874                                  -2.614029 (at 1%) 
KPSS  DINTERES                          0.490598               0.739000 (at 1%)                            0.143834                                    0.463000 (at 5%) 
 
Table 6.1 shows the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root tests. In performing the ADF test, the lags of each 
variable are determined through considering the minimum values of Schwarz-Bayesian information 
criterion (SBIC) statistics (not reported). In practice, the SBIC is most preferred because it penalises 
strongly each additional term added to the regressors in the econometric model estimated with the 
intention of investigating the presence of unit roots within the series (Brooks, 2002:  427). 
 
With the intention of obtaining reliable results from unit root tests, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test can 
enhance the results obtained from the ADF test. Some econometric literature argues that in empirical 
analysis, the ADF and PP tests reach similar conclusions most of the time and suggests undertaking a 
confirmatory test (Brooks, 381-382). Thus, the KPSS stationarity test is used here for validating the 






does not fail to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity since the calculated tests statistics are greater than 
their critical values.  
 
Finally, the results from the formal unit root tests conclude that there is a unit root in all variables under 
study and this view matches the view of non-stationarity based on the informal investigation examining 
the plots and their correlograms.   
 
Additionally, it is worth noting that before summarising the conclusion from the results shown in table 
6.1, that all variables have a unit root, we reject (not reported) a linear trend in the data generating process 
for all variables under study. To this end, the unit root tests undertaken on our series using the 
econometric model allowing the presence of a linear trend in the data generating process, failed to reject 
the unit root hypothesis and therefore do not show the presence of a significant linear trend in the data 
(Maddala and Kim, 1998: 87-88).  
 
In addition, table 6.1 shows that all differenced time series are stationary. The theory says that in such a 
case one can include these stationary time series in the econometric models and run a regression analysis. 
But, that analysis can be incomplete as it misses the long-run relationships usually found in 
macroeconomic variables and examined through a cointegration test. 
  
6.4.2 Methodology for testing cointegration   
 
 
With the intention of obtaining a full and correct specification of the econometric models in the empirical 
research, the literature recommends investigating for the presence of cointegrating non-stationary time 
series with the aim of including them in the econometric models. Informally, one can get a good idea 
whether the series are cointegrating or not by plotting together the series as a system. To this end, figure 
6.1 and figure 6.2 (seen below) show that the series under study are trending together over time and the 
probability of finding cointegrating relationships among them is high.                




























Figure 6.1: Time series trending together in the VAR1 model (source: reproduced from the data).  Figure 
6.2: Time series trending together in the VAR2 model (source: reproduced from the data).  
 
Formally, to investigate the cointegrating relationship between time series, one can either use the Engle-
Granger univariate single equation method or the Johansen multivariate approach. In this chapter, the 
choice between these two approaches is based on information from table x1 to table x5 (see page 103-
page 105) in appendix 2, which show that the significance of correlation-coefficients of series and their 
own lags persist up to 16 lags. In addition, the tables x6 and x7 (see page 105-page 106) in appendix 2, 
highlight interactions between the series under study.  
 
In the endeavour to identify cointegrating series and with the intention of capturing correlations between 
these series with their own lags and interactions among series, the Johansen methodology developed with 
the vector autoregressive model (VAR) is the most appropriate approach. 
 
6.5   Vector Autoregressive model selection   
 
This stage involves selecting the order (p) of a VAR model and then deciding whether to include an 
intercept in the cointegrating space, or to add a linear trend. In fact, when selecting the order (p) of a 
vector autoregressive model, Patterson (2000: 632), Enders (2004: 357) and Brooks (2002: 335-336) 
propose using the AIC and SBIC statistics and retaining the number of lags which correspond to the 






researchers should set a maximum number of lags equal to 3
1
T (T is the number of the sample 
observations) and choose between one up to this number, as the order of the VAR corresponding to the 
optimum value of AIC and SBIC. Concerning the optimum value, some literature (Enders, 2004: 370; 
Brooks, 2002: 336) proposes keeping to a minimum the value of AIC and SBIC. In addition, Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1997: 354) suggest considering, in the case of a single equation, the order of the VAR 
corresponding to the minimum value of AIC and SBIC statistics and the maximum value of AIC and 
SBIC statistics in a multivariate regression context.  
 
In determining the order of the VAR1 and VAR2 (specified in chapter five, section 5.5), the first step is to 
set the maximum order using the formula 3
1
T = 47084.3)51( 3
1
 , since we have 51 observations in the 
sample (Enders 2004: 358) and then select the order of the VAR1 and VAR2 equal or close to 4 which is 
convenient as quarterly data are analysed here (Brooks, 2002: 380). By applying Ender‘s formula and 
considering the suggestion of Brooks (2002: 380) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997: 354), the optimum 
order of each VAR1 and VAR2 is equal to 4 and 3 respectively (see appendix 2, table x8 and table x9, 
page 106). Note that the econometric software package Eviews 6.0 helps in determining the value of AIC 
and SBIC at different lag levels of each VAR model. 
 
Additionally, under the Johansen methodology, Eviews 6.0 proposes different specifications of the 
econometric models which can be estimated with the aim of identifying the cointegrating vectors among 
the series. These specifications are: (i) assuming a constant in the cointegrating space or (ii) having a 
constant in the cointegrating space and allowing for the existence of a linear trend in the data or, (iii) 
considering a linear trend and a constant in the data as well as in the cointegrating space (Brooks, 2002:  
426). 
 
In this research, the choice of the model is based on Patterson (2000: 630) stipulating that the variables 
which are stochastically cointegrated are mostly assumed to be deterministically cointegrated. In this way, 
the model allowing for a linear trend in the data and a constant in cointegrating space is the one most used 
in empirical research. Thus we estimate the VAR1 and VAR2 models by assuming the existence of a 







6.5.1 Identification of the Cointegrating vectors  
 
 
The cointegration analysis investigates the existence of cointegrating relationships between the variables 
of the VAR1 and VAR2 models. The VAR1 model has four variables: real money balances (LNM2-
LNCPI), real income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DINTERES), and the nominal exchange rate 
of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar (LNEXCHAR). The VAR2 model contains the money stock 
(LNM2), the price level (LNCPI), real income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DINTERES), and 
the depreciation (mostly) of the Rwandan franc (DLNEXCHA).  
 
6.5.1.1 Identification of the Cointegrating vectors in the VAR1 model 
 
 
The results from the identification of the cointegrating vector in VAR1 = ((LNM2-LNCPI), 1  
DINTERES, 2 LNREALGD, 3 LNEXCHAR), are summarised in table 6.2 below. For details, one can 
see the table x10 in appendix 2, pages 107-108. 
 
Table 6.2: Cointegration analysis results for variables in the VAR1 model 
 
Eigenvalues (trace test)                      0.575543                     0.374261                     0.229440                   0.066208 
Hypothesis (for trace test)                    0r                        1r                        2r                        3r    
  trace (test.statistic)                         74.47072                    35.90823                    14.81127                    3.082586 
  trace (critical.value at 5%)              47.21                            29.68                        15.41                          3.76 
  trace (critical.value at 1%)              54.46                          35.65                          20.04                          6.65 
 Hypothesis (for max test)                     0r                        1r                       2r                     3r  
 max (test.statistic)                             38.56249                    21.09696                    11.72869                    3.082586 
  max (critical value at 5%)                 27.07                        20.97                           14.07                           3.76 
   max (critical value at 1%)                32.24                        25.52                           18.63                            6.65 
 
In table 6.2, the investigation of the cointegrating vectors is based on the 95 per cent and 99 per cent 
critical values of the maximum eigenvalue test statistic and the trace test statistic. The   trace test and 
 max test fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent significance level that there are two or fewer 






test suggests one cointegrating relationship in the VAR1 model while the   trace test maintains two or 
fewer cointegrating relationships. Enders (2004: 354) recommends to retain the smallest number of 
cointegrating vectors in the case of conflicting results between the maximum eigenvalue test statistic and 
the trace test statistic.  
 
Based on Enders‘ recommendation (2004: 354) and the economic theory underlying this research we 
retain here one cointegrating relationship in the VAR1 model as it provides a general picture of the 
demand for money. For details, one can see the table x10 in appendix 2, page 107. 
 










 1.000000 -1.310661  0.042936  0.002618  
  (0.19846)  (0.03297)  (0.14314)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2-LNCPI)            -0.215440    
            (0.13130)    
 
D(LNREALGD) 
           
           -0.019999 
   
            (0.05873)    
 
D(DINTERES) 
           
            -5.31168 
   
             (1.22353)    
 
D(LNEXCHAR) 
             
            0.045956 
   
             (0.02478)    
 
Once we identify the equation of demand for real money balances, it is possible to rewrite this equation in 
the usual form and obtain:  
 
LNM2-LNCPI = -0.042936 DINTERES + 1.310661 LNREAL GDP -0.002618 LNEXCHAR.  
 
In this equation, all the estimates of the coefficients of the variables have the correct sign and are 
statistically significant except for the estimate of the coefficient of the exchange rate.  The results for the 
test of significance of the coefficients in the VAR1 model are summarised in table 6.3 below. For details, 







Table 6.3: Results of the test of significance of the coefficients of variables in theVAR1 model 
 
Coefficients                             
2                     p-value for the test statistic 
     0.042936
1
ˆ                  13.18422                      0.000282 
   1.310661
2
ˆ                       11.98906                      0.000535 
    -0.002618
3
ˆ                     2.155080                      0.142099* 
       Ho: Null hypothesis: 0ˆ i  (estimated coefficients of the variables in the VAR1 model)     
         *: fail to reject the null hypothesis  
            
 
It is worth noting that when testing the significance of the estimates of the coefficients in a cointegrating 
relationship, Brooks (2002) recommends the 
2 -test statistic because the usual t-test statistic can result 
in incorrect conclusions since we use non-stationary time series. 
 
6.5.1.2 Identification of the Cointegrating vectors in the VAR2 model 
 
 
The overall aim of section (6.5.1) is the identification of the cointegrating vectors in the VAR1 and VAR2 
models respectively. VAR1 embodies the demand function for real money balances and VAR2 traces out 
the effectiveness of monetary policy by analysing the relationships between the money stock and some 
relevant macroeconomic variables. The concern in this sub-section (6.5.1.2) is the identification of the 
cointegrating vectors in VAR2 = (LNM2, 1  LNREALGD, 2  LNCPI, 3  DINTERES, 4  
DLNEXCHA). The results from the maximum eigenvalue test statistic and the trace test statistic are 







 Table 6.4: Results of Cointegration analysis for variables in the VAR2 model 
 
Eigenvalues (for trace test)                 0.636895               0.472999             0.342279                      0.150399              0.042437 
Hypothesis (for trace test)                  0r                   1r                    2r                         3r                  4r  
  trace (test.statistic)                        102.5524               56.96456             28.13972                     9.285883                1.951386 
  trace (critical.value  at 5%)            68.52                     47.21                   29.68                          15.41                      3.76 
  trace (critical.value  at 1%)            76.07                     54.46                   35.65                           20.04                      6.65 
Hypothesis (for max test)                      0r                 1r               2r                         3r                  4r  
 max (test statistic)                            45.58787              28.82484            18.85384                      7.334497                1.951386 
 max (critical value at 5%)                 33.46                   27.07                  20.97                            14.07                      3.76 
 max (critical value at 1%)                 38.77                   32.24                   25.52                            25.52                      6.65 
 
In table 6.4, the investigation of the cointegrating vectors is based on the 95 per cent and 99 per cent 
critical values of the maximum eigenvalue test statistic and the trace test statistic. The   trace test and 
 max test fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent significance level that there are two or fewer 
cointegrating relationships in the VAR2 model. Conversely, at the 1 per cent significance level, the 
 max test concludes there is one cointegrating relationship in the VAR1 model while the   trace test 
maintains two cointegrating relationships. Based on Enders‘ view (op.cit) and the economic theory 
underlying the model specification (chapter 5 in section 5.5), we accept for this thesis one cointegrating 
relationship as it permits one to get a good idea of the relationship between the money stock and other 
relevant macroeconomic variables, especially the price level. For details, one can see table x11 in 
appendix 2, page 109. 
 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 1.000000 -1.535878 -7.338497 -1.001417  0.054221  
  (0.61876)  (1.50581)  (0.53012)  (0.03847)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2) -0.120026     
  (0.07683)     
D(LNCPI) -0.001604     
  (0.03200)     
D(DLNEXCHA)  0.043896     
  (0.01862)     
D(LNREALGD) -0.001249     
  (0.03972)     
D(DINTERES) -4.116767     







      
                                  
After identifying the relationship between the money stock and the price level, we can put this relation 
into the usual form of the equation as follows:   
 
LNM2 = 1.001417 LNREALGD +1.535878 LNCPI - 0.054221 DNTERES + 7.338497 DLNEXCHA. 
 
In this equation, based on results on the bottom of page 112 and page 113, all estimates have the right 
signs and are statistically different from zero except the estimate of the coefficient of the lending interest 
rate but with an observed level of significance not too far from the usual level. In table 6.5 we summarise 
the results from the test of significance of the coefficients of the variables in the VAR2 model.  
 
 Table 6.5: Results of the test of significance of the coefficients in the VAR2 model 
 
    Coefficients                             
2                     p-value for the test statistic 
   001417.1
1
ˆ                   6.934144                    0.008457 
    535878.1
2
ˆ                  8.528249                    0.003497 
    054221.0
3
ˆ                3.758494                    0.052540   
    338497.7
4
ˆ                  12.42097                    0.000425 
 Ho: Null hypothesis: 0ˆ i  (estimated coefficients of the variables in the VAR 2 model)     
              
6.5.2 Results from the test for stability in the demand function for money  
 
One of the main aims of this research is to test the stability of the demand function for money. The 
stability of the demand function for money means a reasonable volatility in the velocity of money 
(Wallace, 1978: 365). In addition, classical economists highlight that the total value of expenditure (Y) 
equals the amount of money used (M); multiplied by the number of times it has been used over and over 
(V) (Handa, 2000: 25). In this way, classical economists consider money demand as a fixed fraction of 
total spending. Furthermore, monetarists enhance slightly the classical economists‘ ideas about the 
constancy of velocity. For monetarists, instead of considering velocity as fixed, it is better to maintain that 
it is at least predictable (Ritter et al., 2004: 440). Empirically, the velocity of money income is estimated 






2006: 75) and Nassar (2005: 9). In the context of Rwanda, the test for the null hypothesis of a unit income 
elasticity failed to reject this hypothesis as it has 
2 (1) =1.63 with a p-value= 0.201208. Moreover, the 
stability of the demand function for real balances is tested through examining whether the inverse-
characteristics‘ roots of the characteristic‘s polynomial (see appendix 4, page 114, for more details) 
formulated using the variables in VAR1 lay inside (see figure 2 below) the unit circle (Enders (2004: 46-
47), Patterson (2000: 601-604)). The econometric package, Eviews, allows one to plot the inverse roots of 
the characteristic polynomial of the endogenous variables in the VAR. From there, one can find out 
whether the inverse roots are positioned inside or outside the unit circle. Otherwise, any response to a 
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Figure 6.3: Inverse roots from the endogenous variables in the VAR1 model. (Source: reproduced from 
the data). 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the stability condition is satisfied in the VAR1 model since all inverse roots lie 
inside of the unit circle except for three unit roots (see figure 6.3 and table 14 in appendix 2, page 114) for 
which non-decaying effects to shocks are accounted for by the cointegrating relationships (stationary 
linear combination of the non-stationary series) in the VAR1 model. Thus, we confirm the stability of 
both the velocity of money income and the demand for real money balances. It is usual to find some 
inverse roots which lie on the unit circle (not inside the circle) in a cointegrating system when we 







After identifying the cointegrating vectors in models VAR1 and VAR2, the following sub-section (6.5.3) 
examines the economic meaning of the cointegrating vectors identified using our sample based on data 
collected at the National Bank of Rwanda from 1996:Q1 to 2008:Q3.  
 
6.5.3 Discussion of Results obtained from the Cointegrating vector in the VAR1 model 
 
The statistical significance of the estimate of the coefficient of real income in the long-run equation of 
money demand shows the extent of the effectiveness of monetary policy in regulating aggregate demand 
in Rwanda (Handa, 2000: 17). This responsiveness of the real money balances to real income growth is 
theoretically supported by Keynesian economic theories emphasising that an increase in real income 
increases the demand for money for transaction purposes. In the case of Rwanda, this responsiveness is 
justified by the remarkable effort of rebuilding the country in the aftermath of the war and the Genocide 
of 1994 leading the expansionary monetary policy. In this endeavour, Rwanda has been assisted 
financially and technically by the international community. Basing our opinion on the existence of a 
stable long-run relationship between real money balances and real income, one can affirm the existence of 
sound macroeconomic stability over the sample period. This performance is also pointed out by the IMF 
(2009: 7) reporting that from 1997 until 2006, real GDP of Rwanda increased at 7.4 per cent. In 2007, the 
increase was slightly above this average growth and greater than the increase of real GDP observed in 
East African Countries (IMF, 2009: 7). 
 
Concerning the proxies for the opportunity cost of holding money, from our sample of data, we found that 
the lending interest rate contributes to an explanation of demand for money balances while the nominal 
exchange rate does not. The statistical insignificance of the nominal exchange rate over the sample period 
may be explained by the low volume of transactions done by economic agents in preferring to keep their 
wealth in US dollars. Most of the wealth in foreign currency belong to the central government or public 
establishments. These assets come from donors in terms of grants, government budget support or 
disbursements that flow from multilateral or bilateral loans, and from the exportation of goods and 
services especially tea, coffee, minerals reserves and tourism (Kanimba, 2008: 14-16; 25-26). 
 
In addition, the National Bank of Rwanda sells some of these assets in foreign reserves to the commercial 
banks through a weekly auction. In turn, the commercial banks progressively sell their reserves in foreign 
currency to their customers in need of importing goods and services (Kanimba, 2008: 25-26). In our 






reserves in foreign currency is for satisfying their customers in need of these reserves rather than 
speculating about changes in the nominal exchange rate. This explains the non-significance of the 
nominal exchange rate of the franc as an opportunity cost of holding money. 
 
Additionally, the analysis of the sample of data shows that the lending interest rate, a proxy for the cost of 
money, is statistically significant (see table 6.3, page 85). In this way, the negative signs and the statistical 
significance of its coefficient in the equation of the demand for real money shows that as this rate 
increases, economic agents become discouraged from borrowing money from the banks. Some 
economists deem that commercial banks can speculate around the lending interest rate and this 
speculation should cause very high levels in the lending interest rate (Friedman, 1991: 26) compared to 
the interest rate of a time deposit and savings‘ deposit.  
 
In the case of Rwanda, Kanimba (2007: 12) highlights the remarkable gap between the interest rate on 
time deposits and a lending interest rate as a result of the absence of competition in the Rwandan bank 
system. On the other hand, banks justify this gap as a necessary increment for covering intermediation 
costs and the inherent risk on loans (Rusuhuzwa and Barebereho, 2008: 67). In our opinion, both 
arguments from both the monetary authorities and commercial banks may have some merit. The banks 
collect a big part of their time deposits and savings‘ deposits mostly from public institutions (social 
security funds for instance or the Rwanda Tea Authority). The reserves collected serve to distribute loans 
to economic agents, perhaps with some risk since the banks know that the borrowers do not have other 
alternatives of getting funds for financing their businesses.  
 
On the bank‘s side, most of time they argue that many businesses present their projects without doing 
proper feasibility studies and some projects‘ promoters are speculators in the sense that once they present 
their projects and get their money, they disappear without ever paying back the loan.  
 
Maybe, with time, and as the private sector gets stronger and develops in Rwanda, then speculation in the 
banking system might became less rampart. The development of the private sector needs huge and 
profitable private sector investment projects to generate savings.  These savings can in turn be used for 






6.5.4 Discussion of Results obtained from the Cointegrating vectors in the VAR2 model 
 
According to Friedman (1991: 15), the money supply affects the general level of prices over a long-run 
period. In this way, Friedman (op. cit) suggests focussing on the rate of money growth relative to the rate 
of growth of output instead of mechanically associating the rate of inflation to the exact rate of monetary 
growth.   
 
In the case of Rwanda, the statistical significance and the correct sign of the estimate for the coefficient of 
the price level in the long-run relationship with the money stock confirms the monetarists‘ view that 
money stock growth affects the general level of prices over time. This result confirms and answers one of 
the main questions of this study, namely, targeting a monetary aggregate could still be considered as an 
effective intermediary objective in the process of achieving the primary objective of price stability in 
Rwanda. In addition, the classical economists‘ view that the price elasticity of unit in the long run is 
identified from our sample. The test for the null hypothesis of a unit price elasticity failed to reject this 
hypothesis as it has 
2 (1) =0.478593 with a p-value= 0.489060. This outcome reinforces the accuracy of 
the long-run relationship between the money stock and price level detected from the sample. For details, 
one can see the table x4 in appendix 3, page 124. 
 
Furthermore, the statistical significance of real income in the VAR2 model shows the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in influencing real income. In addition, the IS-LM theory emphasises that an increase of 
the money stock in the economy reduces the interest rate (Colander and Gamber, 2002) and (Hubbard, 
2005: 482). The macroeconomic interpretation of the real income and lending interest rate in the VAR2 
model is similar to that outlined in the VAR1 model for the case of Rwanda. To continue the discussion 
we now move onto an analysis of the results based on the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of 
the Rwandan franc against the US dollar.  The starting point in this endeavour relies on a study done by 
El-Sakka and Ghali (2005), highlighting that the results from many empirical studies undertaken on 
developing countries show a positive correlation between a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and 
inflation. 
 
In the case of Rwanda, over the study period, the positive sign and the statistical significance of the 
estimate of the coefficient of the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the relationship with the 
money stock confirms the empirical finding of El-Sakka and Ghali, (2005) and Nassar (2005: 7) that the 






This situation observed in Rwanda during the period 1996-2003, is marked by the depreciation (see figure 
6.4 below) of the nominal exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar. One possible 
explanation could be that economic agents are anticipating further inflation by observing the current 
depreciation of the local currency. In this way, they can avoid inflation based on this depreciation and 




Figure 6.4 shows that from 1997 until 2003, the exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar 
was rapidly depreciating and generally appreciated in subsequent periods (IMF, 2009: 25).  
 
6.6 Discussion of Results obtained from the estimation of the Vector Error Correction 
Models (VECM)  
 
      
The Johansen methodology shows that there is a stable (see appendix 2, table x 14, page 114) long-run 
equilibrium between real money balances, real income, a lending interest rate, and the nominal exchange 
rate and a stable (see appendix 2, table x 15, pages 114-115) long-run equilibrium exists between the 
money stock, the price level, real income, a lending interest rate, and the depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar. As chapter five mentions in section (5.3), the 
previous dynamic short-run movements in any one of the cointegrating variables can sometimes deviate 
from its equilibrium level. The error correction model demonstrates that this previous disequilibrium is 
progressively corrected in order to re-establish the long- run equilibrium situation among cointegrating 
variables. The results from estimation of the error correction models (VECM1) and (VECM2) are 






6.6.1 Results obtained from the estimation of the VECM1 and the VECM2 models   
 
The estimation of the VECM1 and VECM2 models (appendix 3, table x1 and table x3, pages 116-123) 
results in the estimates of the error correction term‘s coefficients equal to -21.5 per cent per quarter and to 
-12 per cent per quarter respectively. The t-test shows that both estimates are not statistically significant 
at a five per cent (5%) significance level since the critical value of the t-test statistic of -1.684 (see page 
138) is greater (in absolute value) than the calculated t-test statistic which is -1.64084 for the VECM1 
model and equals to -1.56218 for the VECM2 model. The degrees of freedom are 33 (51-18) in the 
VECM1 model and equal to 34 (51-17) in the VECM2 model. 
 
Macroeconomically it is unusual that a disequilibrium which occurs in a cointegrating relationship in a 
given period be completely eliminated by stakeholders (economic agents, policy makers) in the same 
period. However, Gujarati (2003: 825) shows that an error correction term which is statistically 
insignificant can be interpreted as a coefficient of a macroeconomic relationship which deviates from an 
equilibrium in a certain period and adjusts toward its long-run equilibrium over the same time period. 
Therefore, based on Gujarati‘s (2003: 825) interpretation and the estimation results of the VECM1 and 
VECM2 models we can say that, over the sample period, if the demand for money and the outstanding 
money stock in the Rwandan economy deviate from their equilibrium in any quarter, they will adjust to 
their equilibrium level in the same quarter. In this regard, one can say that the monetary instruments 
utilised by the National Bank of Rwanda (open-market operations, discount window facilities, reserve 
ratio requirements) to adjust base money for controlling the money stock M2 are effective as we point out 
in chapter one (section 1.5) as being a highlight of this thesis.    
 
In addition to the empirical analysis at the five per cent (5%) significance level, we checked how the 
change of the probability of the sample error (p-value) can modify our initial results. In this way, we 
found that at the five point six per cent (5.6%) significance level, the Rwandan money market needs 3.5 
quarters to eliminate a half-life of the disequilibrium discrepancy in the money demand model. At the six 
point five per cent (6.5%) significance level the Rwandan money market needs 4.5 quarters to eliminate a 
half-life of the disequilibrium discrepancy in the money supply model. At the five point six per cent 
(5.6%) and six point five per cent (6.5%) significance levels, the critical values of the t-test statistic are 
equal to -1.633 and -1.552 respectively. Both error correction coefficients of -21.5 per cent per quarter 
and -12 per cent per quarter become statistically significant in the VECM1 and VECM2 models (see page 






level as both results trace out an important improvement in monetary policy affecting the Rwandan 
money market compared to the results carried out five years ago as reviewed in chapter one (section 1.5).  
 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the dummy variable capturing the eligibility of Rwanda to benefit from a 
reduction of the debt due to policies of the IMF, AFDB, and the World bank of more than 1.5 billion of 
US dollars, is not statistically significant (see the table x9 in appendix 3, pages 132-135).  It may take 
more time for Rwandan economic agents to adjust their economic activities to new circumstances. Similar 
behaviour was also detected after the decision taken in January 2008 by the National Bank of Rwanda 
(NBR, 2007: 3) recommending that commercial banks increase their capital from 1.5 billion Rwandan 
francs (roughly 2.7 million US dollars) to a minimum of 5 billion Rwandan francs (roughly 9 million US 
dollars). 
6.7 The diagnostic test of the models VECM1 and VECM2 and exogeneity tests 
  
The results from the tests (see appendix 3, table x5 and table x6, pages 127-130) for the normality of 
residuals, the variable‘s autocorrelations, homoscedasticity of the residuals, and variable‘s serial 
correlation tests show that both the VECM1 and the VECM2 models are in general of good quality. In 
fact, we failed to reject the null hypotheses for our tests for the VECM1 model. An example is the non 
rejection of the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity (variance constant) of the residuals in the VECM1 
and the VECM2 models since we have 
2 (180) =194.8626 with a p-value= 0.2125 for VECM1 and 
2 (480) = 489.6039 with a p-value= 0.3709 (see pages 128 and 130) for VECM2. It is worth noting that 
in a linear regression model, homoscedasticity of the residuals is one of the requirements for getting 
unbiased results. However, we rejected the null hypotheses for the tests of normality of residuals and 
variable‘s autocorrelation in the VECM2 model (see appendix 3, table x6, pages 128-129), but according 
to Gonzalo (1994) this is not an issue here since we used the Johansen framework in this research.    
 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis shows that in the VECM1 and the VECM2 models, real income does 
not respond to changes in real money balances and the price level does not respond to changes in the 
money stock in the short-run. So they are said in this circumstance to be weak exogenous variables (see 
appendix 3, table x7 and table x8, pages 130-132). These findings are consistent with economic theories 
stipulating that monetary policy affects the real economy over a long-run horizon. One of theories is 







Before concluding this section, we emphasize the limitations of this research, in formulating a specific 
OLS model from the VECM1 and the VECM2 models. The underlying justification is that the 
interactions found among variables (endogeneity behaviour) justify the use of a general model (Enders, 
2004: 373). Further studies must confront this issue and perform Granger causality tests and calculate 
impulse responses to innovations in money demand and the outstanding money stock in the economy. 
However, the test of stability and the diagnostic tests that we performed on the VAR1, VAR2, VECM1 




The cointegration analysis confirms the existence of a stable long-run relationship between real money 
balances (LNM2-LNCPI), real income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DINTERES), and the 
nominal exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar (LNEXCHAR).  
 
Furthermore, the cointegration analysis was extended to the velocity of money income and the results 
confirmed its stability (from a classical view) or its predictability (from a monetarist‘s view).  In addition, 
a stable long-run relationship is confirmed for the money stock (LNM2), the price level (LNCPI), real 
income (LNREALGD), a lending interest rate (DNTERES), and the depreciation of the exchange rate of 
the Rwandan franc against the US dollar (DLNEXCHA). 
 
Additionally, the previous dynamic short-run movements in the cointegrating variables can sometimes 
cause a deviation from the long-run equilibrium. The correction of the disequilibrium is determined by 
estimating the VECM1 and the VECM2 models. The findings from the estimation of the VECM1 and the 
VECM2 models reveal that the demand for money and the outstanding money stock in the Rwandan 
economy deviate from their equilibrium in any quarter and adjust to equilibrium in the same quarter. We 
supplement this finding by examining the situation at the observed significance level. We found that the 
Rwandan money market needs 3.5 quarters and 4.5 quarters to eliminate a half-life of the disequilibrium 













The emphasis in this thesis is a cointegration analysis of the effectiveness of monetary policy and money 
demand stability in Rwanda. In line with the ―Rwanda Vision 2020‖ and with a goal of enhancing 
economic growth and stability, the government of Rwanda has put in place a medium-term programme of 
four years as stated in its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS).  A part of 
this programme is a prudent monetary policy which is one of the responsibilities of the National Bank of 
Rwanda (NBR), especially via its role of controlling liquidity in the national economy so as to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. To this end, the NBR adjusts base money for making sure the level of the 
monetary aggregate M2 is consistent with price stability. Two necessary conditions required for 
effectively implementing this monetary policy are: (i) a stable demand function for money; (ii) a stable 
long-run relationship between the money stock and the price level. Chapter one introduced the motivation 
of this study, chapters two to four provide a theoretical support for the conditions required for 
successfully achieving price stability through targeting the monetary aggregate M2 in the national 
economy. Chapters five and six outline the methodology and empirical results respectively. 
 
7.2 Research hypotheses 
 
In line with the necessary requirements for achieving the final objective of price stability through 
targeting the monetary aggregate M2, chapter one asks three questions, capturing the research hypotheses 
of the thesis, to be answered after analysing the empirical results:  
 
(i) Is the stability of the demand function for money in Rwanda as confirmed by previous 
researchers still valid given recent structural changes in the Rwandan economy?  
(ii) Do equilibria exist in money demand and supply models and does the money stock indicate 






(iii) Is real money demand sensitive to exchange rate changes? 
 
Based on these questions, our research sought to confirm the following hypotheses: 
       
(i) The demand function for money in Rwanda is still stable given the recent structural changes 
in the Rwandan economy.  
(ii) Equilibria exist in money demand and supply models and the money stock determines the 
price level. 
(iii) Real money demand is sensitive to exchange rate changes. 
 
7.3 Conclusions and future research 
 
After applying the methodology examined in chapter five, chapter six outlines the empirical results. In 
reference to these results, we confirm the existence of a stable money demand model over the sample 
period which addresses our first research question. Also a unitary elasticity of real income in the money 
demand model is a good indication that real money balances and real income move one to one over the 
period of study. Therefore, the velocity of money income can be predictable over the long-run horizon. 
 
Moreover, the results show that over the sample period, a stable long-run relationship exists between the 
money stock and the price level which responds to the second research question. This result falls in the 
monetarist‘s view that in the long-run, inflation is always a monetary phenomenon. Thus, targeting the 
monetary aggregate M2 is a good indicator of the tendency of the price level over time. Lastly, over the 
sample period, the study found that the exchange rate of the Rwandan franc against the US dollar was not 
significant in the demand for real money balances model which indicates that the money demand is not 
sensitive to exchange rate changes.   
 
Furthermore, at a five per cent (5%) significance level, the analysis of short-run relationships in the 
money demand and supply models reveals that over the sample period, if the demand for money and the 
outstanding money stock in the Rwandan economy deviate from their equilibrium in any quarter, they 
will adjust back to equilibrium in the same quarter. In addition to the empirical analysis at a five per cent 
(5%) significance level, we found that at a five point six per cent (5.6 %) and a six point five per cent 
(6.5%) significance level, the Rwandan money market needs 3.5 quarters and 4.5 quarters to eliminate a 
half-life of the disequilibrium discrepancy in the money demand and supply models respectively. The 






VECM2 models. Both results trace out the important progress of monetary policy to stabilise the 
Rwandan economy in comparison to the results carried out by a different study five years ago.  
 
 
In conclusion, for the National Bank of Rwanda to be able to achieve the overall objective of price 
stability through targeting the monetary aggregate M2, the  conditions of (i) a stable demand function for 
money and (ii) a stable long-run relationship between the money stock and price level are supported by 
the results of the current study. Therefore, despite recent changes that have occurred in Rwandan 
economic structures, monetary policy remains effective. 
 
However, it is worth noting the limitations of our study: 1) the specification of the money demand 
function does not integrate with the interest rate for money market operations; 2) in this study the 
consumer price index proxies the GDP deflator. Therefore, there is no assurance that real GDP properly 
measures current income. 3) We assumed that changes in the depreciation of the exchange rate of the 
Rwandan franc against the US dollar captures real aspects of expecting further inflation, though many 
other factors can influence such an expectation. 4) The estimation of equations with small sample sizes 
















































































Appendix 1 (continued): Correlogram and random walk graphs for variables in the VAR1 






































































Appendix 1 (continued): Correlogram and random walk graphs for variables in the VAR1 






























































Appendix 2: Tests for correlation and covariance, Determining the order of VAR1 and 
VAR2 using AIC and SBIC statistics, identification of cointegrating vectors, tests of 
significance of coefficients, stability in the VAR1 and VAR2 models  
 
a)     Tests for correlation     
      
Table x1 : lnM2 
     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
      . |*******       . |******* 1 0.925 0.925 46.280 0.000 
      . |******|       . | .    | 2 0.855 -0.006 86.630 0.000 
      . |******|       . | .    | 3 0.783 -0.051 121.17 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 4 0.709 -0.054 150.10 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 5 0.643 0.009 174.39 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 6 0.587 0.039 195.12 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 7 0.532 -0.029 212.54 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 8 0.476 -0.054 226.75 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 9 0.420 -0.030 238.11 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 10 0.365 -0.032 246.88 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 11 0.312 -0.010 253.48 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 12 0.264 -0.015 258.31 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 13 0.225 0.023 261.89 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 14 0.183 -0.044 264.35 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 15 0.146 -0.011 265.96 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 16 0.105 -0.062 266.81 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 17 0.067 -0.001 267.17 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 0.036 0.008 267.27 0.000 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 19 -0.002 -0.075 267.27 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.037 -0.028 267.39 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 21 -0.070 -0.024 267.84 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 22 -0.094 0.036 268.67 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 23 -0.121 -0.046 270.07 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.148 -0.054 272.28 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 25 -0.175 -0.027 275.44 0.000 
       
       
 
Table x2:  lnReal GDP 
    
      
     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
      . |*******       . |******* 1 0.935 0.935 47.244 0.000 
      . |******|       .*| .    | 2 0.865 -0.068 88.548 0.000 






      . |***** |       . | .    | 4 0.717 -0.018 153.20 0.000 
      . |***** |       . |*.    | 5 0.663 0.112 179.03 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 6 0.612 -0.019 201.55 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 7 0.560 -0.064 220.79 0.000 
      . |****  |       .*| .    | 8 0.498 -0.106 236.37 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 9 0.440 0.022 248.84 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 10 0.386 -0.004 258.65 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 11 0.339 0.011 266.40 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 12 0.296 -0.031 272.48 0.000 
      . |**    |       .*| .    | 13 0.245 -0.105 276.75 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 14 0.197 -0.002 279.57 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 15 0.148 -0.013 281.22 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 16 0.100 -0.042 282.00 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 17 0.061 0.006 282.30 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 0.023 -0.041 282.34 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 19 -0.015 -0.039 282.36 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.056 -0.046 282.63 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 21 -0.095 -0.026 283.45 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 22 -0.128 0.012 284.98 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 23 -0.158 -0.025 287.38 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.183 -0.030 290.74 0.000 
      **| .    |       .*| .    | 25 -0.214 -0.076 295.48 0.000 
       
       
Table x3 : dlnexcha 
 
    
      
     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
      . |******|       . |******| 1 0.788 0.788 32.932 0.000 
      . |****  |       .*| .    | 2 0.549 -0.190 49.235 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 3 0.388 0.064 57.569 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 4 0.264 -0.048 61.523 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 5 0.172 -0.002 63.230 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 6 0.103 -0.020 63.855 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . |**    | 7 0.138 0.225 65.002 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 8 0.182 -0.006 67.044 0.000 
      . |*.    |       .*| .    | 9 0.141 -0.135 68.301 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 10 0.099 0.033 68.939 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 11 0.116 0.123 69.831 0.000 
      . | .    |       **| .    | 12 0.026 -0.329 69.879 0.000 
      . | .    |       . |*.    | 13 -0.064 0.087 70.164 0.000 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 14 -0.140 -0.107 71.574 0.000 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 15 -0.192 -0.095 74.320 0.000 
      **| .    |       .*| .    | 16 -0.261 -0.192 79.533 0.000 
     ***| .    |       . | .    | 17 -0.365 -0.064 90.057 0.000 
     ***| .    |       . | .    | 18 -0.354 0.061 100.22 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 19 -0.275 0.019 106.58 0.000 






      **| .    |       .*| .    | 21 -0.281 -0.120 119.06 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 22 -0.285 -0.050 126.61 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 23 -0.273 0.038 133.81 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.280 -0.061 141.67 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 25 -0.299 0.026 150.99 0.000 
       
       
Table x4 : LnCpi 
    
      
     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
      . |*******       . |******* 1 0.914 0.914 45.200 0.000 
      . |******|       . | .    | 2 0.834 -0.014 83.545 0.000 
      . |******|       . | .    | 3 0.766 0.039 116.63 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 4 0.706 0.009 145.31 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 5 0.645 -0.035 169.74 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 6 0.581 -0.044 190.03 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 7 0.520 -0.023 206.65 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 8 0.476 0.061 220.90 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 9 0.431 -0.032 232.84 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 10 0.385 -0.021 242.61 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 11 0.338 -0.036 250.31 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 12 0.293 -0.021 256.27 0.000 
      . |**    |       .*| .    | 13 0.243 -0.072 260.46 0.000 
      . |*.    |       .*| .    | 14 0.187 -0.070 263.02 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 15 0.134 -0.030 264.37 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 16 0.083 -0.039 264.90 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 17 0.035 -0.029 264.99 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 -0.009 -0.019 265.00 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 19 -0.049 -0.014 265.21 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.080 0.012 265.77 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 21 -0.107 -0.014 266.80 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 22 -0.134 -0.024 268.46 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 23 -0.159 -0.022 270.89 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.184 -0.034 274.29 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 25 -0.207 -0.017 278.73 0.000 
       
  
 
Table x5  : Lnexchar 
 
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
      . |*******       . |******* 1 0.967 0.967 50.600 0.000 
      . |*******       .*| .    | 2 0.930 -0.101 98.266 0.000 
      . |******|       .*| .    | 3 0.886 -0.099 142.49 0.000 
      . |******|       .*| .    | 4 0.838 -0.081 182.92 0.000 
      . |******|       .*| .    | 5 0.786 -0.091 219.18 0.000 






      . |***** |       .*| .    | 7 0.667 -0.079 278.36 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 8 0.604 -0.047 301.27 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 9 0.538 -0.064 319.89 0.000 
      . |***   |       .*| .    | 10 0.469 -0.071 334.42 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 11 0.400 -0.049 345.23 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 12 0.331 -0.032 352.81 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 13 0.262 -0.045 357.69 0.000 
      . |*.    |       .*| .    | 14 0.191 -0.077 360.36 0.000 
      . |*.    |       .*| .    | 15 0.118 -0.103 361.39 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 16 0.045 -0.051 361.55 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 17 -0.023 0.010 361.59 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 18 -0.087 0.000 362.21 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 19 -0.143 0.044 363.94 0.000 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.193 0.030 367.19 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 21 -0.238 -0.015 372.30 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 22 -0.280 -0.024 379.60 0.000 
      **| .    |       . | .    | 23 -0.317 -0.030 389.31 0.000 
     ***| .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.350 -0.012 401.56 0.000 
     ***| .    |       . | .    | 25 -0.378 -0.024 416.43 0.000 
       
       
 
 
b) Tests for covariance 
 
Table x6: Covariance analysis within VAR2 model  
    
    
    
   
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary    
Date: 10/07/09   Time: 11:25    
Sample (adjusted): 2 50    
Included observations: 49 after adjustments   
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)   
      
      
Covariance     
Correlation LNM2  LNREALGD  LNCPI  DINTERES  DLNEXCHA  
LNM2  0.227610     
 1.000000     
      
LNREALGD  0.104201 0.050816    
 0.968902 1.000000    
      
LNCPI  0.100286 0.046388 0.046288   
 0.977039 0.956487 1.000000   
      
DINTERES  -0.162406 -0.090920 -0.077256 0.564277  
 -0.453170 -0.536929 -0.478026 1.000000  
      
DLNEXCHA  -0.002739 -0.001166 -0.001585 0.000435 0.000363 
 -0.301228 -0.271450 -0.386588 0.030388 1.000000 









     
 
 
Table x7: Covariance analysis within VAR1 model  
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary   
Date: 10/07/09   Time: 10:02   
Sample (adjusted): 1 50   
Included observations: 50 after adjustments  
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)  
     
     
Covariance    
Correlation LNM2-LNCPI  DINTERES  LNREALGD  LNEXCHAR  
LNM2-LNCPI  0.076324    
 1.000000    
     
DINTERES  -0.101974 0.629863   
 -0.465087 1.000000   
     
LNREALGD  0.061580 -0.109529 0.055227  
 0.948484 -0.587257 1.000000  
     
LNEXCHAR  0.060578 -0.090296 0.052468 0.062015 
 0.880508 -0.456875 0.896543 1.000000 
 
C)  Determining the order of VAR1 model and VAR2 model using AIC and SBIC statistics 
 
 
Table x8: VAR 1 (LNM2-LCPI, LNREALGD, LNEXCHAR, DINTERES): Money demand equation 
 
LAG –AIC/SBIC                    AKIC SBIC 
9 -19.22217 -13.03660 
8 -15.00684 -9.545589 
7 -13.96864 -9.217497 
6 -13.22209 -9.167117 
5 -11.54424 -8.171799 
4 -10.99038 -8.287174 
3 -11.12920 -9.082225 
2 -11.38119 -9.977792 
1 -10.4686 -9.69647 
   
 
Table x9: VAR 2 (LnM2, LNREALGD, DLNEXCHAR, DINTERES, LNCPI): relationship money stock, real income, depreciation of 
exchange rate, interest rate, price level.  
 
LAG -Information   
 
                   criteria 
AKIC SBIC 
7 -28.18191 -20.73475 
6 -20.59465 -20.59465 
5 -18.02144 -12.74997 
4 -17.18163 -12.96608 
3 -16.49703 -13.31678 
2 -16.74571 -14.58064 






d) Identification of the cointegrating vectors in the VAR1 and VAR2 models 
 
Table x10: Identification  of the cointegrating vectors in  the VAR1 model  
 
Date: 05/19/10   Time: 13:50 
Sample(adjusted): 6 50 
Included observations: 45 after adjusting endpoints 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized  Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None **  0.575543  74.47072  47.21  54.46 
At most 1 **  0.374261  35.90823  29.68  35.65 
At most 2  0.229440  14.81127  15.41  20.04 
At most 3  0.066208  3.082586   3.76   6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels 
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None **  0.575543  38.56249  27.07  32.24 
At most 1 *  0.374261  21.09696  20.97  25.52 
At most 2  0.229440  11.72869  14.07  18.63 
At most 3  0.066208  3.082586   3.76   6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 1% level 
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  
-15.74505  20.63642 -0.676024 -0.041219  
 15.91788 -1.775572 -0.784114 -15.31810  
-25.07036  37.19759  4.450285  0.615230  
 15.70302 -14.75124 -0.900022 -0.079762  
     
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
D(LNM2-LNCPI)  0.013683  0.005441  0.012125 -0.008216 
D(LNREALGD)  0.001270 -0.008795 -0.003970 -0.002561 
D(DINTERES)  0.337354  0.109269 -0.073969  0.039329 
D(LNEXCHAR) -0.002919  0.002034 -0.002840 -0.000976 
     
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  325.7909  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  
 1.000000 -1.310661  0.042936  0.002618  
  (0.19846)  (0.03297)  (0.14314)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2-LNCPI) -0.215440    
  (0.13130)    
D(LNREALGD) -0.019999    
  (0.05873)    
D(DINTERES) -5.311648    
  (1.22353)    
D(LNEXCHAR)  0.045956    
  (0.02478)    
     
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  336.3394  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  






   (0.04849)  (0.09386)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.076886 -0.804709  
   (0.04449)  (0.08611)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2-LNCPI) -0.128835  0.272708   
  (0.18523)  (0.17136)   
D(LNREALGD) -0.159997  0.041828   
  (0.07442)  (0.06885)   
D(DINTERES) -3.572317  6.767756   
  (1.67493)  (1.54950)   
D(LNEXCHAR)  0.078335 -0.063845   
  (0.03414)  (0.03158)   
     
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  342.2038  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.010905  
    (0.08098)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.749968  
    (0.06659)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.711971  
    (0.37955)  
     
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2-LNCPI) -0.432802  0.723714  0.040442  
  (0.26679)  (0.33793)  (0.03627)  
D(LNREALGD) -0.060462 -0.105855 -0.011631  
  (0.10874)  (0.13773)  (0.01478)  
D(DINTERES) -1.717878  4.016273 -0.642923  
  (2.46859)  (3.12685)  (0.33557)  
D(LNEXCHAR)  0.149541 -0.169495 -0.012262  
  (0.04784)  (0.06060)  (0.00650)  
     
 








Table x11: Identification of cointegrating vectors in the VAR2 model 
 
Date: 05/19/10   Time: 13:37 
Sample(adjusted): 6 50 
Included observations: 45 after adjusting endpoints 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3 
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
      
Hypothesized  Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value  
      
None **  0.636895  102.5524  68.52  76.07  
At most 1 **  0.472999  56.96456  47.21  54.46  
At most 2  0.342279  28.13972  29.68  35.65  
At most 3  0.150399  9.285883  15.41  20.04  
At most 4  0.042437  1.951386   3.76   6.65  
      
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels 
      
      
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value  
      
None **  0.636895  45.58787  33.46  38.77  
At most 1 *  0.472999  28.82484  27.07  32.24  
At most 2  0.342279  18.85384  20.97  25.52  
At most 3  0.150399  7.334497  14.07  18.63  
At most 4  0.042437  1.951386   3.76   6.65  
      
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 1% level 
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 10.95256 -16.82180 -80.37532 -10.96807  0.593858  
 13.06140 -45.58880 -63.36621  7.912773 -2.567359  
 11.03669 -9.735172 -50.60395 -11.35232 -0.843458  
-1.898999 -8.573662  35.60281  17.24943  2.241637  
-24.21244 -10.40578 -35.24769  62.11797  2.355861  
      
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
D(LNM2) -0.010959 -0.020069  0.007438 -0.000228  0.003544 
D(LNCPI) -0.000146  0.003504  0.005226  0.003911 -0.001156 
D(DLNEXCHA)  0.004008  0.000836  0.003144 -0.002432 -0.000295 
D(LNREALGD) -0.000114  0.006833 -0.002088 -0.003918  0.002563 
D(DINTERES) -0.375873  0.038306  0.021026 -0.040602 -0.055151 
      
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  463.1048   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 1.000000 -1.535878 -7.338497 -1.001417  0.054221  
  (0.61876)  (1.50581)  (0.53012)  (0.03847)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2) -0.120026     
  (0.07683)     
D(LNCPI) -0.001604     






D(DLNEXCHA)  0.043896     
  (0.01862)     
D(LNREALGD) -0.001249     
  (0.03972)     
D(DINTERES) -4.116767     
  (0.84731)     
      
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  477.5172   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 1.000000  0.000000 -9.292925 -2.264426  0.251293  
   (2.14006)  (0.20399)  (0.07705)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -1.272515 -0.822337  0.128312  
   (0.83962)  (0.08003)  (0.03023)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2) -0.382161  1.099289    
  (0.10059)  (0.28677)    
D(LNCPI)  0.044161 -0.157273    
  (0.04850)  (0.13827)    
D(DLNEXCHA)  0.054814 -0.105527    
  (0.02885)  (0.08225)    
D(LNREALGD)  0.087995 -0.309574    
  (0.05777)  (0.16469)    
D(DINTERES) -3.616438  4.576532    
  (1.31290)  (3.74276)    
      
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  486.9442   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.941363 -0.304755  
    (0.49191)  (0.19200)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.641165  0.052170  
    (0.07803)  (0.03046)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.142373 -0.059836  
    (0.06276)  (0.02450)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2) -0.300069  1.026877  1.776135   
  (0.11639)  (0.28405)  (0.65441)   
D(LNCPI)  0.101840 -0.208150 -0.474717   
  (0.05419)  (0.13225)  (0.30469)   
D(DLNEXCHA)  0.089518 -0.136139 -0.534218   
  (0.03218)  (0.07854)  (0.18094)   
D(LNREALGD)  0.064955 -0.289252 -0.318154   
  (0.06836)  (0.16682)  (0.38434)   
D(DINTERES) -3.384384  4.371844  26.71960   
  (1.56199)  (3.81205)  (8.78239)   
      
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  490.6114   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.510615  
     (0.23572)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.607521  
     (0.14798)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.183153  
     (0.04168)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.866159  
     (0.22579)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LNM2) -0.299636  1.028829  1.768031 -0.126977  
  (0.11689)  (0.28826)  (0.68547)  (0.14148)  
D(LNCPI)  0.094412 -0.241684 -0.335464  0.037470  
  (0.05230)  (0.12897)  (0.30667)  (0.06330)  






  (0.03093)  (0.07628)  (0.18139)  (0.03744)  
D(LNREALGD)  0.072395 -0.255663 -0.457633  0.011438  
  (0.06697)  (0.16516)  (0.39273)  (0.08106)  
D(DINTERES) -3.307280  4.719955  25.27404  3.486645  
  (1.56098)  (3.84938)  (9.15357)  (1.88926)  
      
 
 
e) Test of significance of coefficients 
 
 
Table x12: Test of significance of coefficients in the VAR1 model 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 13:37 
 Sample (adjusted): 4 50 
 Included observations: 47 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,2)=0  REAL INCOME 
Convergence achieved after 28 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  11.98906  




 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 13:40 
 Sample (adjusted): 4 50 
 Included observations: 47 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,3)=0 Dinterest  
Convergence achieved after 40 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  13.18422  











 Vector Error Correction Estimates  
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 13:42  
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50  
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
    
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,4)=0  nominal exchange rate  
Convergence achieved after 218 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  2.155080   





 Date: 10/09/09   Time: 12:33 
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50 
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,2)=-1 
Convergence achieved after 42 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  1.633585  





Table x13: Test of significance of coefficients in the VAR2 model 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:26 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,2)=0    cpi 
Convergence achieved after 76 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  8.528249  









 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:31 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,3)=0 DLNEXCHA 
Maximum iterations (500) reached. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  12.42097  
Probability  0.000425  
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:34 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,4)=0  REAL INCOME 
Convergence achieved after 46 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  6.934144  
Probability  0.008457  
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:37    
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50    
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegration Restrictions:     
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,5)=0    Interest rates    
Convergence achieved after 16 iterations.   
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors   
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):    
Chi-square(1)  3.758494     






f) Tests of stability in VAR1 and VAR2 models 
 
Table x14 : Results for stability of demand for money (VAR1 model) 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNM2-LNCPI LNREALGD DINTERES LNEXCHAR  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 4 
Date: 11/02/09   Time: 12:17 
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.962954 - 0.208418i  0.985251 
 0.962954 + 0.208418i  0.985251 
 0.982380  0.982380 
 0.598853 - 0.522395i  0.794683 
 0.598853 + 0.522395i  0.794683 
 0.292159 - 0.701819i  0.760202 
 0.292159 + 0.701819i  0.760202 
-0.491160 - 0.504290i  0.703951 
-0.491160 + 0.504290i  0.703951 
-0.007014 - 0.694414i  0.694449 
-0.007014 + 0.694414i  0.694449 
 0.614586 - 0.307047i  0.687018 
 0.614586 + 0.307047i  0.687018 
-0.663330  0.663330 
-0.566488  0.566488 
-0.125070  0.125070 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 




Table x15: stability of VAR2 model 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNM2 LNCPI DLNEXCHA LNREALGD DINTERES  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 3 
Date: 11/02/09   Time: 12:23 
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.996215  0.996215 
 0.899828 - 0.146390i  0.911658 
 0.899828 + 0.146390i  0.911658 
 0.648329 - 0.539562i  0.843479 
 0.648329 + 0.539562i  0.843479 
 0.360295 - 0.563412i  0.668764 
 0.360295 + 0.563412i  0.668764 
 0.607145  0.607145 






-0.554738 + 0.175569i  0.581858 
-0.138526 - 0.555615i  0.572623 
-0.138526 + 0.555615i  0.572623 
-0.283500 - 0.388362i  0.480830 
-0.283500 + 0.388362i  0.480830 
 0.355729  0.355729 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 








Appendix 3: Estimation of error correction models, restrictions for a unity real income elasticity 
and a unity price elasticity, tests for quality of the models and test for exogeneity  
 
 
Table x1: Results from the estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model1 (VECM1) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/08/09   Time: 10:45   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1    
Convergence achieved after 1 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
Restrictions are not binding (LR test not available) 
     
     
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
     
     
LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1)  1.000000    
     
LNREALGD(-1) -1.310650    
  (0.19846)    
 [-6.60422]    
     
DINTERES(-1)  0.042933    
  (0.03297)    
 [ 1.30202]    
     
LNEXCHAR(-1)  0.002608    
  (0.14314)    
 [ 0.01822]    
     
C  6.034506    
     
     
Error Correction: D(LNM2-LNCPI) D(LNREALGD) D(DINTERES) D(LNEXCHAR) 
     
     
CointEq1 -0.215441 -0.020001 -5.311698  0.045959 
  (0.13130)  (0.05873)  (1.22355)  (0.02478) 
 [-1.64084] [-0.34055] [-4.34121] [ 1.85438] 
     
D(LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1))  0.086034 -0.040553  7.656058 -0.048675 
  (0.20782)  (0.09296)  (1.93660)  (0.03923) 
 [ 0.41399] [-0.43624] [ 3.95334] [-1.24086] 
     
D(LNM2(-2)-LNCPI(-2))  0.111443 -0.092429  5.593277 -0.064521 
  (0.22891)  (0.10240)  (2.13320)  (0.04321) 
 [ 0.48684] [-0.90266] [ 2.62202] [-1.49322] 






D(LNM2(-3)-LNCPI(-3)) -0.294040 -0.011316  5.361384  0.006086 
  (0.20810)  (0.09309)  (1.93924)  (0.03928) 
 [-1.41297] [-0.12157] [ 2.76468] [ 0.15492] 
     
D(LNM2(-4)-LNCPI(-4))  0.156248  0.011876  3.439811  0.044100 
  (0.20853)  (0.09328)  (1.94325)  (0.03936) 
 [ 0.74928] [ 0.12731] [ 1.77013] [ 1.12036] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-1))  0.309809  0.256663 -7.551962  0.007344 
  (0.40214)  (0.17988)  (3.74748)  (0.07591) 
 [ 0.77040] [ 1.42683] [-2.01521] [ 0.09676] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-2)) -0.168410  0.017914 -4.024775  0.050958 
  (0.41079)  (0.18375)  (3.82805)  (0.07754) 
 [-0.40997] [ 0.09749] [-1.05139] [ 0.65719] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-3))  0.163862 -0.214806 -1.080901  0.008737 
  (0.41104)  (0.18386)  (3.83037)  (0.07759) 
 [ 0.39866] [-1.16830] [-0.28219] [ 0.11261] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-4))  0.021075 -0.114253 -5.738992 -0.164707 
  (0.36991)  (0.16546)  (3.44709)  (0.06982) 
 [ 0.05697] [-0.69050] [-1.66488] [-2.35890] 
     
D(DINTERES(-1))  0.004737 -0.007407 -0.922479  0.001538 
  (0.01550)  (0.00693)  (0.14441)  (0.00293) 
 [ 0.30565] [-1.06855] [-6.38776] [ 0.52569] 
     
D(DINTERES(-2))  0.013797  0.000304 -0.829454 -0.005852 
  (0.01977)  (0.00885)  (0.18427)  (0.00373) 
 [ 0.69769] [ 0.03433] [-4.50118] [-1.56790] 
     
D(DINTERES(-3))  0.014099 -0.000783 -0.263902 -0.004740 
  (0.02108)  (0.00943)  (0.19641)  (0.00398) 
 [ 0.66893] [-0.08308] [-1.34361] [-1.19137] 
     
D(DINTERES(-4))  0.010600 -0.003923  0.044133 -0.000233 
  (0.01613)  (0.00722)  (0.15033)  (0.00304) 
 [ 0.65711] [-0.54373] [ 0.29358] [-0.07645] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-1))  1.245797 -0.175869  19.46144  0.806627 
  (0.90847)  (0.40637)  (8.46584)  (0.17148) 
 [ 1.37131] [-0.43278] [ 2.29882] [ 4.70386] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-2)) -1.599927  0.209628 -3.828449 -0.097328 
  (1.22011)  (0.54577)  (11.3699)  (0.23031) 
 [-1.31130] [ 0.38410] [-0.33672] [-0.42260] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-3))  0.595635  0.089344 -6.156428  0.057297 






 [ 0.48573] [ 0.16288] [-0.53875] [ 0.24754] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-4))  0.411673 -0.106962  21.82273 -0.151702 
  (0.87907)  (0.39322)  (8.19190)  (0.16593) 
 [ 0.46830] [-0.27202] [ 2.66394] [-0.91424] 
     
C  0.006214  0.015650 -0.653911  0.008282 
  (0.02212)  (0.00990)  (0.20616)  (0.00418) 
 [ 0.28087] [ 1.58144] [-3.17182] [ 1.98336] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.370326  0.374520  0.726316  0.824238 
 Adj. R-squared -0.026135 -0.019301  0.553997  0.713573 
 Sum sq. resids  0.084489  0.016905  7.337007  0.003010 
 S.E. equation  0.055939  0.025022  0.521288  0.010559 
 F-statistic  0.934079  0.950991  4.214947  7.448052 
 Log likelihood  77.39827  113.6007 -23.04328  152.4260 
 Akaike AIC -2.639923 -4.248918  1.824146 -5.974491 
 Schwarz SC -1.917258 -3.526253  2.546811 -5.251826 
 Mean dependent  0.019318  0.011626 -0.006889  0.012807 
 S.D. dependent  0.055222  0.024784  0.780565  0.019730 
     
     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.67E-11   
 Determinant resid covariance  6.05E-12   
 Log likelihood  325.7911   
 Akaike information criterion -11.10183   
Schwarz criterion -8.050573   
     
 




 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/09/09   Time: 12:33   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,2)=-1   
Convergence achieved after 42 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):   
Chi-square(1)  1.633585    
Probability  0.201208    
     
     
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
     
     
LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1)  1.000000    
     
LNREALGD(-1) -1.000000    






DINTERES(-1)  0.059543    
  (0.02982)    
 [ 1.99680]    
     
LNEXCHAR(-1) -0.216518    
  (0.05771)    
 [-3.75156]    
     
C  5.418086    
     
     
Error Correction: D(LNM2-LNCPI) D(LNREALGD) D(DINTERES) D(LNEXCHAR) 
     
     
CointEq1 -0.171813 -0.061112 -4.991817  0.048154 
  (0.13788)  (0.05946)  (1.33142)  (0.02546) 
 [-1.24613] [-1.02784] [-3.74925] [ 1.89109] 
     
D(LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1))  0.079069 -0.002565  8.130889 -0.057030 
  (0.22287)  (0.09611)  (2.15212)  (0.04116) 
 [ 0.35478] [-0.02669] [ 3.77807] [-1.38556] 
     
D(LNM2(-2)-LNCPI(-2))  0.083597 -0.045704  5.731916 -0.071140 
  (0.24337)  (0.10495)  (2.35009)  (0.04495) 
 [ 0.34350] [-0.43550] [ 2.43902] [-1.58278] 
     
D(LNM2(-3)-LNCPI(-3)) -0.307154  0.022773  5.628933 -0.000110 
  (0.21967)  (0.09473)  (2.12129)  (0.04057) 
 [-1.39822] [ 0.24040] [ 2.65354] [-0.00270] 
     
D(LNM2(-4)-LNCPI(-4))  0.155163  0.039578  3.878342  0.037250 
  (0.21912)  (0.09449)  (2.11597)  (0.04047) 
 [ 0.70811] [ 0.41885] [ 1.83289] [ 0.92045] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-1))  0.357402  0.221174 -7.046426  0.007356 
  (0.40946)  (0.17657)  (3.95394)  (0.07562) 
 [ 0.87286] [ 1.25260] [-1.78213] [ 0.09728] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-2)) -0.134504  0.001669 -3.513371  0.048665 
  (0.41774)  (0.18014)  (4.03393)  (0.07715) 
 [-0.32198] [ 0.00927] [-0.87096] [ 0.63077] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-3))  0.206663 -0.246028 -0.614651  0.008571 
  (0.41855)  (0.18049)  (4.04169)  (0.07730) 
 [ 0.49376] [-1.36311] [-0.15208] [ 0.11088] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-4))  0.016979 -0.114632 -5.839963 -0.163833 
  (0.37721)  (0.16266)  (3.64252)  (0.06966) 
 [ 0.04501] [-0.70472] [-1.60328] [-2.35174] 
     
D(DINTERES(-1))  0.009246 -0.007510 -0.820013  0.000708 






 [ 0.60190] [-1.13359] [-5.52778] [ 0.24970] 
     
D(DINTERES(-2))  0.018547 -0.000959 -0.740854 -0.006432 
  (0.01962)  (0.00846)  (0.18947)  (0.00362) 
 [ 0.94527] [-0.11338] [-3.91022] [-1.77494] 
     
D(DINTERES(-3))  0.017966 -0.001949 -0.194080 -0.005176 
  (0.02116)  (0.00912)  (0.20429)  (0.00391) 
 [ 0.84925] [-0.21364] [-0.95004] [-1.32489] 
     
D(DINTERES(-4))  0.011439 -0.003650  0.068097 -0.000462 
  (0.01646)  (0.00710)  (0.15896)  (0.00304) 
 [ 0.69492] [-0.51414] [ 0.42840] [-0.15186] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-1))  1.177630 -0.090473  19.31580  0.797806 
  (0.93245)  (0.40210)  (9.00425)  (0.17221) 
 [ 1.26294] [-0.22500] [ 2.14519] [ 4.63275] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-2)) -1.742163  0.219265 -6.953018 -0.072803 
  (1.23801)  (0.53387)  (11.9548)  (0.22864) 
 [-1.40723] [ 0.41071] [-0.58161] [-0.31842] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-3))  0.690243  0.036845 -4.849433  0.052724 
  (1.24790)  (0.53813)  (12.0504)  (0.23047) 
 [ 0.55312] [ 0.06847] [-0.40243] [ 0.22877] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-4))  0.178438 -0.054876  17.30635 -0.120728 
  (0.86737)  (0.37404)  (8.37581)  (0.16019) 
 [ 0.20572] [-0.14671] [ 2.06623] [-0.75365] 
     
C  0.010429  0.012626 -0.607157  0.008253 
  (0.02243)  (0.00967)  (0.21664)  (0.00414) 
 [ 0.46483] [ 1.30503] [-2.80257] [ 1.99192] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.345196  0.395487  0.694392  0.825028 
 Adj. R-squared -0.067088  0.014867  0.501972  0.714861 
 Sum sq. resids  0.087861  0.016339  8.192855  0.002997 
 S.E. equation  0.057045  0.024599  0.550853  0.010535 
 F-statistic  0.837278  1.039060  3.608731  7.488867 
 Log likelihood  76.51776  114.3678 -25.52573  152.5274 
 Akaike AIC -2.600789 -4.283014  1.934477 -5.978997 
 Schwarz SC -1.878124 -3.560349  2.657142 -5.256332 
 Mean dependent  0.019318  0.011626 -0.006889  0.012807 
 S.D. dependent  0.055222  0.024784  0.780565  0.019730 
     
     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.84E-11   
 Determinant resid covariance  6.27E-12   
 Log likelihood  324.9743   
 Akaike information criterion -11.06552   
 Schwarz criterion -8.014271   






     
 
 
Table x3: Results from the estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model1 (VECM2) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 10/08/09   Time: 14:54    
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50    
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegration Restrictions:     
      B(1,1)=1     
Convergence achieved after 1 iterations.   
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors   
Restrictions are not binding (LR test not available)  
      
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      
LNM2(-1)  1.000000     
      
LNCPI(-1) -1.535907     
  (0.61876)     
 [-2.48223]     
      
DLNEXCHA(-1) -7.338500     
  (1.50580)     
 [-4.87350]     
      
LNREALGD(-1) -1.001393     
  (0.53011)     
 [-1.88902]     
      
DINTERES(-1)  0.054218     
  (0.03847)     
 [ 1.40940]     
      
C  6.764274     
      
      
Error Correction: D(LNM2) D(LNCPI) D(DLNEXCHA) D(LNREALGD) D(DINTERES) 
      
      
CointEq1 -0.120029 -0.001603  0.043896 -0.001249 -4.116802 
  (0.07683)  (0.03200)  (0.01862)  (0.03972)  (0.84732) 
 [-1.56218] [-0.05011] [ 2.35769] [-0.03145] [-4.85864] 
      
D(LNM2(-1)) -0.030000  0.052836 -0.074004 -0.048569  4.117285 
  (0.17431)  (0.07260)  (0.04224)  (0.09012)  (1.92232) 
 [-0.17210] [ 0.72781] [-1.75200] [-0.53892] [ 2.14183] 
      
D(LNM2(-2))  0.060897  0.119777 -0.042560 -0.055920  3.683241 
  (0.19427)  (0.08090)  (0.04707)  (0.10044)  (2.14233) 






      
D(LNM2(-3)) -0.290949  0.055643 -0.010753 -0.042857  2.815874 
  (0.17684)  (0.07365)  (0.04285)  (0.09143)  (1.95021) 
 [-1.64523] [ 0.75551] [-0.25094] [-0.46874] [ 1.44388] 
      
D(LNCPI(-1))  0.195878  0.393587 -0.017965  0.043489 -10.69311 
  (0.52835)  (0.22004)  (0.12803)  (0.27316)  (5.82657) 
 [ 0.37074] [ 1.78872] [-0.14032] [ 0.15921] [-1.83523] 
      
D(LNCPI(-2)) -0.685913 -0.087173  0.105172  0.406806 -4.044338 
  (0.56218)  (0.23413)  (0.13623)  (0.29065)  (6.19961) 
 [-1.22010] [-0.37233] [ 0.77204] [ 1.39964] [-0.65235] 
      
D(LNCPI(-3))  0.505232 -0.044234 -0.072366 -0.195227 -11.36792 
  (0.52559)  (0.21889)  (0.12736)  (0.27173)  (5.79610) 
 [ 0.96127] [-0.20208] [-0.56820] [-0.71845] [-1.96130] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-1))  0.108867  0.047495  0.213878 -0.041739 -14.57898 
  (0.74210)  (0.30906)  (0.17982)  (0.38367)  (8.18382) 
 [ 0.14670] [ 0.15368] [ 1.18937] [-0.10879] [-1.78144] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-2)) -1.280549 -0.081846  0.027509 -0.000896 -17.54201 
  (0.66878)  (0.27852)  (0.16206)  (0.34576)  (7.37518) 
 [-1.91476] [-0.29386] [ 0.16975] [-0.00259] [-2.37852] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-3)) -0.567871 -0.090816  0.037617  0.031743 -24.94339 
  (0.71524)  (0.29787)  (0.17332)  (0.36979)  (7.88758) 
 [-0.79396] [-0.30488] [ 0.21704] [ 0.08584] [-3.16236] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-1))  0.526587  0.116837 -0.014109  0.279952 -4.917005 
  (0.36502)  (0.15202)  (0.08845)  (0.18872)  (4.02543) 
 [ 1.44261] [ 0.76857] [-0.15951] [ 1.48342] [-1.22149] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-2)) -0.316561 -0.022417  0.079219  0.158260 -0.992516 
  (0.40344)  (0.16802)  (0.09776)  (0.20858)  (4.44905) 
 [-0.78466] [-0.13342] [ 0.81034] [ 0.75875] [-0.22309] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-3))  0.668605  0.203765 -0.071724 -0.343622 -1.680915 
  (0.37842)  (0.15760)  (0.09170)  (0.19564)  (4.17312) 
 [ 1.76685] [ 1.29295] [-0.78218] [-1.75636] [-0.40280] 
      
D(DINTERES(-1))  0.005582  0.003623  0.001222 -0.006419 -0.912341 
  (0.01299)  (0.00541)  (0.00315)  (0.00672)  (0.14328) 
 [ 0.42964] [ 0.66953] [ 0.38818] [-0.95558] [-6.36754] 
      
D(DINTERES(-2))  0.003486 -0.004905 -0.006062  0.002430 -0.834002 
  (0.01641)  (0.00684)  (0.00398)  (0.00849)  (0.18102) 
 [ 0.21237] [-0.71755] [-1.52408] [ 0.28628] [-4.60726] 
      






  (0.01490)  (0.00620)  (0.00361)  (0.00770)  (0.16428) 
 [ 0.38072] [-0.55784] [-1.32418] [ 0.13274] [-1.82942] 
      
C  0.029952 -0.001501  0.004459  0.012381  0.024151 
  (0.01632)  (0.00680)  (0.00395)  (0.00844)  (0.17996) 
 [ 1.83543] [-0.22092] [ 1.12768] [ 1.46741] [ 0.13420] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.440843  0.433816  0.503153  0.386765  0.718711 
 Adj. R-squared  0.121325  0.110282  0.219241  0.036345  0.557975 
 Sum sq. resids  0.062007  0.010755  0.003641  0.016574  7.540889 
 S.E. equation  0.047059  0.019598  0.011403  0.024330  0.518958 
 F-statistic  1.379713  1.340868  1.772212  1.103719  4.471367 
 Log likelihood  84.35912  123.7771  148.1469  114.0455 -23.65998 
 Akaike AIC -2.993739 -4.745647 -5.828750 -4.313134  1.807110 
 Schwarz SC -2.311222 -4.063130 -5.146233 -3.630617  2.489627 
 Mean dependent  0.035805  0.016487  0.000128  0.011626 -0.006889 
 S.D. dependent  0.050203  0.020777  0.012905  0.024784  0.780565 
      
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.49E-15    
 Determinant resid covariance  7.92E-16    
 Log likelihood  463.1045    
 Akaike information criterion -16.58242    






Table x4: Results from the estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model1 (VECM2) : Unit price elasticity 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 10/14/09   Time: 09:54    
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50    
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegration Restrictions:     
      B(1,1)=1, B(1,2)=-1    
Convergence achieved after 78 iterations.   
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors   
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):    
Chi-square(1)  0.478593     
Probability  0.489060     
      
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      
LNM2(-1)  1.000000     
      
LNCPI(-1) -1.000000     
      
DLNEXCHA(-1) -6.970710     
  (1.16327)     
 [-5.99236]     
      
LNREALGD(-1) -1.443783     
  (0.11088)     
 [-13.0210]     
      
DINTERES(-1)  0.079418     
  (0.04188)     
 [ 1.89617]     
      
C  6.270247     
      
      
Error Correction: D(LNM2) D(LNCPI) D(DLNEXCHA) D(LNREALGD) D(DINTERES) 
      
      
CointEq1 -0.083908 -0.006113  0.039578 -0.010821 -3.787120 
  (0.07224)  (0.02952)  (0.01727)  (0.03662)  (0.78462) 
 [-1.16148] [-0.20706] [ 2.29203] [-0.29552] [-4.82667] 
      
D(LNM2(-1)) -0.041973  0.055203 -0.074127 -0.043657  4.166957 
  (0.17774)  (0.07263)  (0.04249)  (0.09009)  (1.93048) 
 [-0.23614] [ 0.76004] [-1.74477] [-0.48457] [ 2.15851] 
      
D(LNM2(-2))  0.030983  0.125943 -0.043316 -0.043147  3.853137 
  (0.19952)  (0.08153)  (0.04769)  (0.10113)  (2.16698) 
 [ 0.15529] [ 1.54473] [-0.90828] [-0.42664] [ 1.77812] 
      






  (0.18070)  (0.07384)  (0.04319)  (0.09159)  (1.96258) 
 [-1.69626] [ 0.79821] [-0.26177] [-0.39340] [ 1.48815] 
      
D(LNCPI(-1))  0.237542  0.390568 -0.026833  0.036798 -9.915324 
  (0.53648)  (0.21923)  (0.12823)  (0.27193)  (5.82670) 
 [ 0.44278] [ 1.78159] [-0.20926] [ 0.13532] [-1.70170] 
      
D(LNCPI(-2)) -0.649378 -0.089823  0.097402  0.400931 -3.362954 
  (0.57138)  (0.23348)  (0.13657)  (0.28962)  (6.20570) 
 [-1.13652] [-0.38471] [ 0.71319] [ 1.38436] [-0.54191] 
      
D(LNCPI(-3))  0.601539 -0.049584 -0.095765 -0.207449 -9.273513 
  (0.52667)  (0.21521)  (0.12589)  (0.26695)  (5.72011) 
 [ 1.14216] [-0.23039] [-0.76073] [-0.77710] [-1.62121] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-1))  0.298105  0.031044  0.178478 -0.077591 -11.54522 
  (0.73270)  (0.29941)  (0.17513)  (0.37139)  (7.95785) 
 [ 0.40686] [ 0.10369] [ 1.01910] [-0.20892] [-1.45080] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-2)) -1.175818 -0.089434  0.005215 -0.017715 -15.58674 
  (0.67306)  (0.27503)  (0.16088)  (0.34115)  (7.31004) 
 [-1.74699] [-0.32517] [ 0.03242] [-0.05193] [-2.13224] 
      
D(DLNEXCHA(-3)) -0.396751 -0.112655  0.018010 -0.014553 -23.46844 
  (0.71496)  (0.29216)  (0.17089)  (0.36240)  (7.76522) 
 [-0.55492] [-0.38559] [ 0.10539] [-0.04016] [-3.02225] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-1))  0.513677  0.111753 -0.000638  0.270029 -6.254469 
  (0.37575)  (0.15355)  (0.08981)  (0.19046)  (4.08102) 
 [ 1.36707] [ 0.72782] [-0.00711] [ 1.41779] [-1.53257] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-2)) -0.335371 -0.024572  0.089489  0.154270 -1.984417 
  (0.41170)  (0.16824)  (0.09841)  (0.20868)  (4.47150) 
 [-0.81459] [-0.14605] [ 0.90938] [ 0.73926] [-0.44379] 
      
D(LNREALGD(-3))  0.681511  0.198973 -0.067600 -0.353382 -2.142530 
  (0.38696)  (0.15813)  (0.09249)  (0.19614)  (4.20280) 
 [ 1.76118] [ 1.25831] [-0.73087] [-1.80167] [-0.50979] 
      
D(DINTERES(-1))  0.008264  0.003454  0.000606 -0.006799 -0.857633 
  (0.01296)  (0.00530)  (0.00310)  (0.00657)  (0.14074) 
 [ 0.63776] [ 0.65225] [ 0.19560] [-1.03511] [-6.09361] 
      
D(DINTERES(-2))  0.007107 -0.005283 -0.006627  0.001617 -0.787502 
  (0.01637)  (0.00669)  (0.00391)  (0.00830)  (0.17783) 
 [ 0.43406] [-0.78967] [-1.69322] [ 0.19486] [-4.42843] 
      
D(DINTERES(-3))  0.008258 -0.003784 -0.005089  0.000336 -0.276985 
  (0.01502)  (0.00614)  (0.00359)  (0.00761)  (0.16311) 






      
C  0.030138 -0.001613  0.004594  0.012156  0.009777 
  (0.01665)  (0.00680)  (0.00398)  (0.00844)  (0.18078) 
 [ 1.81065] [-0.23712] [ 1.15475] [ 1.44076] [ 0.05408] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.420050  0.434631  0.498592  0.388650  0.717014 
 Adj. R-squared  0.088650  0.111563  0.212073  0.039308  0.555307 
 Sum sq. resids  0.064313  0.010739  0.003674  0.016523  7.586401 
 S.E. equation  0.047926  0.019584  0.011455  0.024292  0.520522 
 F-statistic  1.267502  1.345323  1.740170  1.112519  4.434044 
 Log likelihood  83.53760  123.8095  147.9413  114.1148 -23.79537 
 Akaike AIC -2.957227 -4.747087 -5.819611 -4.316213  1.813127 
 Schwarz SC -2.274710 -4.064570 -5.137094 -3.633696  2.495644 
 Mean dependent  0.035805  0.016487  0.000128  0.011626 -0.006889 
 S.D. dependent  0.050203  0.020777  0.012905  0.024784  0.780565 
      
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.58E-15    
 Determinant resid covariance  8.01E-16    
 Log likelihood  462.8652    
 Akaike information criterion -16.57179    
 Schwarz criterion -12.95846    
      








Table x5: Results from the test of quality of the Model 1 (VECM1) 
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests 
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 10:19 
Sample: 1 52  
Included observations: 47 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     
1  4.063349 2  0.1311  
2  2.991615 2  0.2241  
3  2.954633 2  0.2282  
4  1.005677 2  0.6048  
     
     
Joint  11.01527 8  0.2008  
     
     
     
 
VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 10:14    
Sample: 1 52     
Included observations: 47    
      
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. Df 
      
      
1  1.884778 NA*  1.925751 NA* NA* 
2  4.764155 NA*  4.933101 NA* NA* 
3  15.63280  0.4789  16.54279  0.4158 16 
4  33.34298  0.4018  35.90042  0.2906 32 
5  50.12079  0.3893  54.67560  0.2359 48 
6  59.37781  0.6404  65.28730  0.4318 64 
7  75.03260  0.6361  83.68168  0.3672 80 
8  87.15925  0.7291  98.29585  0.4159 96 
9  95.49791  0.8680  108.6095  0.5731 112 
10  101.1258  0.9618  115.7584  0.7730 128 
11  114.4285  0.9670  133.1258  0.7317 144 
12  132.4759  0.9451  157.3609  0.5442 160 
      
      
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 










 VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 09:27   
Sample: 1 52    
Included observations: 47   
     
     
     
   Joint test:    
     
     
Chi-sq df Prob.   
     
     
 194.8626 180  0.2125   
     
      
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 10:16 
Sample: 1 52  
Included observations: 47 
   
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  9.942308  0.8696 
2  12.44352  0.7129 
3  17.41976  0.3590 
4  17.72263  0.3404 
5  18.64503  0.2875 
6  10.92278  0.8142 
7  17.16506  0.3750 
8  15.03200  0.5223 
9  9.037599  0.9119 
10  7.401637  0.9647 
11  14.51433  0.5605 
12  20.05442  0.2178 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
 
 
Table x6: Results from the test of the quality of the Model 2 (VECM 2) 
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 14:13   
Sample: 1 52    
Included observations: 45   
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     
1  6.443336 2  0.0399  






3  7.375110 2  0.0250  
4  5.558557 2  0.0621  
5  7.076518 2  0.0291  
     
     
Joint  33.43900 10  0.0002  
     
     
 
 
VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 14:08    
Sample: 1 52     
Included observations: 45    
      
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. Df 
      
      
1  11.19504 NA*  11.44947 NA* NA* 
2  21.52265 NA*  22.25744 NA* NA* 
3  38.62527 NA*  40.58167 NA* NA* 
4  69.46285  0.0000  74.42780  0.0000 25 
5  85.48400  0.0013  92.45159  0.0002 50 
6  106.5246  0.0098  116.7292  0.0015 75 
7  134.1209  0.0129  149.4090  0.0010 100 
8  153.0797  0.0446  172.4670  0.0032 125 
9  172.4998  0.1008  196.7422  0.0062 150 
10  183.9625  0.3062  211.4799  0.0312 175 
11  207.9381  0.3354  243.2124  0.0199 200 
12  238.3272  0.2586  284.6520  0.0043 225 
      
      
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 14:12 
Sample: 1 52  
Included observations: 45 
   
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  20.97977  0.6937 
2  18.26505  0.8309 
3  24.81840  0.4726 
4  33.18227  0.1266 
5  19.46411  0.7743 
6  19.15758  0.7895 
7  32.54894  0.1427 
8  23.49544  0.5487 
9  24.91983  0.4669 
10  15.61688  0.9258 






12  48.57216  0.0032 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
 
 VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 10/08/09   Time: 14:17    
Sample: 1 52     
Included observations: 45    
      
      
      
   Joint test:     
      
      
Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
      
 489.6039 480  0.3709    
      
      
      
 
Table x7: Test of exogeneity in the VAR1 model 
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 10:16   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1, A(2,1)=0  real  Income   
Convergence achieved after 34 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):   
Chi-square(1)  0.128297    




 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 10:19   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1, A(3,1)=0   Dinteres   
Convergence achieved after 27 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):   
Chi-square(1)  13.71933    
Probability  0.000212    
 
 






 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 10:21   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1, A(4,1)=0  exchange rate   
Convergence achieved after 104 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):   
Chi-square(1)  3.990247    
Probability  0.045764    
 
 
Table x8: Test of exogeneity in the VECM2 model  
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 11:51   
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50   
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,1)=1, A(1,1)=0 Money stock   
Convergence achieved after 112 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):   
Chi-square(1)  9.629317    




 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:09 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
 B(1,1)=1, A(2,1)=0      LNCPI 
Convergence achieved after 22 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  1.204870  
Probability  0.272350  
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:10 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   






Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, A(3,1)=0    DLNEXCHA 
Convergence achieved after 235 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  11.27639  





 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:14 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, A(4,1)=0  real GDP 
Convergence achieved after 24 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  1.194268  




 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 10/19/09   Time: 12:16 
 Sample (adjusted): 5 50 
 Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1, A(5,1)=0     Interest rate 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  1.152792  





Table x9: Vector Error Correction Model considering dummy and dummy2 variables  
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 11/02/09   Time: 10:34   
 Sample (adjusted): 6 50   
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegration Restrictions:    






Convergence achieved after 1 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
Restrictions are not binding (LR test not available) 
     
     
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
     
     
LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1)  1.000000    
     
LNREALGD(-1) -2.487805    
  (0.61502)    
 [-4.04507]    
     
DINTERES(-1)  0.055751    
  (0.07080)    
 [ 0.78741]    
     
LNEXCHAR(-1)  0.753576    
  (0.36594)    
 [ 2.05931]    
     
C  7.628134    
     
     
Error Correction: D(LNM2-LNCPI) D(LNREALGD) D(DINTERES) D(LNEXCHAR) 
     
     
CointEq1 -0.124890  0.001549 -3.464838  0.018999 
  (0.07878)  (0.02901)  (0.67200)  (0.01543) 
 [-1.58537] [ 0.05339] [-5.15599] [ 1.23158] 
     
D(LNM2(-1)-LNCPI(-1)) -0.026988 -0.014964  5.369959 -0.019133 
  (0.19818)  (0.07299)  (1.69061)  (0.03881) 
 [-0.13618] [-0.20503] [ 3.17634] [-0.49299] 
     
D(LNM2(-2)-LNCPI(-2))  0.055119 -0.022750  3.606564 -0.034814 
  (0.22137)  (0.08152)  (1.88839)  (0.04335) 
 [ 0.24899] [-0.27905] [ 1.90986] [-0.80309] 
     
D(LNM2(-3)-LNCPI(-3)) -0.352196  0.048428  3.411532  0.030361 
  (0.20535)  (0.07562)  (1.75171)  (0.04021) 
 [-1.71513] [ 0.64039] [ 1.94754] [ 0.75501] 
     
D(LNM2(-4)-LNCPI(-4))  0.061956 -0.000744  2.168373  0.064097 
  (0.20818)  (0.07667)  (1.77586)  (0.04077) 
 [ 0.29761] [-0.00970] [ 1.22103] [ 1.57230] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-1))  0.314928  0.162572 -6.388625 -0.015803 
  (0.41374)  (0.15237)  (3.52944)  (0.08102) 
 [ 0.76117] [ 1.06696] [-1.81010] [-0.19504] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-2)) -0.210657 -0.083192 -2.481350  0.039839 






 [-0.48894] [-0.52432] [-0.67514] [ 0.47219] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-3))  0.132322 -0.321581  0.236018 -0.009033 
  (0.42837)  (0.15776)  (3.65424)  (0.08389) 
 [ 0.30890] [-2.03846] [ 0.06459] [-0.10769] 
     
D(LNREALGD(-4))  0.058255 -0.159542 -5.250456 -0.173232 
  (0.38176)  (0.14059)  (3.25659)  (0.07476) 
 [ 0.15260] [-1.13480] [-1.61226] [-2.31723] 
     
D(DINTERES(-1))  0.001116 -0.007793 -0.969500  0.001554 
  (0.01628)  (0.00599)  (0.13885)  (0.00319) 
 [ 0.06858] [-1.30015] [-6.98255] [ 0.48749] 
     
D(DINTERES(-2))  0.009774 -0.001129 -0.799177 -0.006257 
  (0.02080)  (0.00766)  (0.17741)  (0.00407) 
 [ 0.46995] [-0.14745] [-4.50462] [-1.53636] 
     
D(DINTERES(-3))  0.009240 -0.002529 -0.223666 -0.004953 
  (0.02241)  (0.00825)  (0.19116)  (0.00439) 
 [ 0.41233] [-0.30645] [-1.17008] [-1.12874] 
     
D(DINTERES(-4))  0.006807 -0.006332  0.065524  5.85E-05 
  (0.01703)  (0.00627)  (0.14531)  (0.00334) 
 [ 0.39960] [-1.00940] [ 0.45091] [ 0.01754] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-1))  1.059416 -0.269045  17.03134  0.855463 
  (0.90955)  (0.33496)  (7.75895)  (0.17811) 
 [ 1.16477] [-0.80321] [ 2.19506] [ 4.80289] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-2)) -1.368514  0.200930 -0.885878 -0.114239 
  (1.26478)  (0.46578)  (10.7892)  (0.24768) 
 [-1.08201] [ 0.43138] [-0.08211] [-0.46124] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-3))  0.544973  0.098256 -6.945675  0.041781 
  (1.25532)  (0.46230)  (10.7085)  (0.24582) 
 [ 0.43413] [ 0.21254] [-0.64861] [ 0.16996] 
     
D(LNEXCHAR(-4))  0.593161 -0.324646  27.77492 -0.160123 
  (0.94465)  (0.34789)  (8.05839)  (0.18499) 
 [ 0.62791] [-0.93319] [ 3.44671] [-0.86559] 
     
C -0.028874 -0.042177 -0.747030  0.007205 
  (0.05386)  (0.01983)  (0.45943)  (0.01055) 
 [-0.53612] [-2.12651] [-1.62599] [ 0.68315] 
     
DUMMY  0.003213  0.014066  0.808127  0.000136 
  (0.03978)  (0.01465)  (0.33932)  (0.00779) 
 [ 0.08078] [ 0.96019] [ 2.38162] [ 0.01744] 






DUMMY2  0.038152  0.054731 -0.625879 -0.000318 
  (0.05905)  (0.02174)  (0.50369)  (0.01156) 
 [ 0.64615] [ 2.51699] [-1.24259] [-0.02747] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.390487  0.589612  0.778004  0.816888 
 Adj. R-squared -0.072744  0.277717  0.609287  0.677722 
 Sum sq. resids  0.081784  0.011092  5.951355  0.003136 
 S.E. equation  0.057196  0.021064  0.487908  0.011200 
 F-statistic  0.842965  1.890418  4.611291  5.869906 
 Log likelihood  78.13044  123.0825 -18.33375  151.5042 
 Akaike AIC -2.583575 -4.581446  1.703722 -5.844632 
 Schwarz SC -1.780614 -3.778484  2.506684 -5.041671 
 Mean dependent  0.019318  0.011626 -0.006889  0.012807 
 S.D. dependent  0.055222  0.024784  0.780565  0.019730 
     
     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.64E-11   
 Determinant resid covariance  3.46E-12   
 Log likelihood  338.3312   
 Akaike information criterion -11.30361   
 Schwarz criterion -7.931173   
     






Appendix 4: Summary for some econometrics concepts and Student's_t-distribution 
 
 
a) Stability in the VAR 
 
According to Patterson (2000:601-604), ―stability is concerned with the following question: the 
impact of a shock to the innovation in one of the equations of a VAR, does the response to this 
shock (eventually die out as we get further away in time from the date of the shock? If the 
answer is yes the model is stable; if not the model is unstable. A stable VAR is stationary‖. 
Considering one equation for illustration, Enders (2004:46-47) demonstrates that stationarity is a 
desirable property of an estimated AR model: 
tpttttt Upyyyyy    332211  (1), for several reasons: One important 
reason is that a model whose coefficients are non-stationary will exhibit the unfortunate property 
that previous values of the error term will have a non-declining effect on the current value of yt 
as time progresses. Setting  to zero, for a zero mean AR (p) process yt, equation (1) can be 
expressed as tt UyL )( (2). The process AR (p) is stationary if it is possible to write from 
equation (2) the process tt ULy
1)(   (3) with 1)( L converging to zero. This means that the 
autocorrelation among ty  and its previous values will decline as the lag length is increased. 
When the expansion 1)( L is calculated, it will contain an infinite number of terms, and can be 
written as an tttt UUaUaUaMA   332211)( (4). If the process described through 
equation (1) is stationary, the coefficient in the )(MA  representation will decline with lag 
length, so that  321 aaa .On the other hand, if the process is non-stationary the 
coefficient in the )(MA  representation would not converge to zero as the lag length increases.  
 







p zzzz   (5) all lay outside the unit circle. 
The notion of a characteristic equation is so-called because its roots determine the characteristics 








b) Error correction models, weak exogenous in a multivariate model 
 
In the custom of econometric analysis, the long-run equilibrium among time series (cointegrating 
vectors) implies that current changes in these series are trying to remove the deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium among these series if stable. In this way, after identifying the cointegrating 
vectors under the multivariate analysis, it is possible to formulate an error correction model as 
was the case for a single equation (see section 5.3.2). In the case of the multivariate estimation, 
the new error correction model is the so-called Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that all the features of the error correction model and weak 
exogeneity are still applicable in the VECM except that the VECM has a multivariate context 
(more than one equation). For that reason, we assume that it suffices to give an illustration of the 
general equation of the VECM, which we estimate using Eviews 6.0 in chapter 6. Useful 
literature can be found in Enders (2004: 352), Patterson (2000: 608-610) and Brooks (2000: 
403).   
 
The VECM has a general form:   tktkttktt uxxxxx   112211  , where 
 is the matrix of the error correction coefficients, ktx   is the long–run relationships (error 
correction term) and i  represents the matrix of the dynamic adjustments responses of the 
dependent variables tx  to changes in the differenced and lagged ptx   determinants of the 
vector tx  (Enders, 2004: 352) and (Brooks, 2000: 403).  
 
Before concluding on the use of VECM‘s, it is worth noting that when estimating then we learn 
about the current responses of variables to the deviations in previous period of the system from 
the long-run equilibrium (cointegrating vectors). This can sometimes lead to a focus on current 
responses of the system to innovation (new economic policies for instance, or economic crises or 







One Sided 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 99.5% 99.75% 99.9% 99.95% 
Two Sided 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 98% 99% 99.5% 99.8% 99.9% 
1 1.000 1.376 1.963 3.078  6.314 12.71 31.82 63.66 127.3 318.3 636.6 
2 0.816 1.061 1.386 1.886 2.920 4.303 6.965 9.925 14.09 22.33 31.60 
3 0.765 0.978 1.250 1.638 2.353 3.182 4.541 5.841 7.453 10.21 12.92 
4 0.741 0.941 1.190 1.533 2.132 2.776 3.747 4.604 5.598 7.173 8.610 
5 0.727 0.920 1.156 1.476 2.015 2.571 3.365 4.032 4.773 5.893 6.869 
6 0.718 0.906 1.134 1.440 1.943 2.447 3.143 3.707 4.317 5.208 5.959 
7 0.711 0.896 1.119 1.415 1.895 2.365 2.998 3.499 4.029 4.785 5.408 
8 0.706 0.889 1.108 1.397 1.860 2.306 2.896 3.355 3.833 4.501 5.041 
9 0.703 0.883 1.100 1.383 1.833 2.262 2.821 3.250 3.690 4.297 4.781 
10 0.700 0.879 1.093 1.372 1.812 2.228 2.764 3.169 3.581 4.144 4.587 
11 0.697 0.876 1.088 1.363 1.796 2.201 2.718 3.106 3.497 4.025 4.437 
12 0.695 0.873 1.083 1.356 1.782 2.179 2.681 3.055 3.428 3.930 4.318 
13 0.694 0.870 1.079 1.350 1.771 2.160 2.650 3.012 3.372 3.852 4.221 
14 0.692 0.868 1.076 1.345 1.761 2.145 2.624 2.977 3.326 3.787 4.140 
15 0.691 0.866 1.074 1.341 1.753 2.131 2.602 2.947 3.286 3.733 4.073 
16 0.690 0.865 1.071 1.337 1.746 2.120 2.583 2.921 3.252 3.686 4.015 
17 0.689 0.863 1.069 1.333 1.740 2.110 2.567 2.898 3.222 3.646 3.965 
18 0.688 0.862 1.067 1.330 1.734 2.101 2.552 2.878 3.197 3.610 3.922 
19 0.688 0.861 1.066 1.328 1.729 2.093 2.539 2.861 3.174 3.579 3.883 
20 0.687 0.860 1.064 1.325 1.725 2.086 2.528 2.845 3.153 3.552 3.850 
21 0.686 0.859 1.063 1.323 1.721 2.080 2.518 2.831 3.135 3.527 3.819 
22 0.686 0.858 1.061 1.321 1.717 2.074 2.508 2.819 3.119 3.505 3.792 
23 0.685 0.858 1.060 1.319 1.714 2.069 2.500 2.807 3.104 3.485 3.767 
24 0.685 0.857 1.059 1.318 1.711 2.064 2.492 2.797 3.091 3.467 3.745 
25 0.684 0.856 1.058 1.316 1.708 2.060 2.485 2.787 3.078 3.450 3.725 
26 0.684 0.856 1.058 1.315 1.706 2.056 2.479 2.779 3.067 3.435 3.707 
27 0.684 0.855 1.057 1.314 1.703 2.052 2.473 2.771 3.057 3.421 3.690 
28 0.683 0.855 1.056 1.313 1.701 2.048 2.467 2.763 3.047 3.408 3.674 
29 0.683 0.854 1.055 1.311 1.699 2.045 2.462 2.756 3.038 3.396 3.659 
30 0.683 0.854 1.055 1.310 1.697 2.042 2.457 2.750 3.030 3.385 3.646 
40 0.681 0.851 1.050 1.303 1.684 2.021 2.423 2.704 2.971 3.307 3.551 
50 0.679 0.849 1.047 1.299 1.676 2.009 2.403 2.678 2.937 3.261 3.496 
60 0.679 0.848 1.045 1.296 1.671 2.000 2.390 2.660 2.915 3.232 3.460 






100 0.677 0.845 1.042 1.290 1.660 1.984 2.364 2.626 2.871 3.174 3.390 
120 0.677 0.845 1.041 1.289 1.658 1.980 2.358 2.617 2.860 3.160 3.373 
 0.674 0.842 1.036 1.282 1.645 1.960 2.326 2.576 2.807 3.090 3.291 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Student's_t-distribution: Accessed 20.05.2010 
 
 
Calculation of the critical values of the t-student distribution at different p-values 
 
Degrees of freedom =33               p-value=5.5%               critical value of t-test =-1.642         t-test statistic (calculated) = -1.64084    
Degrees of freedom =33               p-value=5.6%               critical value of t-test =-1.632         t-test statistic (calculated) = -1.64084    
 
Degrees of freedom =34               p-value=6%               critical value of t-test =-1.595            t-test statistic (calculated) = -1.56218    
Degrees of freedom =34               p-value=6.4%            critical value of t-test =-1.560            t-test statistic (calculated) = -1.56218 
Degrees of freedom =34               p-value=6.5%            critical value of t-test =-1.552            t-test statistic (calculated) = -1.56218  
 
Source: http: //www.stattrek.com/Tables/T.aspx.   Accessed 10.10.2010 






Appendix 5:  Data  
 
 
Year               GDP        M2       EXCHAR        CPI          DINTEREST 
 
1996I    92.88   62.13     305.16 70.90       18.30 
1996II   99.10   64.58     307.14 71.10       18.23 
1996III  105.98   66.60     306.94 74.40       18.06 
1996IV   113.70   68.87     307.42 76.33       18.44 
1997I    130.81   74.14     305.35 77.63       16.55 
1997II   138.27   84.29     301.67 78.40       16.13 
1997III  144.51   81.11     299.65 81.43       17.31 
1997IV   149.70   88.60     304.13 88.10       16.22 
1998I    153.06   85.45     307.25 88.77       16.04 
1998II   156.19   82.66     309.30 89.27       15.87 
1998III  158.31   84.18     315.44 86.20       14.88 
1998IV   159.65   91.99     325.17 84.47       17.13 
1999I    154.97   102.79   332.73 84.90       15.88 
1999II   156.51   103.04   335.24 83.93       16.10 
1999III  158.99   107.38   334.18 85.00       16.32 
1999IV   162.69   102.51   342.67 86.00       16.84 
2000I    171.73   103.80   362.87         86.23       15.59 
2000II   175.85   109.72   379.39         86.93       16.85 
2000III  179.17   107.36   405.45         88.57       16.43 
2000IV   181.97   119.39   425.22         91.47       16.99 
2001I    182.04   122.17    433.65        92.03       16.93 
2001II   184.28   127.75    439.91        91.13       15.83 
2001III  186.47   125.32     444.86       90.90       18.21 
2001IV   188.92   130.69     456.52       91.07       17.29 
2002I    186.32   129.70     460.78       91.20       16.46 






Year               GDP        M2       EXCHAR        CPI          DINTEREST 
 
2002III  197.57   135.30           482.01         93.53     16.24 
2002IV   206.41   144.31           502.01         95.80     15.64 
2003I    222.07   143.25           513.80         96.87     15.93 
2003II   233.14     145.89         531.69         98.87     16.25 
2003III  244.19     158.31         550.98         100.83     15.49 
2003IV   255.56    167.53          570.24         103.43     16.30 
2004I    266.99    162.41 582.43         107.24     15.90 
2004II   278.61    161.28 579.73         109.82     15.94 
2004III  290.11    167.25 576.23         113.56      15.90 
2004IV   301.95    187.23 568.84         117.18      16.21 
2005I    311.30    190.84 562.92         120.06      16.31 
2005II   324.30    202.11 556.99         122.70      15.36 
2005III  338.07    200.90 554.44         123.39      15.54 
2005IV   353.15    218.37 553.73         122.49      15.90 
2006I    371.60    220.07 553.86         128.01      15.45 
2006II   387.73    237.64 552.04         132.81      15.58 
2006III  403.56    254.15 551.29         134.84      16.23 
2006IV   419.72    285.65 550.01         136.24      16.20 
2007I    455.62    277.12 547.87         143.08      15.99 
2007II   463.69    306.41 546.37         144.33      15.90 
2007III  463.53    331.43 547.89         145.81      16.06 
2007IV   455.71    370.07 545.12         146.86      15.95 
2008I    462.24    363.58 543.89         152.77      16.06 
2008II   463.52    371.37 543.35         163.02      16.24 
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